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 Case studies where both scarcity and conflict are present have dominated research 
on the nexus between environmental scarcity and conflict.  This dissertation offers a 
quantitative analysis of the effect changes in water resources have on domestic conflict in 
42 Sub-Saharan African nations which differ across the dependent variable, domestic 
conflict, and which vary across the explanatory environmental variables.  This research 
advances the discussion of the causal effects of environmental scarcity and degradation 
on domestic conflict in four ways.  It grounds the domestic conflict-environmental 
degradation discussion in the civil and social conflict literature; research on 
environmental security concludes that environmental change is most likely to play a role 
in domestic conflicts but research on domestic conflict typically does not include 
environmental variables.  This quantitative study addresses a methodological 
  
shortcoming of earlier research, limited variation across the variable measuring water 
resource availability, by testing an alternative means of operationalizing water resources 
using annual precipitation data weighted by land area and population and weighted by 
land area and gross national product.  This study introduces additional variation on the 
dependent variable and compares the results of a dichotomous variable with the results of 
a dependent variable with categorical coding based on the States in Armed Conflict 
Database.  This research extends the scope of explanatory variables to include indicators 
for political institutions and their capacity to manage the water resources within their 
national boundaries. 
 The findings support and extend previous conclusions that water resources 
contribute to civil conflict and demonstrate that the use of precipitation data weighted by 
land area and population, a variable with variation, is a correlate for water resource 
availability, a static variable; and thereby providing results that are more reliable.  This 
correlate advances the environment-conflict discourse by more directly linking the data 
that describes the natural world to the social changes to which those natural phenomenon 
are purported to relate.  This study also finds that institutional capacity to manage water 
resources creates opportunities for rent-seeking but that open political institutions 
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Chapter 1: The Research Question and Why It Is Important 
Introduction 
 African nations lack generally accepted institutional norms for either the 
distribution of state goods and services or executive transfer.  Sub-Saharan Africa 
consistently ranks at or near the bottom in comparisons with other world regions and 
Sub-Saharan African nations frequently occupy the bottom-most places in many 
measures of social well-being.  Regardless of the measure of human development, Sub-
Saharan African nations occupy those positions representing the lowest end of the 
measurement scale.  Each of these factors, institutional norms for the distribution of state 
goods and services and for or executive transfer, measures of social well-being, and 
measure of human development, is associated with increased likelihood of civil conflict. 
 Many African nations are among the least developed nations in the world; none is 
an industrialized nation, and development in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether measured by 
changes in social conditions, economic performance or political conditions, consistently 
lags behind other geopolitical regions.  Civil conflicts have occurred with remarkable 
frequency in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Case studies where both scarcity and conflict are 
present have dominated research on the nexus between environmental scarcity and 
conflict, yet scholars of conflict have produced very few longitudinal, large-N studies of 
intrastate conflict focusing on regional differences and even fewer have looked 
specifically at Africa.  Those that have considered Africa did not include the range of 
political, economic, and social variables that prior studies have shown to be effective 




 This dissertation offers a quantitative analysis of the effect changes in water 
resources have on domestic conflict in 42 Sub-Saharan African nations which differ 
across the dependent variable, domestic conflict, and which vary across the explanatory 
environmental variables.  This research advances the discussion of the causal effects of 
environmental scarcity and degradation on domestic conflict in four ways.  It grounds the 
domestic conflict-environmental degradation discussion in the civil and social conflict 
literature; research on environmental security concludes that environmental change is 
most likely to play a role in domestic conflicts but research on domestic conflict typically 
does not include environmental variables.  This quantitative study addresses a 
methodological shortcoming of earlier research, limited variation across the variable 
measuring water resource availability, by testing an alternative means of operationalizing 
water resources using annual precipitation data weighted by land area and population.  
This study introduces additional variation on the dependent variable and compares the 
results of a dichotomous variable with the results of a dependent variable with categorical 
coding based on the States in Armed Conflict Database.  This research extends the scope 
of explanatory variables to include indicators for political institutions and their capacity 
to manage the water resources within their national boundaries. 
 Depravation and grievance were the basis for the first quantitative studies on 
environmental resources and conflict; these works began with a priori assumptions that 
the independent variable of interest was resource scarcity.  Studies since then have 
challenged these findings and put forth an alternate claim that the variable of interest is 
not scarce natural resources but an abundance of natural resources.  However, the two 




ways.  The grievance work is based on a conception of environment taken from the 
environmental community, one in which natural resources are communal and not easily 
exploitable.  The greed work conceives of the environment as an economic good or a 
marketable product, items extracted from the earth that have value in the marketplace 
such as diamonds, oil, and timber.  This study will attempt to reconcile those differences 
by asking three broad questions: Do environmental variables enhance our understanding 
of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa?  Under what circumstances?  And, by what 
means? 
 The evidence of a connection between the environment and conflict is not well-
established; hence the first question is necessary to confirm that the alleged causal 
relationship is present in the assembled data for Sub-Saharan Africa.  The initial piece to 
the puzzle is to ascertain whether the addition of any of the measures of environmental 
change produce a better-fitting model and then to refine that piece by exploring whether 
the connection between environment and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa exists for 
scarcity alone, abundance alone, or both together.  Having established that environmental 
change matters in Sub-Saharan African civil conflicts, the study next turns to solve the 
puzzle by questioning the circumstances under which these changes matter, looking 
specifically at levels of conflict, thresholds of scarcity and a difference between Cold 
War and the Post Cold War periods.  Finally, this study will take a closer look at the 
manner in which political systems and ecosystems interact to cause domestic conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa through a close examination of institutional actors that mediate 




 Water resource availability has a discernable causal effect on civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa but the direction of the relationship was counter to expectations; increased 
water availability is associated with increased conflict, not less as expected.  These 
findings are counterintuitive because they support a mobilization-based conflict theory 
rather than supporting a grievance-based theory of conflict.  Increased water resource 
availability reduces opportunity costs of the would-be rebel to participating in violence 
against the state by creating conditions of a surplus labor force in search of a source of 
income.   
 This study found that water resources affecting the incidence of higher-level 
conflics by looking at a 35-year time span we learn that it is sufficient or abundant water 
resource availability, rather than scarce resources that affects the likelihood of conflict 
and that environmental change, and specifically changes in per capita water resource 
availability have only a very small explanatory power on low-level conflict over the 
longer time frame.  The results of this study cannot confirm the hypothesis that scarcity 
must reach a threshold before increasing the probability of conflict but do find that 
abundance reduces the likelihood of conflict.  While natural and physical scientists have 
concluded that humans are fundamentally altering the earth’s biological and geophysical 
systems beyond the thresholds within which these systems can readily adapt, this study 
concludes that water resources have not yet reached a level of scarcity across enough of 
the continent sufficient to be detected above the existing long-term variation. 
 This study concludes that institutional capacity alone, be it the capacity to manage 
water resources or maintaining a political system that is open to the participation of all of 




allows for the chief executive to be selected openly and from a wide section of society 
reduces the likelihood of conflict, the capacity to manage irrigated cropland indicates an 
increased likelihood of conflict as the benefits of this more productive land are directed to 
a narrow segment of society. 
 The indirect mechanisms explored as mediators between the environment and 
conflict also provided weak evidence to suggest that institutions mediate between water 
resources and conflict.  There was no evidence that environmental stressors such as 
drought or floods exacerbate existing political weaknesses,  Nor was there evidence that 
the extent to which individuals in society are able to express options without fear of 
interference by the government has any effect on the relationship between water 
resources and conflict or that open political institutions mediate the effect of precipitation 
by increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in violent action against the state.  The 
contradictory findings between the effect of irrigated agriculture on the one hand and 
civil liberties and executive recruitment on the other provide evidence that the 
relationship between water resources, and the environment more generally, institutional 
capacity and civil conflict are complex.  
 Studies of the environment conflict interrelationship have not succeeded in 
specifying well the manner in which the environment matters to civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The findings of this study provide additional insights into the 
mechanisms by which environmental change, and water resources in particular, affects 
the likelihood of conflict.  It has concluded that water resource availability has a 
discernable causal effect on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and that increasing 




preferencing a mobilization-based theory of conflict over a grievance-based theory of 
conflict.  Finally, these results indicate that nations that are able to establish, implement, 
and enforce political and economic policies such as those to control or direct economic 
growth, reduce poverty, and adapt to changing water resource availability are less likely 
to experience conflict. 
The Puzzle 
 African nations lack generally accepted institutional norms for either the 
distribution of state goods and services or executive transfer.  Sub-Saharan Africa 
consistently ranks at or near the bottom in comparisons with other world regions and 
Sub-Saharan African nations frequently occupy the bottom-most places in many 
measures of social well-being.  Regardless of the measure of human development, Sub-
Saharan African nations occupy those positions representing the lowest end of the 
measurement scale.  Each of these factors, institutional norms for the distribution of state 
goods and services and for or executive transfer, measures of social well-being, and 
measure of human development, is associated with increased likelihood of civil conflict 
and will be examined in more detail below.  Furthermore, this detailed exposition will 
reveal the need for a closer examination of the factors of conflict specific to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 Many African nations are among the least developed nations in the world; none is 
an industrialized nation, and development in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether measured by 
changes in social conditions, economic performance or political conditions, consistently 
lags behind other geopolitical regions.  Civil conflicts have occurred with remarkable 




longitudinal, large-N studies of intrastate conflict focusing on regional differences and 
even fewer have looked specifically at Africa.  Those that have considered Africa did not 
include the range of political, economic, and social variables that prior studies have 
shown to be effective predictors of conflict and have not considered environmental 
variables at all. 
 Natural and physical scientists have concluded that humans are fundamentally 
altering the earth’s biological and geophysical systems beyond the thresholds within 
which these systems can readily adapt (Turner et al. 1990, Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 2007b, National Academy of Science 2001).  Social scientists suggest 
that these changes have the potential to lead to economic decline, social instability, and 
conflict (Gleditsch 1998, Homer-Dixon 1994, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 1998).  The prevalence of intrastate conflict world-wide rose throughout the Cold 
War then declined during the Post-Cold War years.  Intrastate conflict in Africa has 
mirrored the global pattern however, it has declined much more slowly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than across the balance of the globe.  Conflict on the continent accounted for 
approximately one third of all intrastate conflicts in 1990, by 2000 Africa was the 
location of approximately half of global intrastate conflicts, and by 2005 approximately 
two thirds of global intrastate conflicts occurred on the African continent (Marshall and 
Gurr 2005). 
 Choucri and North (1975) and Timberlake and Tinker (1985), the earliest 
researchers to consider environmental change as a cause of conflict, suggested a causal 
trail leading from the destruction of environmental resources disrupting economic and 




centers, fighting between nomads and farmers, guerrilla movements, and revolutions.  
The cumulative evidence suggests that the link between domestic conflict and ecological 
scarcity is detectable but weak  (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, Homer-Dixon 1999, Ross 
2004, Kahl 2006).  Researchers have provided little evidence beyond educated 
speculation that environmental changes could lead to more conflict in the future.  
Combined, these provide both a sufficient basis as well as a compelling need for 
additional research on the complex nature of the interrelationship between environmental 
change and domestic conflict. 
 Depravation and grievance were the basis for the first quantitative studies on 
environmental resources and conflict; these works began with a priori assumptions that 
the independent variable of interest was resource scarcity.  Studies since then have 
challenged these findings and put forth an alternate claim that the variable of interest is 
not scarce natural resources but an abundance of natural resources.  However, the two 
groups of researchers have operationalized the environment in significantly different 
ways.  The grievance work is based on a conception of environment taken from the 
environmental community, one in which natural resources are communal and not easily 
exploitable.  The greed work conceives of the environment as an economic good or a 
marketable product, items extracted from the earth that have value in the marketplace 
such as diamonds, oil, and timber.  This study will attempt to reconcile those differences 
by asking three broad questions: Do environmental variables enhance our understanding 





 The evidence of a connection between the environment and conflict is not well-
established; hence the first question is necessary to confirm that the alleged causal 
relationship is present in the assembled data for Sub-Saharan Africa.  The initial piece to 
the puzzle is to ascertain whether the addition of any of the measures of environmental 
change produce a better-fitting model and then to refine that piece by exploring whether 
the connection between environment and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa exists for 
scarcity alone, abundance alone, or both together.  Having established that environmental 
change matters in Sub-Saharan African civil conflicts, the study next turns to solve the 
puzzle by questioning the circumstances under which these changes matter, looking 
specifically at levels of conflict, thresholds of scarcity and a difference between Cold 
War and the Post Cold War periods.  Finally, this study will take a closer look at the 
manner in which political systems and ecosystems interact to cause domestic conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa through a close examination of institutional actors that mediate 
between environmental change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 This study is organized as follows.  The remainder of Chapter 1 sets forth the case 
for focusing the research on Sub-Saharan Africa.  Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
existing discourses on civil conflict, and environment and conflict; it concludes with an 
assessment of gaps in knowledge and the questions that this study will raise to fill those 
gaps.  Chapter 3 lays out methodology, including variables and tests, that will employed 
to answer the raised questions.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the statistical models and  
discusses the implications of the results and the extent to which those findings confirm or 
fail to confirm the stated hypotheses.  Chapter 5 draws conclusions based on the findings 




Why Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Civil conflicts have occurred and continue to occur throughout the world.  Some 
may be more violent, civil wars in El Salvador between 1979 and 1990 and in the 
Balkans between 1991 and 2001 can be characterized by their brutality.  There are 
conflicts that have endured longer than some African nations have existed as independent 
states; Northern Ireland is one example.  Many African nations are among the least 
developed nations in the world and none is an industrialized nation.  Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, whether measured by changes in social conditions, economic 
performance or political conditions, consistently lags behind other geopolitical regions.  
This development policy can be partly attributed to past conflicts, which have hindered 
states from developing as leaders have used state funds for security rather than social 
needs such as education, medical clinics, or agricultural development (Ayittey 1999, 
Henderson 2000). 
 Sub-Saharan Africa comprises the 42 nations located south of the Sahara Desert 
on the continental land mass and seven island nations.  While frequently referred to as a 
group, implying homogeneity, each nation has a unique political system, a unique 
economy, and very different natural resource endowments.  The Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Zaire) harbored one of the world’s notorious kleptocrats yet Botswana has been a 
strongly democratic nation since its independence in 1966.  Ghana has embraced 
structural adjustment policies with a great deal of success yet the same types of externally 





 Civil conflicts have occurred with remarkable frequency in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
yet scholars of conflict have produced very few longitudinal, large-N studies of intrastate 
conflict focusing on regional differences (Henderson 2000, Hegre et al. 1997, Henderson 
and Singer 2000) and even fewer have looked specifically at Africa.  Those that have 
considered Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 1998) did not include a full complement of 
political, economic, and social variables, let alone environmental variables. 
 African nations lack generally accepted institutional norms for either the 
distribution of state goods and services or executive transfer.  The SIPRI Yearbook in 
1999 identified Africa as the only region in the world where armed conflict is on the rise 
(cited in Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).  While Collier and Hoeffler found no difference in 
the incidence of conflict between Africa and the rest of the world over the entire period of 
their study, 1965-1999, the patterns among the independent variables for African nations 
were substantially different from the rest of the world.  Average per capita income and 
average annual growth in GDP were significantly lower in African nations than in non-
African nations; African nations are more heterogeneous than non-African nations.  
These differences helped to explain why, during the Post-Cold War era, the incidence of 
conflict within African states has been greater than intrastate conflict in the rest of the 
world (Marshall and Gurr 2005). 
Conflict since Independence 
Those looking at Sub-Saharan African nations from the outside perceive them to 
be subject to frequent internal conflicts.  This perception has been a part of the western 
world’s impression of the continent since its first encounters with altercations between 




occasionally armed and occasionally protracted, for independence; frequent coups and 
civil conflict (Reader 1997, Thomson 2000). 
A burial ground in Sudan is the location of one of the earliest sites with evidence 
of conflict in the world and dates to 14,000 to 12,000 years ago.  The location of flints, 
the direction of the arrowheads, and size of skeletal remains substantiate conclusions that 
the deaths were violent and without regard for sex or age (Reader 1997).  Several West 
African empires thrived during the medieval period in Europe, including the Ghana 
Empire, the Mali Empire and the Songhai Empire.  These great African empires rose by 
conquering neighboring tribes and controlling trade in resources such as gold and salt, 
each subsequently fell when others, in turn, conquered them to control the flow of trade 
and the wealth that could thereby be gained (Jackson 1993).   
African tribes continued their opposition to and defiance of external rule 
throughout the colonial period.  To illustrate: Khosians mounted armed resistance to early 
Dutch settlers in the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century and Xhosa rebelled against 
British settlers in the early Nineteenth Century.  The Maji-Maji rebellion erupted in 
German East Africa in 1905 when African laborers received only a fraction of promised 
wages for laboring in cotton fields (Tordoff 2002).   
Several African nations also engaged in protracted and violent conflict to gain 
independence.  Three Portuguese colonies, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, all 
mounted armed rebellions against the Salazar regime beginning in 1961, 1963 and 1964, 
respectively; the struggles for independence continued through 1974 in Angola and 
Guinea-Bissau and continued through 1975 in Mozambique.  Independence in Angola 




and non-Marxist oriented factions that had fought for independence with each group 
supported by the respective superpower. 
Since 1980, three quarters of the continent’s nations have experienced armed 
conflict.  In 2000, two thirds of the people worldwide who died as a direct result of armed 
conflict were in Africa.  Between 1960 and 2006 African nations experienced 85 coups 
d’état, 129 attempted but failed coups and 102 reported coup plots.  These have been 
widely experienced; thirty states have had at least one successful coup and eighteen have 
experienced more than one.  Only nine states have seen no attempted or successful 
episodes of military intervention and three of those have achieved independence only 
since 1990.  Frequently cited causes include perceived inequities among societal groups 
as a result of state-building and economic development activities (Henderson 1998) and 
the prospect of engaging in rent seeking behavior (Bayart in McGowan 2003). 
 Cultural difference is a common causal variable in numerous studies of African 
conflict.  It is grounded in common values and behaviors, often rooted in the religion, 
customs, or ideology that a group shares as part of its collective identity.  In Africa, that 
collective identity is typically linked to ethnicity or tribal origin.1  These cultural factors 
                                                 
1 Nomenclature for African identity groups is problematic in a context where the nation-
state is the standard reference point.  “Tribe” is a term based in colonialism and carries 
with it the negative connotation of a backward, traditional, and rural society.  Ethnicity 
has become more widely used in the post-colonial period and, although initially 
associated with modern and urban identities, has come to refer to collective identity 
relationships more broadly.  Connotations notwithstanding, both terms refer to the same 
concept: the culture as a whole, including a shared language, history, geography, and 
demography.  In the Western context, the terms nation and state generally, although not 
universally, connote that meaning well; the same does not hold true on a continent where 
states are artificially imposed constructs with little or no relation to groupings of people 




interact with other social, political and economic factors in myriad ways to contribute to 
conflicts (Henderson 1998 and Mkandawire 2002). 
 Resources have been a factor in conflicts from time immemorial; they are no less 
important to African conflicts in the late twentieth century and their influence on these 
conflicts takes many different forms (Gleick 1993b and 2003).  European nations 
colonized the African continent in a quest to control access to its many natural resources, 
which fueled industrial expansion in both Europe and the Americas.  African natural 
resources have played an important part in the tremendous industrialization and growth in 
the western world since then, including timber from the rainforests of western Africa, 
metals and ores from central and southern African nations, and more recently oil from 
Nigeria.  These resources have also contributed to conflicts that have arisen within 
nations both as conflicts over control of the resources themselves and as conflicts that 
have arisen because the revenues from the sale of those resources have been unevenly 
redistributed within the nation.  Prominent examples of the former include Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Nigeria, and Democratic Republic of the Congo while Nigeria is the preeminent 
example of the latter.  Access to water is increasingly a common source of tension among 
groups in African societies, particularly between nomadic herders and farmers.  In a 
recent incident, farmers and herders in Kenya fought over access to water during a period 
of drought when farmers allegedly diverted water for irrigation, reducing the quantity 
available for nomadic herds (BBC News, 2005; The East African Standard, 2005; UN 
Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2005). 
 Regardless of the causal path, conflict in Africa is about control of governmental 




1999).  Africans have a deeply rooted cultural norm of relying upon the extended family 
in times of need and providing aid in times of surplus.  This norm may work adequately 
in a local setting, but it dies not well to an increasingly urbanized and diverse 
environment of national and more recently international political realms.2  The 
subsistence societies of Sub-Saharan Africa commonly practice mutual assistance: I help 
my brother’s family today because tomorrow my crop may fail and I will be in need of 
help myself.  When this expectation of mutual assistance is taken to the extreme, 
however, a member of the family who has great success in an urban center also finds that 
the extended rural family continues to grow and with it continued expectations to support 
even more family members. 
 This model of family relations carries over to the political sphere in the form of 
patronage.  Governments, through licensing, contracts, and, in states where industries 
were nationalized, parastatal organizations, controlled access to these economic inputs 
necessary for entrepreneurial development by dispensing them to loyal supporters.3   
Patronage systems evolved, often along ethnic lines, as the means by which those in 
control of government resources disburse them.  Because patronage systems are, by 
nature, inequitable, the disenfranchised may resort to violence to demand a more 
equitable redistribution of government resources. 
                                                 
2  The effect is not unlike that of a mega-jackpot lottery winner.  Once a winner’s identity 
becomes public, family and friends, known intimately or only distantly, appear with 
requests for assistance based on the assumption that the most fortunate of the family have 
an obligation to share their wealth with their kinsman. 
3 Loyal supporters, loosely defined, may include those in a recognized patron-client 
relationship; they may also include those who present a government official with an 




 The African colonial experience was not a model in democratic norms that, once 
independent, political leaders could emulate, and, as a result, African states had no 
experience in an orderly and peaceful change in governments.  Military coups or civil 
strife rather than democratic elections were the dominant means of political succession 
for much of the period under study.  While the fractionalization in African societies 
generally occurs along ethnopolitical lines, the root causes are not generally based in 
ethnic differences, rather, ethnic identity is a common bond around which organizers are 
able to mobilize groups to demand redress of grievances.  By better understanding the 
nature of conflict on the continent scholars will provide policy-makers with better tools to 
prevent or resolve African conflicts.  The following discussion provides details on a wide 
range of indicators, both as background and to set the context for focusing on Sub-
Saharan Africa.  As will be discussed in later chapters, many of these same indicators 
have been shown to be indicators of civil conflict. 
Social Indicators 
 Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, consistently ranks at or near the bottom in 
comparisons with other world regions on indicators of social well-being and human 
development.  Furthermore, Sub-Saharan African nations frequently occupy the bottom-
most places in comparison with other nations on these same measures of social well-
being and human development.  The discussion here highlights indicators for food 
production, health, demography and education. 
Food Production 
 Despite crop, food, and cereal production index increases consistent with world 




(2000-2002), measured as value added per worker in 1995 $US.  Food production has 
increased since 1960 but not as rapidly as other regions of the world.  Between 1980 and 
2000, per capita food production grew by 2.3% annually in Asia and 0.9% in Latin 
America.  During the same time period food production in Sub-Saharan Africa declined 
by 0.01% per year.  Despite increasing volume in food production, African nations are 
failing to keep up with population pressures and, as a result per capita food production is 
declining.  (United Nations Development Program 2006) 
Disease 
 Sub-Saharan Africa is home to approximately 10% of the world’s population but 
over two thirds of the world’s people living with HIV reside here.  Approximately 26 
million Africans are infected with HIV/Aids, 7.2% of the adult population (UNAIDS 
2007).  Even the success stories of Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe, where adult 
prevalence is declining, fail to provide much to celebrate.  While prevalence is declining, 
these nations still have significant proportions of the population infected and Zimbabwe’s 
infection levels are among the highest in the world.  South Africa has more people living 
with HIV than any other in the world and only about 15% of the 5.5 million affected 
receive antiretroviral drugs. 
 Malaria is endemic to 46 countries on the African continent, only Lesotho is 
malaria-free.  Approximately 60% of the world’s malaria cases and over 90% of the 
deaths attributable to malaria occur in Africa, virtually all in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Children under 5 years of age account for three-quarters of those deaths and malaria was 
the principle cause of nearly 20% of all deaths in children under 5 years of age (World 




0.6 percent of gross domestic product according to a 2006 survey by the World Health 
Forum (US Department of State 2006). 
Demography 
 Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest infant mortality rate in the world at 103 deaths 
per live 1000 births and has reduced infant mortality the least between 1970 and 2004.  
Other regions have succeeded in reducing this important measure of well-being by half or 
more whereas the Sub-Saharan African decline is less than 30 percent.  Some nations, 
including Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Guinea, Malawi, Gambia, and Senegal, have made 
great strides and reduced infant mortality by 40-50 percent.  Others have made very little 
progress; during the same nearly thirty-year period infant mortality rates fell less than 15 
percent in Botswana and Angola and less than 10 percent in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and 
Rwanda  (World Bank 2004). 
 Life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is similarly far lower than the rest of the 
world.  Between 1970 and 2004 life expectancy on the continent increased by 
approximately 4 months from 45.8 to 46.1 years.  In contrast, life expectancy worldwide 
has increased by 7 years and other regions with a large proportion of low- and middle-
income countries have each seen life expectancy increase by about 10 years.  There is, 
however, great disparity among the individual countries.  Several nations have seen life 
expectancy fall precipitously, 20 years in Botswana, 18 years in Zimbabwe, 17 years in 
Swaziland, and 13 years in Zambia, in part due to their high incidence of AIDS.  Other 
nations have made great progress in extending life expectancy despite AIDS; the Gambia, 
Senegal and Guinea have all raised life expectancy by 15-17 years.  In addition, the five 




Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone and Niger, all experienced modest increases in life 
expectancy during this period ranging from 3.5 to 10 years (United Nations Development 
Program 2006). 
 Population growth rates in Africa are among the highest in the world.  While 
other world regions have seen their growth rates slow, Africa, as a whole, has not had the 
same experience.  Growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa climbed from a range around 
2.5% per year continent-wide in the 1960’s as most nations were gaining independence to 
peak at over 3.0% per year in the early 1980s.  The Sub Saharan annual population 
growth rate for the two decades 1975-2004 was 2.7% per year and is projected to be 2.2% 
per year for the subsequent decade, a rate that is faster than other parts of the world and 
faster than the world as a whole.  Only the Arab states have comparable growth rates.  
Both HIV and civil conflicts have contributed to a slowing of these rates more recently.  
Of the nations noted in the discussion above on HIV, South Africa saw an annual 2.1% 
growth rate between 1975 and 2004 but is expected to experience only 0.1% growth 
annually from 2004-2015.  Côte d’Ivoire is projected to see its 3.4% growth rate cut in 
half to 1.7% and Zimbabwe is projected to see its population growth rate drop from 2.5% 
to 0.6%.  Of the nations with high HIV rates, only Kenya is not projected to experience a 
dramatic reduction in its population growth rate, although it is projected to drop from 
3.1% to 2.5%.  A few nations are even projected to see negative growth rates: Botswana 
(-0.4%), Swaziland (-0.4%), and Lesotho (-0.3%).  A few Sub-Saharan nations will see 
their populations grow faster than their historic rates: Burundi at 3.4 percent compared 
with a historic rate on 2.4 percent and Eritrea at 2.9 percent compared to a historic rate of 





 Literacy rates have risen throughout the world, but African literacy rates have 
risen more slowly than other regions.  Between 1990 and 2004, adult literacy has 
increased by 7.8 percentage points in Africa, from 55.5% in 1990 to 63.3% in 2004, 
while other world regions have experienced increases of 11-20 percentage points.  South 
Asia’s literacy rate of 60.9% remains lower than Sub-Saharan Africa’s, but South Asia’s 
rate of increase is about 50% greater than Sub-Saharan Africa’s and is expected to soon 
surpass Sub-Saharan Africa, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa at the bottom of the list.  As 
with other social indicators, there are differences within the continent.  Equatorial 
Guinea, South Africa, Namibia, and Lesotho all have adult literacy rates of greater than 
80%; at the other extreme, there are 10 nations with adult literacy rates less than 50%, the 
least literate being Mali at 19.0%.  Sudan, Mauritania, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and the Central African Republic all experienced literacy rate gains of 15 
percentage points or greater and Burundi experienced a 22.2 percentage point increase.  
Meanwhile Chad, Ghana and Zambia all experienced losses of -2.0, -0.6 and -0.4 
percentage points, respectively (United Nations Development Program 2006). 
Sanitation 
 As a whole, Sub-Saharan Africa made little progress between 1990 and 2004 in 
providing its population with access to an improved water source.  Only 8% more people 
had access to safe drinking water at the end of that 14-year period than at the beginning.  
As the continent started the 21st century, a little more than half of the population had 
access to an improved water source.  All other regions of the less developed world report 




lowest proportion is East Asia and the Pacific at 79% in 2004.  Access to improved 
sanitation is even lower across the developing world.  Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
both stand at 37% of the population with access to improved sanitation; however, Sub-
Saharan Africa made far less progress in bringing sanitation to its population.  In the 
years between 1990 and 2004, it increased the proportion of the population with access to 
this necessity by only 5% while South Asia improved by 19%, more than doubling the 
proportion of its population with access to improved sanitation (United Nations 
Development Program 2006). 
 Some of the social indicators discussed above have been directly linked to conflict 
and many others interact with additional factors to contribute to civil conflict; those 
linkages will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.  Regardless of the measure of 
human development, this discussion has demonstrated that Sub-Saharan African nations 
have the ignoble honor of occupying, indeed nearly monopolizing, those positions 
representing the lowest end of the measurement scale.  For these reasons, a closer 
examination of the factors of conflict specific to Sub-Saharan Africa is warranted. 
Political Stability and Capacity to Govern 
 Polity scores are an indicator of a nation’s stability and its ability to exercise the 
authority inherent in its recognition as a sovereign nation.  In 1980, the approximate 
midpoint between independence and 2000, the terminal year of this study, only three 
Sub-Saharan African nations scored in the top third of the 21-point Polity scale4 whereas 
30 scored in the bottom third; by 2000 only two nations scored in the top third of the 
                                                 





scale and only two scored in the bottom third of that scale, indicating improvement from 
those states on the authoritarian end of the scale but also indicating some backsliding by 
some states on the democratic end of the scale. 
 African states are qualitatively different from the Westphalian assumptions about 
what constitutes a modern, sovereign state (Jackson 1990); they lack the internal 
legitimacy and the institutions necessary to exercise their claimed authority to regulate 
the use of natural resources within their territory.  African states, in general, are not truly 
sovereign according to Jackson’s argument, yet “…modern states claim sovereignty over 
land and natural resources within their territorial boundaries and thus sole authority to 
regulate their use” (Neumann 2005, 121). 
 Their legitimacy is conferred by external others, including states and international 
organizations such as the UN, rather than derived internally from the capacity to exercise 
fundamental state privileges such as exercising control over territory and defending the 
state against aggression.  New states admitted into the international order as quasi-states 
ultimately “…would have to make good on their claims to sovereignty, through the 
development of effective domestic economies and political institutionalism or else the 
inadequacies of their statehood would be revealed” (Clapham 1998, 146).  Sub-Saharan 
African nations and their leaders generally emerged at independence with popular 
support internally and expectations, both internally and externally, that they would 
translate their status as quasi-states into fully sovereign nations and members of the 
international political system.  That initial, popular support quickly eroded when leaders 
took paths of political development that included favoritism, corruption, and dictatorship.  




participation among or between interest groups or ethnic groups hitherto repressed or 
favored by colonial rulers, each expecting to advance or protect its sectional claims and 
concerns (Davidson 1978).  When that happened, other groups from within and outside 
the state challenged the externally conferred authority to exercise sovereignty and, in 
some cases, established the required institutions, including those necessary to manage the 
resources within that portion of the nation’s territory over which they lay a claim of 
sovereignty. 
 Because of Sub-Saharan African insurgent and rebel movements’ success in 
controlling territory, providing services, and establishing institutions commonly 
associated with a state, the quasi-state moniker can also be applied to these groups.  
These groups often controlled a significant percentage of the territory outside the capital 
and with it the economic benefits of the resources contained therein.  The Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front controlled the territory that would eventually become Eritrea to 
such a degree that Ethiopian forces control was limited to Asmara and effectively 
governed the majority of the population.  UNITA in Angola and the NFPL in Liberia 
both controlled sizeable portions of their respective countries, set up governing 
institutions, and traded commodities such as iron ore, diamonds, rubber, and timber on 
the international markets to finance their operations, both insurgent and governmental 
(Clapham 1998). 
 In the Post Cold War years, this blurring of the lines between the internationally 
recognized state that exerts little power outside of the capital and the insurgent and illegal 
state that provides protection and defense, as well as exerts control over the economic 




exercised state-like functions as equivalent to a state and to offer both recognized 
governments and rebel groups aspiring to be governments the privileges afforded to 
states: a seat at the negotiation table, a role to play in the post-conflict government, as 
well as access to humanitarian and international aid.  In some cases, the states themselves 
have conducted their business in such a way that they appear to the international system 
to be no different from an insurgency; Clapham (1998) presents these cases, using Idi 
Amin and Jean-Bédal Bokassa as examples, as privatized states whereas William Reno 
(1995) likens similar cases to shadow states.  For both authors the distinguishing 
characteristics are the use of public resources for personal gain and the conducting of the 
state’s affairs as though the sovereign nation were the leader’s personal property. 
 Understanding who controls the state and access to its resources is important to 
understanding who is likely to participate in or be disinterested in and disillusioned by 
political processes.  Throughout the post-independence years, those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa who have controlled the state have often used it as a personal fiefdom to reward 
loyalists, typically comprised of those with family or tribal connections to the ruler, and 
have intentionally designed state institutions to entrench their power and enhance the 
state’s extractive capacities.  Those with access to the state and its institutions maintain 
sole authority to regulate their use.  In Sub-Saharan Africa that regulation has taken the 
extreme form of corruption to an extent that the state has devolved to a point where it is 
often a mere shadow of a state, in some cases collapsed, or near collapse, in some cases 
managed as though it were a privately held empire. 
 Patronage and clientelism was the basis for political and social relationships in 




administrative, in exchange for trust and loyalty in a relationship based in the relative 
power of the two roles.  Alternatively, superiors provided subordinates with protection, 
economic security, or social position in exchange for loyalty, obedience, and service.  
Similar relationships exist between merchants, artisans, and customers; and between 
religious leaders and their followers.  Power in each of these relationships is based in the 
ability of the patron to confer on the client a political, economic, or social good or service 
in the form of administrative positions, social position (upward mobility) or wealth on the 
client and the client’s reciprocal act of loyalty, obedience, or provision of the good to be 
purchased.  Both the pattern of the patron-client relationship and the relative positions of 
the occupants of the roles transferred to post-independence political institutions. 
 Lemarchand (1972) observed that a political system whose structural basis is 
clientelism will ultimately find that clientelism will “…impose serious harm on the 
system’s capacity to innovate” (p. 89).  Some thirty-five years later evidence has proven 
this assertion to be valid.  Sub-Saharan African political systems based in clientelism 
have become dysfunctional.  The political regimes of postcolonial Sub-Saharan African 
are characterized by an individual who is identified with the state, who dominates the 
state, and who perceives himself to be above the law; relationships of loyalty and 
dependence; and bureaucrats who perceive their office as a means to acquire wealth and 
status with little regard for the public good.  Within this system both state elites and 
bureaucratic functionaries use the resources of the state to maintain patronage networks, 
use their official positions to collect illegal rents, and often perceive these actions as 
rightful entitlements of their office.  Such practices are not unique to the African 




Sub-Saharan Africa is their role as the dominant feature of Sub-Saharan African politics 
and the foundation of Sub-Saharan African political institutions.  It is the systematic use 
of clientalism and the rents gained from state resources to ensure political support that 
differentiates Sub-Saharan Africa from other parts of the world where similar corporatist 
and patrimonial behavior is also found. 
 The process used to privatize state enterprises in Uganda serves to illustrate this 
point.  Cronyism, in combination with the use of considerable personal discretion to favor 
those with whom government officials have close political or kinship connections (Tangri 
and Mwenda 2001), occurs at all levels of government from the cabinet minister down to 
the civil servant who processes routine paperwork, for a small fee.  Privatization was 
intended to counter this long-standing means of conducting business.  However, there 
were few mechanisms in place to ensure accountability or transparency in decision-
making and many parastatals, including the Uganda Grain Milling Corporation, the 
ground handling operations at Entebbe International Airport, Uganda Commercial Bank, 
and the Uganda Sheraton, were sold to foreign investors for far less than they were worth.  
The state manipulated privatization so that enterprises were divested into the hands of 
loyal clients and not opponents.  While the state did lose the parastatals as direct tools of 
patronage, it ensured itself a continued measure of control by selling the enterprises to 
loyal clients and thereby used the forced divestiture as means to consolidate political 
power.  Parastatals in private hands, if economically viable, meant revenue and the state 
wanted to retain as much control, albeit indirectly, over that revenue as possible. 
 Failure to demonstrate adequate progress as measured by the Polity scale, a 




dysfunctional structural relationships all support continued investigation into the causes 
of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic Conditions 
In 2001, Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region of the developing world with a 
higher proportion of its population in poverty, defined as per capita GDP of less than $2 
per day, and in extreme poverty, defined as per capita GDP of less than $1 per day, than 
in 1981.  In 1997, approximately one-half of African nations had a per capita GDP of $1 
per day or less and less than one quarter of African nations had a per capita GDP of 
$1000 or more (World Bank 2004).  Between 1981 and 2001, Sub-Saharan African per 
capita GDP decreased by 14%; during the same time period poverty increased from 41% 
to 46% and 140 million more people were in extreme poverty at the end of those two 
decades than at the beginning.  Between 1990 and 2001, the number of people living on 
$1 per day or less declined by 25% in South Asia and 50% in East Asia but grew by 4% 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Even Latin America and the Caribbean, where the numbers in 
poverty and extreme poverty have risen but the proportion in poverty and extreme 
poverty has remained fairly steady over the 20-year period, at 10% and 25% respectively, 
can claim success over Sub-Saharan Africa where both poverty and extreme poverty have 
risen. 
 Foreign direct investment has become an increasingly important source of 
revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially since the end of the Cold War.  African foreign 
direct investment, both in terms of millions of dollars and as a percent of GDP, grew 
considerably from 1990 to 2002; although foreign investments in Africa never 




did surpass the Middle East and South Asian regions.  These trends suggest that some 
Sub-Saharan African nations, in the decade after the end of the Cold War, successfully 
demonstrated themselves as viable locations for investment. 
 In the realm of official, government-to-government assistance, Sub-Saharan 
Africa still eclipses other regions in terms of dollars and as a percent of national income.  
The $19.4 million in official assistance is more than 2.5 times that of the $7.3 million 
sent to East Asia and the Pacific region, the next largest recipient.  Nor does the $7.8 
million in direct investment come close to the $19.4 million in official assistance.  The 
volume of official development assistance, however, suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa 
still relies far more on government-to-government assistance than on direct investment. 
 Primary commodities other than agriculture play an important part in the 
economies of many African nations.  Oil is one of the most important.  Nigeria, whose 
proven reserves have grown from 17.4 billion barrels in 1980 to 36.2 billion barrels in 
2008, is the only Sub-Saharan African nation in the world’s top 20 known reserves, 
which represent 95% of known reserves.  A small number of Sub-Saharan African 
nations have reserves greater than one billion barrels and about as many have known 
reserves less than 1 billion barrels. 
Table 1: Oil Reserves 
(Billion Barrels) 





Congo Brazzaville 1.6 






Table 2: Countries with Fewer than 1 Billion Barrels in 
Reserves 
Benin Ethiopia  
Cameroon Ghana 
Côte d’Ivoire Mauritania 
Congo Kinshasa South Africa 
 
At no time have Sub-Saharan African reserves been more than the 4.3% of world 
reserves they represent in 2008 and, for most of the time between 1980 and 2008, they 
ranged between 2.5% and 3.5% of known world reserves. 
 Other natural resources that comprise a large share of Sub-Saharan African 
nation’s economies are the primary commodities copper, iron ore, bauxite, and diamonds.  
Nations who rely too heavily on these minerals are held hostage to the vagaries of the 
international commodity markets and their price fluctuations.  Zambia has relied heavily 
on copper.  Its production however dropped from more than 675,000 metric tons in 1975 
to 445,000 metric tons in 1990 and held 12 million metric tons of reserves in 1990 
(World Resources Institute 1992).  By 2000 Zambian production had dropped to 250,000 
metric tons (US Geological Survey 2007).  Zaire held 26 million metric tons of reserves 
in 1990 and saw its production decline from more than 460,000 metric tons in 1974 to 
370,000 metric tons by 1990 and to 21,000 metric tons by 2000.  Iron ore has been 
important to the economies of South Africa, Liberia, and Mauritania.  In 1990, South 
Africa had 2,500 million metric tons of iron ore reserves (World Resources Institute 
1992) and in 2000 was producing more than 33 million metric tons of ore (US Geological 
Survey 2007).  Liberia had 500 million metric tons of reserves in 1990 and produced 
4,050,000 metric tons that year but because of conflict in the country was not producing 




Bauxite is important to the Ghanaian economy; in 1990, the nation produced 381,000 
metric tons and in 2000 production was over 500,000 metric tons (World Resources 
Institute 1992 and US Geological Survey 2007).  Diamonds, both industrial and 
gemstone, have been found in several Sub-Saharan African nations and are now an 
important commodity, both legal and smuggled, to Angola, Botswana, Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Congo Kinshasa, Zimbabwe, and Liberia  (US Geological Survey 2007 and 
World Resources Institute 1992). 
 Forestry and forest resources play an important part in the economic vitality of 
many communities and of the nations in eastern, central, and western Africa.  The forests 
account for approximately 6% of GDP in Africa, the highest in the world; that figure 
skyrockets to more than 60% of GDP in western Africa, where timber exports are a vital 
economic resource.  In addition to the export revenue, forest resources provide fuel for 
cooking, particularly among rural households; as well as numerous non-timber products 
such as raw materials for the craft industry, ecotourism destinations, gums and resins, 
honey and beeswax, and medicinal plants.  Export trade in medicinal plants brought a 
combined $65 million annually in the early years of the century to South Africa, Zambia 
and Cameroon. 
Environmental Conditions 
 These social, political, and economic conditions exist in a natural environment of 
either highly variable water resources or very limited water resources.  Over 70% of the 
earth’s surface is covered with water, either in liquid form in oceans, lakes and rivers or 




The first, with the earth in full phase, is a hemispheric shot with the African continent and 
the expanses of South Atlantic, Indian, and Antarctic Oceans.  Note that the proportion of 
land is considerably smaller than the water.  The second image has the pale blue dot of 
earth visible through the rings of Saturn.  The sunlight reflected off the expanse of water 
causes the planet to appear blue from space.   
 
Figure 1: Earth from space, taken by 
Apollo 17 crew.  Source: 
http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap050102.html
 
Figure 2: Earth from Saturn, taken by 




The continuous exchange of water from the oceans and land surfaces comprises 




surfaces is uneven as is its distribution across the temporal sphere; in the same location, it 
can fall in massive quantities at one time and be completely absent at other times.  This 
vast resource also does not frequently exist in a form that is usable to human societies (or 
to most ecosystems).  Only approximately 2.5% of the total volume of 1.4 billion cubic 
kilometers is fresh water, the balance is saline and unusable.  Two thirds of that 2.5% is 
permanently (presumably) frozen as polar icecaps and about 30% is in underground 
aquifers.  The usable portion, about 200,000 cubic kilometers, is less than 1% of the total 
volume.  The minimum water requirements for an individual are 20-50 liters 
(approximately 5-13 gallons per day).  However, the water required to produce the food 
an individual eats each day is about 70 times as much; one kilogram (2.2 lbs.) of a staple 
grain, such as rice or wheat, requires 500 to 4000 liters (100 to 1100 gallons) 
(Rijsberman, Manning, and de Silva 2006). 
Water insecurity encompasses more than mere physical availability.  That which 
is characterized as insecurity or scarcity is often a function of policy decisions and water 
management that preference some users over others; often agricultural uses take 
precedence over the needs of ecosystems or industry.  Security is also a function of risk 
and vulnerability.  A civilization’s or a community’s success in harnessing the potential 
of its water resources is always a determining factor of the extent to which it can succeed 
or thrive (United Nations Development Program 2006, 133-134).  Water insecurity is also 
defined by variability.  In some respects, drought-prone areas are less insecure because 
drought is a part of the area’s variability; therefore, it can be planned for and adapted to.  
In effect, drought remains a serious problem in some Sub-Saharan African regions 




variability.  Drought’s impact on a society has been likened to a slow, debilitating disease 
that takes some time to manifest itself; in contrast, floods are acute and devastating.  The 
floods of 2000 in Mozambique illustrate a flood’s ability to undo the accomplishments of 
many years hard work in a short time (United Nations Development Program 2006, 157). 
 The distribution of water resources across Sub-Saharan Africa is not well-
matched to the distribution of population across the continent.  The availability of water 
across Sub-Saharan Africa varies widely from nation to nation, across seasons and across 
years.  Furthermore, water resources, unlike food or fuel, other factors that are essential 
for a community or civilization to survive and thrive, are not easily moved over long 
distances.  These realities in combination help to explain why Sub-Saharan Africa as 
whole has sufficient water for its population but many individual nations face water 
scarcity and water stress.  Several examples serve to illustrate this point: the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo has more than 20,000 cubic meters per person while Kenya, 
Malawi and South Africa fall below the water stress threshold. 
While Africa does have more water available on a per capita basis than other 
regions of the world, including Europe and Australia, 5720 cubic meters per person per 
year compared with 4230 cubic meters per person per year in Europe and 3920 cubic 
meters per person per year in Australia, its variability in timing and distribution combined 
with the large number of countries experiencing water stress (less than 1667 cubic meters 
of renewable water resources per person per year) or water scarcity (less than 1000 cubic 
meters of renewable water resources per person per year) in 1990 leave Sub-Saharan 
Africa more vulnerable to that variability than other parts of the world. Sub-Saharan 




approximately one quarter of the population lived in a water-stressed country and that 
proportion is projected to rise to 85% by 2025 (United Nations Development Program 
2006, 135-136). 
 Annual precipitation patterns vary greatly across Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
Sahelian region is among the driest: Mauritania received less than 100 mm of 
precipitation annually5, on average during the 20th century, Mali 280 mm and Chad 320 
mm.  In the east, Eritrea saw an average of 390 mm and Kenya 670 mm annually; in the 
south Botswana, averaged 400 mm annually during the 20th century but Equatorial 
Guinea saw an average of 2150 mm.  Tropical west Africa was the wettest area on the 
continent where Liberia received an average of 2380 mm annually and Sierra Leone saw 
an average of 2580 mm annually (Mitchell et al. 2004).  These annual averages disguise 
regional variation within nations and are subject to the placement of rain gauges, which 
may or may not be representative of the climatic variations within each nation. 
 Available water resources come not only from precipitation but also from 
international rivers.  Africa stands out as having more international river basins than any 
other continent, at 60 and has six basins shared by five or more states, more than any 
other region.  Most nations have access to only a single river basin and all of the major 
river basins are shared among three to ten nations.  Most African river basins are 
characterized by an annual climatic cycle that alternates seasons of rainfall with seasons 
of drought.  African societies have succeeded by adapting to such large variations in 
water supply.  Nevertheless, these natural variations make African nations vulnerable to 
                                                 




the effects of extreme drought, and more recently, flooding as agricultural areas 
traditionally reserved for recession agriculture are converted to irrigated crop land. 
 The agricultural sector typically consumes more water than any other sector and 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, however 
that sector is predominately subsistence agriculture.  In the late 1980s Sub-Saharan 
Africa utilized 640 cubic meters of water per person per year to produce the average diet, 
two thirds that of Latin America and the Middle East (including North Africa) and only 
one third that of North America or Europe (Gleick 2000). 
 Even with the rise in irrigated agriculture, Sub-Saharan African farmers rely 
almost exclusively on seasonal rains to sustain their farms.  Irrigated agriculture has 
remained a very small proportion of agricultural land.  Between 1961 and 1999, irrigated 
land was never more than 4.5% of Sub-Saharan African cropland (World Bank 2001). 
 Forests and wooded areas covered nearly 22% of the African continent in 2005 
(United Nations Environment Program 2006) and these regions represent more than 16% 
of the world’s forested areas.  In fact, the Congo basin holds the world’s second largest 
continuous block of tropical rain forest.  Deforestation is a significant concern to some 
nations.  Liberia lost 22% of its forest cover between 1990 and 2000 as timber was sold 
to finance the decade-long civil war.  Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia are unique among West 
African nations for increasing the proportion of their land covered in forests; for the 
former the 2% increase during the last decade of the Twentieth Century was part of a 
concerted effort to establish industrial tree plantations, for the latter its 7% increase 
during the same time period was a matter of necessity to slow the encroachment of the 




resources; they protect catchment areas, purify water, regulate river flows, and prevent 
soil erosion.  The forests of Sub-Saharan Africa are also an important component of its 
hydrologic cycle; the process of transpiration adds water vapor to the atmosphere, which 
in turn contributes to cloud formation and precipitation.  Thus, significant changes in 
quality and quantity forest cover can have an effect on the timing, intensity, and 
frequency of precipitation and therefore water resource availability. 
 Because they are essential for life, water resources stand out as a probable source 
of societal tension.  Africa stands out among the world’s water-scarce regions because it 
currently has the world’s largest percentages of people without safe drinking water, 
because the hydrological cycle in Africa is highly variable (Adams 1992), because 18 of 
48 nations will be water stressed by 2025 from population growth alone (Sharma et al. 
1996), because the continent is home to a large number of the world’s poorest nations, 
and because the governments are generally undemocratic and unstable.  The impacts of 
climate change are expected to become an additional stressor in societies beset by a 
plethora of social, economic, and political stresses. 
Summary of Research Agenda  
 Research on the role of environmental factors in the outbreak of conflict has 
typically been grounded in the international security literature, which concludes that 
environmental degradation is most likely to contribute to the outbreak of domestic 
conflict yet the domestic conflict literature rarely includes environmental factors among 
its explanatory variables.  The dynamics of conflict are very different for each and the 
more plausible relationship is between the environment and conflict within a nation.  




provided evidence that abundant resources, especially in forms that generate income, 
contribute to the outbreak of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, le Billon 2001, Peluso 
and Watts 2001, de Soysa 2002).  Those who acknowledge the theoretical literature on 
civil conflict either make a direct claim of deprivation, or imply that the connection 
exists.  Auvinen (1997), as one example, asserts “(t)he regime’s inability to provide 
economic and political goods is seen as a source of relative deprivation within a 
population.”  However, the civil conflict literature concluded that deprivation and 
grievance alone were insufficient to produce conflict.  The foundation for environmental 
scarcity arguments will be strengthened by clearly grounding them within the broader 
theoretical framework of civil conflict literature; this will be accomplished by including 
in one model both the variables typically included in quantitative studies of civil conflict 
and the variables used in the quantitative environmental security studies. 
 Methodological concerns are found throughout this young area of research.  The 
Homer-Dixon case studies have been criticized for choosing cases with both conflict and 
environmental scarcity (Levy 1995).  Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) addressed the case 
study critics with a quantitative study based in the Homer-Dixon hypotheses.  One 
shortcoming of the Hauge and Ellingsen study is the lack of variation across two of their 
three environmental variables; data for each was available for one year during the period 
under study but not the same year for each nation.  Their solution was to replicate the 
values they had over the years of missing data, thus reducing the reliability of their 
results.  This analysis will expand on the number of years covered by extending the date 
range back to 1965 and improve on the variation in the water resources variable by using 




 This study will demonstrate that water resource availability has a discernable 
causal effect on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore, this study supports 
and extends Hauge and Ellingsen’s (1998) findings that water resources contribute to 
civil conflict by demonstrating that a variable measure of water resource availability 
based on annual precipitation can be used successfully in lieu of the water resource 
availability estimates.  This noteworthy finding makes a valuable contribution to the 
study of environment and conflict by adding a new indicator to the correlates of civil 
conflict that is both variable and updated and that can be used in place of an estimator 
that is neither variable nor frequently updated.   
 Both the temporal and spatial scopes of quantitative conflict studies have also 
been limited by the ranges of existing data sets.  As a result, developing nations in 
general and African nations in particular are under represented.  This study will cover all 
post-colonial years for each African nation.  It will also include separate analyses for two 
temporal subsets, the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; there is reason to suspect 
different causal dynamics at work during each period.  African nations were the site of 
proxy wars during the Cold War.  In the absence of a superpower rivalry African nations 
lost their patrons and foreign aid dollars were redirected to nations of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.  Opposition groups in Africa have adapted, becoming more 
entrepreneurial and relying on natural resources to fund their arms purchases. 
 This study has utilized two differing methods to quantify the concept of civil 
conflict, the widely-used 0/1 coding to denote the presence of any form of civil conflict in 
a given year and an infrequently-used categorical variable that denotes increasing levels 




grained categorization will offer a more detailed picture of how environmental change 




Chapter 2:  Environmental Security: Evolution of a Concept 
 
This chapter traces the evolution of studies at the intersection of conflict and 
environmental change.  The discussion starts with an exploration of civil conflict and the 
factors, both generally applicable and specific to the nations of Africa, which that body of 
work has identified as useful predictors.  The discussion then turns to explore the 
relatively recent literature on environmental security, a discussion which takes place 
almost exclusively within the realm of international relations theorists despite the 
conclusion that conflicts whose causal factors include changes in the environment are far 
more likely be intranational than international.  The chapter concludes by summarizing 
what is known on the question of environmental change as a causal factor of conflict, 
identifying gaps in that knowledge and setting forth the hypotheses that are the basis for 
the subsequent analysis. 
Civil Conflict 
 The study of conflict within a nation has become a fractured body of literature 
that encompasses a wide range of inter-societal relations.  A field that once focused 
nearly exclusively on the “great revolutions” now spans a continuum along which lie 
events as diverse as failed states, civil war, social revolutions, state repression, 
democratic transitions, coups d’état, guerilla warfare, protest, and rebellion.  Between the 
extremes of stability and revolution lie varying combinations of expressed dissension and 
state responses that can manifest themselves as conflict at any time.  The methods have 
similarly expanded from single case studies to comparative case studies to quantitative 




2001) contained nearly 40 different terms for intrastate conflict and identified a similar 
number of causal variables, highlighting theoretical, definitional, and operational 
dilemmas.  Each study adopts a unique definition for the dependent variable; for 
empirical studies, it is often predicated on the pre-existing data set used in the analysis. 
 One lens through which to view politics is as a competition among groups within 
society to control the distribution of state-controlled goods and services.  This view 
presumes that the society has established norms to regulate the distribution of said goods 
and services as well as intergroup competition.  A common element in the notion of 
intrastate conflict is that it occurs outside the set of rules governing executive transfer.  
Most African nations however, lack generally accepted institutional norms for either the 
distribution of state goods and services or executive transfer.  This shortcoming is a direct 
result of the significant obstacles African nations faced at independence.  They were 
expected simultaneously and instantaneously (or nearly so) to build the institutional 
components of a state; construct a national identity from disparate ethnic groups, some of 
whom had histories (colonial or pre colonial) of conflict; and to ensure the economic 
development and welfare of their citizens.  These are processes that the developed world 
accomplished successively and over periods ranging from decades to centuries (Ayoob 
1984, 1995; Cohen et al. 1981; Henderson 1998, 2000; Jackson 2001; Jackson 1990; 
Snow 1996).  It is the absence of norms for distributing state goods and services and for 
transferring executive power that is the basis of many conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Pressures for democratization came late to Sub-Saharan Africa; while Huntington (1991) 
has marked a third wave of democratization globally beginning in 1974, Sub-Saharan 




noted in the first chapter, Sub-Saharan African leaders tolerated little competition from 
rivals and ensured loyalty through patronage networks.  Consenting to competition 
among elites meant that political rivals would be given brief tenures in government with a 
salary and access to resources to support what could become a patronage network capable 
of challenging the leader.  Including opposition members in a cabinet also meant that 
they became disaffected when they were replaced.  Removal from office excluded the 
ousted, whether rival or follower, from the network of power and created a class of 
aggrieved elites who were capable of creating independent and competing patronage 
networks and bases of power with which thereby lowering the opportunity cost for elites 
to support rebel movements (Bratton and van de Waal 1997). 
 Early African leaders also recognized that the creation of legitimate political and 
economic institutions meant allowing the existence of an opposition and accepting 
challenges to their power.  Most chose instead to imitate the methods of their colonizers; 
they created weak, economically marginalized, autocratic and heavily militarized states 
and limited access to political and economic goods to an elite few (Henderson 2000, 
Holsti 1996, Suliman 1998).  As a result, many post-colonial African states failed to 
garner the legitimacy of their subjects and the norm for executive transfer devolved into a 
series of coups, the dominant means of executive transfer until roughly the end of the 
Cold War, or rigged elections, held to provide a façade of democratization.  Regardless of 
regime type, coups d’état have been the primary means of regime change in Africa 
(McGowan and Johnson 1984). 
 Civil conflict theory posits an inverted-U curvilinear relationship between regime 




Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Elbadowi and Sambanis 2000, Henderson and Singer 2000).  
Democratic regimes have a lower propensity for violence because their resources are 
distributed according to compromise and consensus.  A democratic regime by definition 
provides opportunities to express grievances and to negotiate compromises over their 
redress.  An autocratic regime also has a low propensity for violence because the public 
expression of grievance is neither tolerated nor negotiable.  A group will challenge the 
existing regime only if it perceives that its opportunity for success is high, or at least 
greater than the costs.  Semi-democracies, also termed transitional democracies, provide 
ideal conditions for civil violence and African democracies, to the extent that they exist, 
are transitional or semi-democracies.  They lack the routine, institutionalized, and widely 
accepted processes for negotiating compromises.  In addition, the transitional 
democracies have yet to address the backlog of grievances. 
Grievance 
 The socio-psychological tradition in conflict studies, also known as relative 
deprivation, has its origin in the works of Mosca (1939), Pareto (1935), and Durkheim 
(1933).  The contemporary version generally grounds itself in Gurr (1970) who considers 
the motivations behind individual participation in rebellion and how those motivations 
generate episodes of political violence and revolution.  Its main premise centers on 
deprivation, the perceived difference between what one has and what one believes one is 
entitled to.  The larger this differential the more reason one has to hold a grievance 
against the state and therefore the more likely one is to engage in collective violence 




 Rising expectations, the difference between what society expects and what it 
receives, are one source of grievance. Rapid social change can take many forms: 
socioeconomic (Olsen 1963), industrialization (Feierabend et al. 1969), urbanization 
(Hibbs 1973), political modernization (Huntington 1968), increased exposure to mass 
media and education (Parvin 1973), and democratization (Huntington 1991).  The 
arguments presented in the previous chapter provide a plethora of evidence to, at least 
intuitively, find the grievance argument compelling in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Rapid social 
change exacerbates grievances when neither state nor society has developed the 
institutional capability to provide the expected goods and when individual expectations 
change faster than the state’s resources and institutions can supply the required economic 
and political goods. 
 These changes lead to changes in expectations, frustration about the difference 
between expectations and outcomes; politicized anger emanates from these frustrations 
and is expressed through participation in movements and protests.  A number of cross-
national studies (Gurr 1970; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Gurr and Lichbach 1979, 1986) 
provided evidence that short-term economic stress and long-term strains increase conflict 
intensity.  Other studies (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966; Huntington 1968) look at 
strains of modernization (increased mobilization and slow economic growth) and argue 
for a curvilinear relationship between economic development and conflict.  They (and 
others: Hardy 1979, Weede 1981) found instead a negative linear relationship.  
 While the deprivation or grievance argument makes intuitive sense, under 
scrutiny it has a number of serious flaws and has been supplanted by other explanations 




resources and the rationality of strategic choices in achieving their objectives.  The 
concept is grounded in the motivations and actions of individuals; empirical studies either 
test the assumptions at the macro level with nations as the unit of analysis, which 
presumes the existence of a relationship between the macro-level conditions measured by 
aggregate indicators and micro-level motivations behind individual choices, or utilize 
indirect and imprecise tests to measure individual motivation indirectly and after the fact 
(Brush 1996; Gurney and Tierney 1982; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991).  A second 
criticism notes that relative deprivation fails to explain how feelings of deprivation are 
channeled in collective action because the focus is on macro issues rather than the 
working of organizations; it therefore fails to explain how participants coalesce and how 
movements spread.  Each instance is an independent event; the episodes are not related to 
one another (Brush 1996; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991).  Thirdly, relative deprivation 
critics note that the theory is unable to explain cases of rapid change that are not 
accompanied by protest (Gurney and Tierney 1982; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991).  
Resource Mobilization 
 Groups engage in collective action typical of social movements (demonstrations, 
boycotts, strikes, violence, riots, sit-ins) because they are excluded from the polity, i.e., 
they lack routine, low-cost access to the resources controlled by the government. They 
cannot realize their interests by legitimate means because the government responds only 
to interests of polity members and the polity in Sub-Saharan Africa, as noted earlier, has 
typically been intentionally circumscribed in a manner that ensures its loyalty to the 
government.  Ethnic identity provides one basis from which to mobilize (Gurr 1994, Tilly 




political resources based on ethnic identity provides the grievances upon which civil 
violence may be based (Gurr and Harff 1994, Gurr 1994).  Collective action is the result 
of struggle for power between polity members and challengers.  The social movement 
model looks at social structures and processes that allow challengers to pursue power 
through collective action.  
Causal Relationships 
 While the outward manifestation of violence has changed considerably over time, 
the underlying motives have changed much less.  The variables most often suggested as 
correlates of civil wars include regime type (Auvinen 1997, Hegre et al. 2001, Henderson 
2000, Henderson and Singer 2000), level of economic development (Barbier and Homer-
Dixon 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Henderson 2000, 
Henderson and Singer 2000), ethnicity (Auvinen 1997, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 
Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Henderson 2000, Mousseau 2001), and social mobilization 
(Henderson 1998, Jackman 1978, Jenkins and Kpsowa 1990, Kpsowa and Jenkins 1993, 
and Lunde 1991).  Few in this literature consider the impact of environmental factors on 
the outbreak of intrastate conflict; when environmental variables are included in their 
analysis, it is in the context of dependence upon the income earned from the extraction of 
resources such as oil or minerals. 
 The debate on the relationship between regime type and conflict has settled 
around the acceptance of an inverted U: the more democratic or the more dictatorial a 
regime is the less likely the nation is to experience civil conflict (Auvinen 1997, de Soysa 
2002, Henderson 1998, Henderson and Singer 2000, Mousseau 2001, Scarritt and 




sword; in the short term economic development can be destabilizing but is necessary for 
long-term stability (Auvinen 1997, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Elbadowi and Sambanis 
2000, Henderson and Singer 2000, McGowan and Johnson 1984, Muller and Weede 
1990).  Henderson (2002), one of only a few scholars to consider the factors of conflict 
that are specific to Africa, did not find democracy significant in multivariate regressions 
of African conflict.  On closer examination, however, Henderson found democracy to be 
significant when comparing the distribution of regime types and the onset of conflict; 
semi-democracies, or transitional democracies, were more prone to civil conflict than 
democracies or autocracies. 
 The economy, in one form or another, is a component of most models of domestic 
conflict.  In earlier studies it took the form of dependence, export dependence or foreign 
aid dependence (Collier 2000; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 
1993; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; O’Kane 1981).  More recently it appears 
as income or income growth rates (Auvinen 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002; de 
Soysa 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Sǿrli 2002).  In all cases authors found that 
improvements in the economic variables, i.e. increased growth or reduced reliance on 
foreign aid, reduced the odds of conflict but there are important differences among the 
findings.  Henderson (2000) and in collaboration with Singer (2000) looked at measures 
of both development and economic growth.  They found that economic development 
reduced the probability of conflict more than did economic growth.  Auvinen (1997) 





 The ethnic diversity of populations has long been included as a variable in 
conflict studies.  Earlier studies were unable to come to a consensus and found ethnic 
heterogeneity to both increase (Jenkins and Kpsowa 1990, Kpsowa and Jenkins 1993) 
and decrease (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Jackman 1978) the probability of conflict.  
More recently a consensus has emerged acknowledging ethnicity’s complex role.  
Nations with two or three similarly sized groups (or dominant groups) tend to be more 
stable than nations with many groups or one overwhelmingly dominant group (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998, Henderson 2000, Kahl 1998, Mousseau 2001). 
 Researchers at two different points in time included social mobilization as a 
component of their models.  In 1978 Jackman, studying the incidence of coups (the then 
dominant form of civil conflict in Africa), measured social mobilization as the percent of 
the labor force in agriculture and the literacy rate and found that greater social 
mobilization increased the probability of coups.  Jenkins and Kposowa (1993), 
reexamining the issue 15 years later, expanded Jackman’s conceptualization of social 
mobilization to include a component measuring political awareness, defined as literacy 
rate plus secondary school enrollment as a percent of the population, and a component 
measuring the capacity to act, defined as the percent of the population that is urban plus 
the percent of the population in the industrial workforce.  The Jenkins and Kposowa 
model revealed that political awareness reduced the probability of coups while structural 
capacity increased the probability of coup attempts. 
 The civil conflict literature rarely includes independent variables outside the 
relatively narrow realm of social causes.  Yet, the societies under consideration exist 




and they are affected by that environment.  This fact raises two issues.  First can and 
should social factors be explained by natural facts?  Second, (assuming the first was 
answered in the affirmative) is how to ensure that the interrelationship is reflected in the 
model.  “Social facts, such as conflict, cannot be explained by natural facts, such as the 
environment, but only by other social facts.  The question is really whether people living 
in environmentally degraded areas can come to perceive such degradation as a threat to 
their way of life . . . or to their very survival . . . .”  (Molvær 1991 p. 175) 
 What does the quantity or quality of water resources or the acreage of trees or of 
agricultural land in the nation have to do with how well a political system functions?  At 
first glance they seem entirely incongruous.  Scratch below the surface and the 
connection is quite clear.  While water and forests and land will exist with or without 
political systems, the converse does not hold true.  A political system is a human 
construct and as such exists only in the presence of a human civilization.  Human survival 
requires sufficient food and water, which are available from rivers, forests and land 
suitable to grow crops or graze animals.  Therefore, changes in environmental conditions 
that are so extreme as to prohibit the continued existence of human societies might 
explain the outbreak of conflict.  Molvær is referring to changes in environmental 
conditions that are not as extreme but which cross a threshold - either the ecosystem fails 
to provide the services which society requires of it or the cost of adapting to the change is 
greater than society’s willingness to pay for that adaptation.  That threshold represents the 
point at which society can no longer live the life to which it has become accustomed; 




Environment and Conflict 
Environmental Security 
 Choucri and North (1975) and Timberlake and Tinker (1985) are among the 
earliest researchers to consider environmental factors as a cause of conflict.  The 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the 
Bruntland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) raised 
environmental awareness, which subsequently led to the consideration of environmental 
problems as part of the security debate.  Timberlake and Tinker (1985) were among the 
earliest to suggest what the causal chain between environmental degradation and the 
outbreak of conflict might be, postulating that the destruction of environmental resources 
disrupts economic and social systems, which in turn results in political unrest, 
environmental refugees, internal migration to urban centers, fighting between nomads 
and farmers, guerrilla movements, and revolutions.  The discourse which developed 
around environmental security includes several sub-discussions on topics including 
broadening or redefining security (Gleick 1990 and 1991, Homer-Dixon and Levy 1995, 
Levy 1995, Matthews 1989, Ullman 1983, and Westing 1989), the definition of 
environmental security (Allenby 2000, Dabelko and Dabelko 1995, Deudney 1990, Dryer 
2001 and Græger 1996), environmental degradation as a cause and as a consequence of 
violent conflict (Choucri and North 1975, Gleditsch 1998, Litfin 1997, Timberlake and 
Tinker 1985, and Urdal 2005), securitizing the environment (Deudeny 1990 and Barnett 





 The earliest work linking the environment with conflict merely theorized that 
competition over scarce resources could lead nations to fight over them (Choucri and 
North 1975, Matthews 1989, Myers 1993, Timberlake and Tinker 1980, Ullman 1983).  
During the 1990s several scholars added specificity by suggesting a basic causal chain in 
the environmental conflict thesis: population growth and high per capita resource 
consumption lead to a degraded environment which leads to increasing scarcity which in 
turn leads to a more intense competition for resources which further leads to greater risk 
of conflict (Gleick 1990, Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 
Renner 1996).  Population growth rates and population density had been found to be 
important to the outbreak of domestic conflict, but in those studies political, economic, 
and cultural variables tend to be ignored (Ford 1995, Henderson 1993).  Traditionally 
conflict studies sought to understand the state’s behavior through systemic attributes, a 
research design that typically does not include environmental variables. 
 There is much literature examining whether environmental degradation leads to 
conflict.  This debate occurs within the well-established security sub-field of international 
relations theory.  However, that same literature concludes that environmental factors are 
more likely to contribute to the outbreak of conflict within nations, not between them 
(Bächler 1998, Barnett 2000, Gleditsch 1998, Gleick 1993a, Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, 
Homer-Dixon 1994, Renner 1996, Spillman 1995).  As elucidating a discussion as this is, 
it neglects to address the role of the environment in civil conflict. 
 Before delving into the environmental resource and conflict literature, it is 
important to distinguish between the scarcity of environmental resources as studied by 




and Baechler and his research team, and the abundance of environmental resources 
studied by Collier and le Billon and others.  The former group of researchers 
conceptualized the environment as renewable resources such as air, water or biodiversity, 
which have intrinsic value as an environmental good.  These resources are vital to the 
continued functioning of a healthy ecosystem; society borrows them, and to one extent or 
another despoils them, to serve its needs but the resource is renewable if appropriately 
managed.  The “scarcity” is the result of use at rate faster than the resource can renew the 
supply.  The latter conceptualized the environment as non-renewable resources such as 
diamonds, gold and oil, which are exploitable, extractable and have monetary value in the 
global marketplace.  The resource curse or greed-based explanation for the resource-
conflict connection is grounded in the assumption that the nation is economically 
dependent on the revenue derived from the resource.  Water, for example, is an important 
variable in the former group of studies.  However, water resources are outside of the 
market economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and therefore not a variable of concern to the 
latter.6  There is little overlap between the environmental variables used by these two 
groups of researchers.  Furthermore, the way in which environmental change contributes 
to conflict may be different for the different conceptions of environmental resources. 
 Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991) made an early attempt to lay the foundation for 
including environmental change in studies of conflict; however, he failed in his 
theoretical model and in his later work to ground his work adequately in the vast body of 
civil conflict literature.  His work, based in case studies, examined civil conflict through 
                                                 
6 Water resources have been captured by the market in many places, foremost among 
them, the American West, where rights to use water are established by law and frequently 




the causal lens of environmental degradation and identified three types of scarcity: 
demand-induced (from population growth), supply-induced (environmental degradation), 
and structural (inequality).  His work posits that economic scarcity increases deprivation 
and disrupts social institutions but finds little existing research on the effect of scarcity on 
social institutions.  After an examination of five cases (Mexico, Gaza, South Africa, 
Pakistan and Rwanda), Homer-Dixon concluded that severe environmental scarcities 
contribute to major civil violence because the poor are highly dependent on renewable 
resources for their livelihood and because they are less able to adapt to environmental 
scarcity.  This explanation can be extended to states as well as individuals.  Poor states 
tend to lack well-developed markets and capable institutions to facilitate society’s 
adaptation to scarcity; poor individuals rely on subsistence agriculture, often cultivated 
on marginal land, conditions that offer no choice of adaptation other than migrating to 
another piece of marginal land. 
 Poverty and maldistribution of resources, easily a source of deprivation or 
grievance, have a deleterious effect on the environment and this relationship is well 
documented (Auvinen 1997, Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, Homer-Dixon 1994, and Lanz 
1996).  However, until recently the vast majority of the literature asserting environment-
conflict interactions has been primarily concerned with international conflicts.  Hauge 
and Ellingsen (1998) examine a series of hypotheses on the relationship between Homer-
Dixon’s three types of scarcity (supply-induced, demand-induced and structural) and 
domestic armed conflict.  In addition, they considered more traditional political and 
social conflict-generating variables.  They concluded that while environmental scarcity 




factors in this study were more important in determining incidences of civil conflict than 
were environmental factors.  Raleigh and Urdal (2007) confirmed this in an updated 
study on micro-level population pressures.   
 More recently, a group of researchers has emerged who have considered the 
economic drivers of civil conflict (Auty 2004; Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998, 2000, 2002; de Soysa 2002a, 2002b; Humphries 2005; le Billon 2001).  In 
Third World nations generally, and in Africa in particular, they have found that abundant 
resources, marketable in the global economy, have contributed to the continuation of 
existing conflicts and the institutionalization of violence.  This literature, which is 
grounded in the resource curse argument, has tended to consider resources in one of three 
ways: as abundance, as exploitable and as lootable.  While all three refer to a quantity 
greater than the local community or nation can use, there are differences in meaning and 
ultimately the universe of cases to which the generalizations may be applied.  Abundance 
implies more than is required for local use.  In fact, any resource that is marketable is so 
because there are repositories of the resource in a limited number of locations and a use 
for the resource in locations other than its origin.  Exploitable resources implies a 
differentiation between resources for which society has found a use and created a market, 
and other objects for which there is neither a use nor a market.  Lootable resources are 
those which may be placed in commerce by clandestine means thereby circumventing 
state controls designed to generate revenue.  The earliest efforts to explore this research 
avenue did not differentiate but labeled all primary commodities as abundant resources 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000, and 2002; De Soysa, 2002a, 2002b; Le Billon 2001; 




questions and narrowed their findings to more completely specify the linkages between 
resources and conflict (Auty 2004, Humphreys 2005, Ross 2004 and 2006). 
 The conditions under which abundant resources contribute to conflict have 
frequently been tied back to inequities or vulnerabilities in the nation’s economic or 
political system.  In the realm of economic linkages many authors start from the resource 
mobilization argument that the availability of primary commodities increases the 
likelihood of conflict and that conflict is more likely when a rebel stands to gain more 
from fighting than he or she would earn as subsistence farmer (Collier and Hoeffler 
2001).  Other authors lean towards a grievance explanation, noting variously: that 
abundant resources contribute to conflict when the wealth derived from the resource is 
inequitably redistributed among the citizenry or that economic decline (or a lack of 
growth), poverty and unemployment are positively related to conflict (Hendrix and 
Glaser 2007).  The accumulated research also points to a nation’s dependence on a single 
resource for much of its revenue rendering it vulnerable to the volatilities of international 
markets and thereby susceptible to the effects of grievance against the state when the 
revenues derived from the resource are insufficient to meet the demands for previously 
available revenue. 
 The political conditions under which resource abundance has been found to 
contribute to conflict are most often related to weak states and weak bureaucratic 
institutions in tandem with a resource-dependent economy.  In these instances either an 
untaxed polity diminishes the state’s incentive to create strong bureaucratic institutions or 
the lack of a dependence on tax revenue creates less demand by the polity for state 




support for the government (Hendrix and Glaser 2007).  Evidence on African cases 
suggests that conflicts which involve lootable resources have their genesis in other 
political and economic factors that lend credence to a grievance explanation, particularly 
the decades of corrupt political governance compounded by ineffective economic and 
institutional governance (Ballentine 2003). 
 Looking at the environment conflict question through a political ecology lens 
provides yet another perspective on the conditions under which abundant primary 
commodity resources contribute to conflict.  In this view, natural resources are socially 
constructed to fill human desires, needs and practices; the resource’s value is a function 
of its relationship with the global economy (leBillon 2001). 
 At this point that it is imperative to pause and further consider the differences in 
perspective on natural resources.  The discussion earlier established that scarcity–based 
or Malthusian explanation for the environment conflict connection differs from a greed or 
resource curse-based explanation.  To recapitulate, environmental resources in the 
scarcity models provide a service to the ecosystem; they are renewable when 
appropriately managed.  The resource curse or greed-based explanation for the resource-
conflict connection is grounded in the assumption that the nation is economically 
dependent on the revenue derived from the environmental resource.  Political ecologists 
take this a step further to suggest that without a human and economic framework, a 
resource has no value.  This may hold for a commodity based resource, but the position is 
untenable for a natural resource.  The latter include water, air, fertile land, biodiversity 
(although some individual species can be considered “socially constructed” to meet 




necessary for life and for ecosystem survival.  The decision where to build a city, plant a 
field, or build a dam may be a social choice but, regardless of the human choice as to 
location, water and fertile land have to be available somewhere within the reach of the 
distribution chain to support life (that distribution chain can range from the maximum 
distance an individual can walk to a watering hole to the range required to support a 
hunter gatherer to the reach of a refrigerated cargo vessel). 
 In all cases, the mechanisms by which abundant resources contribute to conflict 
emanate from the resources’ ability to be sold, legally or not, in the international 
marketplace to finance the rebellion.  Some have explored whether the rebellion began 
because the resource was available to finance it or whether the rebellion began for other 
reasons and the resource was later used to support its continuation (Hendrix and Glasser 
2007).  Others have examined the role that state strength played in affecting rebel 
opportunity structure, finding that weak states decrease opportunity costs to rebels in 
increase the likelihood of conflict, whereas strong states increase them the costs to rebels 
and thereby deter conflict (Ballentine 2003).  Authors have looked for a relationship 
between the length of the conflict and the availability of abundant resources.  Others have 
suggested that the connection occurs only when the state is dependent on the resources 
for its revenue. 
 Institutions mediate between the environment and its effect on human society.  
The preceding discussion on abundant resources has established the link between certain 
types of resources and economic institutions.  In Sub-Saharan Africa the colonial 
experience shaped post-independence institutions (Easterly and Levine 2003, Kahl 2006, 




colonies was to limit the extent to which markets were introduced into African economies 
(Suliman 1998).  In many fledgling African nations, ethnic identity established the 
boundaries around which and within which political participation was defined; that action 
had a cascading effect as new leaders imitated their “mentors” when guiding political 
development in their new nations.  Kahl (2006) has identified two paths by which that 
mediation occurs: groupness and institutional inclusivity.  The former is an institutional 
representation of the society and the extent to which aggregations of individuals rely on 
few or many overlapping collective identities for economic and physical security.  Kahl, 
in keeping with the findings on ethno-political conflict, asserts that nations with many 
interconnecting group identities or a single group identity, which represents a large 
proportion of the population, are less likely to experience conflict.  Correspondingly, 
nations with multiple but discrete identity groups have a higher likelihood of conflict.  
Kahl’s second pathway between environmental degradation and conflict represents the 
institutions of the state and the extent to which they empower and provide the means for 
societal groups to participate in and influence the decision-making process, particularly 
of state elites and state executives.  Kahl posits that nations with inclusive institutions, 
those that allow for participation and influence, will have a lower likelihood of conflict 
and those with exclusive institutions will have a higher likelihood of conflict.  Raleigh 
and Urdal (2007) extend Kahl’s case study work by finding in a 14-year study (1990-
2004) that indicators of low state capability are significant predictors of conflict and 





 Environmental change happens.  Ecosystems are not static systems; they undergo 
continuous natural and anthropogenic perturbations as a normal and ongoing process, 
regardless of the ecosystem’s health.  Seasons are a natural and annual cycle of variations 
within known ranges in temperature and precipitation to which all species adapt by 
incorporating this change into their behavior.  Healthy ecosystems can weather 
occasional perturbations at the extremes of the known variability but extended or frequent 
perturbations at these extremes can result in degradation, scarcity, and conflict.  The 
effects of these perturbations are analogous to the physical-chemical properties hot spot, 
flashpoint, and firepoint respectively (Glantz 2002).7  A hot spot is an area characterized 
by a high concentration of the article of concern.  A flashpoint is the lowest temperature 
at which a liquid will give off vapors to ignite momentarily on application of a flame.  A 
firepoint is the lowest temperature at which a volatile liquid, after its vapors have been 
ignited, will give off vapors at a rate sufficient to sustain combustion.     
 Thresholds, the transition areas, are the points or ranges at which the state 
changes from one condition to another, for example from hot spot to flashpoint and flash 
point to fire point; they are the points at which stimuli are of sufficient intensity to begin 
to produce an effect.  This concept from the natural and physical sciences can assist in 
illuminating the relationship between changes in the natural environment and the socio-
political environment.  Homer-Dixon (1991) offers the concept of a threshold of 
                                                 
7 Glantz suggests that it is important distinguish between the three because policy options 
differ at each level and because problems of conflict emanating from environmental 
causes differ.  Inherent in understanding the different degrees of effect to environment is 
knowing the human actions triggering them and the policy options available to either 
mitigate or adapt.  This is an area where the ideas developed in this work can be applied 




irreversibility: when environmental degradation reaches the point at which it cannot be 
reversed, it will continue to be a burden on society. 
 Thresholds are important ecological concepts; relationships among environmental 
variables are not necessarily linear.  There may be a range of conditions within which the 
relationship is nonexistent or linear.  Once a threshold is reached, the relationship may 
change dramatically.  For example, a wetland may be adapted for a range of rainfall 
amounts.  If daily or annual extremes frequently exceed or fail to reach that range, then 
the wetland may cease to provide its ecological services.  The communities that depend 
on those services may not have sufficient quantities of grasses and grains, fish, and 
pollutant filtration.  These ecological changes will force governments and societies to 
adapt to them whenever and wherever they occur. 
 When changes to an ecosystem, whether due to anthropogenic or natural forces, 
exceed the tolerances to which the ecosystem has become accustomed, i.e. cross a 
threshold, they affect the ecosystem and subsequently the social and political systems 
which are located within the ecosystems and which depend on the ecosystems’ products 
and services.  While the survival of post-modern man is no longer limited by that which 
nature provides, neither have societies completely eliminated the influence of nature 
(Kristof 1960).  The negative effects of these changes attract the greatest attention, but 
positive impacts also occur. 
 The social and political institutions often perceive these changes as negative 
because they require a change to the distribution of power.  There are winners and losers.  
A negative change is perceived as such because it reduces the advantage of those in 




This imbalance creates the potential for conflict within a nation as the relative advantage 
of societal groups changes.  In a mature democracy, where the society is accustomed to 
changes in the relative power of groups, this rebalancing of power is not expected to 
result in open conflict; in less stable democracies or non-democratic nations, conflict can 
be expected.  At the other extreme, strong dictatorships where the state exercises 
complete (or nearly so) control over society, little challenge is expected to its action of 
seizing control of the winner and therefore little violence is expected.8  An example of a 
positive change would be increased rainfall in the Sahel, which supports additional 
agricultural production and grazing which in turn provides opportunities for rent-seeking 
or manipulation of the political and/or economic power structure. 
 A degrading ecosystem experiences stresses that reduce its usefulness to either the 
ecosystem itself or the society which relies on it and that either endanger the ecosystem’s 
survival or induce a major ecological shift.  The human species can, and usually does, 
adapt to these changes, although at a cost of increased prices for those environmental 
products and services incorporated into the market or of reduced services from those not 
in the market.  Scarcity occurs when human activities, environmental processes, and 
processes that involve human-environment interactions are disrupted because the quantity 
or quality of the ecosystem, its products, or its services, are less than that demanded of it; 
the ecosystem has irreversibly changed.  Both use of the ecosystem and adaptation 
continue but at the price of reduced efficiency and increased cost.  A degraded 
environment and scarce resources contribute to the outbreak of conflict when adaptation 
                                                 
8 This follows the inverted U hypothesis of Muller and Weede (1990); Auvinen (1997); 
Hegre et al. (1999); Henderson and Singer (2000) which was discussed in greater detail 




is no longer feasible; the ecological change becomes irreversible and subsequently 
disrupts human activities. 
 A January 2005, low-level, violent exchange between nomadic herders and 
farmers over water resources illustrates these points.  Scarce rains had created drought 
conditions in an area where farmers and herders share a common water source, River 
Ewaso Kedong.  The region had received less than 20% of normal precipitation over a 
shorter period than normal.  Herders, located downstream from farming communities and 
in a more arid region, began to travel upstream to find sufficient rangeland, where they 
also encountered an insufficient supply of water for their cattle, and asserted that 
upstream farmers were diverting the resource to irrigate their crops.  The violence, 
perpetrated by both herding and farming communities, took several forms including 
vandalizing irrigation pipes, severing electrical connections to a political leaders’ home, 
burning houses, stealing and injuring livestock, and murder.  The violence displaced 
about 2000 villagers and disrupted traffic to the Maasai Mara Game Reserve, a popular 
tourist destination. 
 In this example, scarcity of the resource, water, created a degraded environment 
to which the human communities adapted.  Insufficient rainfall created drought 
conditions and, as a result, grasslands failed to produce sufficient fodder to support cattle, 
watering holes dried up, and soil moisture was inadequate to support crop growth.  Each 
user of the resource adapted to the scarce water and degraded environment: herders 
expanded the range over which they fed and watered their cattle and farmers drew 
additional water to irrigate crops.  Each community’s actions to adapt to the changed 




cattle on land farmers perceived belonging to them and farmers used water for irrigation 
that herders expected to be available for cattle.   
 I suggest that environmental degradation must reach a threshold before it becomes 
important in causing conflict.  Following the work of Homer-Dixon, that threshold is 
extreme scarcity, or following the work of Collier and Hoeffler, that threshold is extreme 
abundance.  That which constitutes extreme scarcity or extreme abundance is relative, 
depending on normal conditions for that region.  Rainfall totals that would be considered 
a drought in the tropical rainforests of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) would 
be an overabundance in the Sahel or Sahara. 
Received Knowledge and Information Gaps 
 The accumulated body of knowledge on the environment and conflict has 
concluded that environmental change is a contributor to conflict.  However, the work to 
date has systematically failed to include the natural environment either as a measure of 
change or as a measure of scarcity.  This has occurred in part because of the 
compartmentalized nature of the discipline and has resulted in the proverbial right hand 
not knowing what the left hand is doing.  International relations scholars concluded that 
the causal variable of interest to this study, environmental change, could not effectively 
explain interstate conflict but suggested that a causal relationship was more likely with 
intrastate conflict.  For many years, however, scholars of intrastate conflict failed to 
consider the environment as a causal variable.  While the recent studies of the resource 
curse have brought marketable commodities into the discussion and begun to develop a 
greater understanding of how they matter, the study of scarcity has been neglected, not 




Homer-Dixon’s methodological shortcomings, Hauge and Ellingen’s lack of variation on 
independent variables, and literary space devoted to discussion over methods rather than 
advancing findings.  This research advances the discussion of the causal effects of 
environmental scarcity and degradation on domestic conflict by using an alternative 
means of operationalizing water resources, annual precipitation data weighted by land 
area and population to addressing the methodological shortcoming of earlier research, the 
lack of variation across the variable measuring water resource availability.   
 Research on the abundance - conflict connections have begun to understand the 
circumstances under which and the conditions whereby that connection occurs.  This 
study will pursue a similar course for scarce resources by introducing additional variation 
on the dependent variable and comparing the results of the more widely used 
dichotomous variable with the results of a dependent variable with categorical coding to 
determine whether the resource-conflict connection is more prevalent at one level of 
conflict or another, i.e. low-level conflicts, intermediate level conflicts, or war.  This 
research considers the conditions under which resources and conflict connect by extends 
the scope of explanatory variables to include indicators for political institutions and their 
capacity to manage the water resources within their national boundaries. 
Hypotheses 
 The first quantitative studies to find support for claims of a causal relationship 
between environmental resources and conflict (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998 and State 
Failure Task Force 1999) were based in a depravation and grievance model and worked 
from a priori assumptions that the independent variable of interest was resource scarcity.  




claim that the variable of interest is not scarce natural resources but an abundance of 
natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000; le Billon 2001).  However, the critics 
operationalize the environment in ways that have important differences from the earlier 
studies.  The grievance work is based on a conception of environment taken from the 
environmental community, one in which natural resources are communal and not easily 
exploitable.  They take forms such as air, water, soil, and biodiversity.  The greed work 
conceives of the environment as an economic good or a marketable product, items 
extracted from the earth that have value in the marketplace such as diamonds, oil, and 
timber.  This study will attempt to reconcile those differences by asking three very simple 
questions: Do environmental variables enhance our understanding of civil conflict in Su-
Saharan Africa?  Under what circumstances?  And, by what means? 
Does the Environment Matter in Sub-Saharan African Civil Conflict? 
 The preceding literature has established that the evidence of a connection between 
the environment and conflict is tenuous; this study will first confirm that the connection 
is evident in the assembled data for Sub-Saharan Africa during the period in question, 
1965-2000.  
H1: Models of civil conflict that include environmental variables are better predictors of 
that conflict than models without environmental variables. 
 
 Water is critical to the life of both individuals and communities and the 
availability of adequate supplies can be expected to have some cascading effects on 
societies therefore the “Does the environment matter?” question is next narrowed to focus 




competing theories of scarcity and abundance.  While water resources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are not a marketable resource, they are a resource whose abundance can be as 
degrading and potentially as destabilizing as its scarcity.  Hence, a third variation of the 
environmental change causes conflict hypothesis will be tested which suggests that, for 
water resources, the relationship is not unidirectional but exists for both a paucity and a 
surfeit of the resource. 
H2: Water resources exhibit a U-shaped relationship with respect to conflict: extremes of 
both scarcity and abundance increase the probability of conflict. 
Under What Circumstances? 
 Having established whether environmental change matters in Sub-Saharan 
African civil conflicts, the study next turns to question the circumstances under which 
these changes matter.  As noted earlier, conflict is a continuum and it is reasonable to 
question whether different combinations of factors contribute to conflicts at different 
points along that continuum.  Drawing on Hague and Ellingsen (1998), the next 
hypothesis will test whether a degraded environment is more likely to contribute to low-
level conflict than to intermediate conflict. 
H3: Water resource scarcity is more likely to contribute to low-level conflict than to 
intermediate-level conflict or war. 
 
 Another way of looking at the environment-conflict relationship is to turn Hauge 
and Ellingsen’s (1998) conclusion that political and economic conditions are more 
important than the environment in increasing the probability of conflict on its head and 




conflict?  Homer-Dixon (1991) suggests that ecological thresholds have consequences for 
human communities.  These thresholds of vulnerability, as he terms them, are those 
ecological conditions beyond which repair or regeneration is not possible.  "Even if 
enlightened social change removes the original political, economic, and cultural causes of 
the degradation, it will be a continuing burden on society.  Once irreversible, in other 
words, environmental degradation becomes an exogenous variable" (Homer-Dixon 1994, 
35-36).  Societies are capable of adapting to a wide range of conditions.  Homer-Dixon 
suggests, however, that there are points at which environmental changes are irreversible.  
This in turn would place a great burden on society to adapt.  The scientific concept of 
thresholds will be applied to the basic question to explore whether ecological thresholds 
can provide some insights into answering that question, specifically whether ecosystem 
changes must cross a threshold before they interact with extant social, economic, or 
political cleavages to increase the probability of conflict.  While Homer-Dixon was 
concerned exclusively with scarce water resources, an excess of water, in the form of 
floods can also contribute to conditions of economic or social stress and thereby 
contribute to conflict.  Hence, this hypothesis will be tested for both threshold effects. 
H4: Changes in water resources must reach a threshold of abundance or a threshold of 
scarcity before they increase the probability of conflict. 
 
 The international system experienced a dramatic shift with the end of the Cold 
War which altered the relationships between Sub-Saharan African nations and both 
powerful states and primary donor states.  This reshuffling in the international system 




gained political backing and economic support.  These changes are expected to have an 
effect on the opportunity costs of opposition movements and thereby alter the likelihood 
that opposition movements will engage in civil conflict.  They are also expected to affect 
the ability of governments to provide services, thereby affecting the potential for groups 
within societies to either experience new grievances or see existing grievances alleviated.  
Coincidentally, states and the international environmental community came to agreement 
on a climate change treaty that established baselines against which progress and climate-
related environmental effects would be measured.  This convergence presents an 
opportunity to add a corollary to the cold war hypothesis specific to water resources. 
H5a: Civil conflict is more likely during post Cold War years than during Cold War 
years. 
H5b: Changes in water resource availability is more likely to contribute to conflict 
during post Cold War years than during Cold War years. 
By What Means? 
 There is no evidence to suggest that environmental degradation and scarcity alone 
are sufficient to cause domestic conflict; their effect on conflict becomes evident when 
they occur in conjunction with other social, economic, or political stresses.  The next set 
of hypotheses will test the manner in which political systems and ecosystems interact and 
will conclude with a question about the future asking a “What if” question about 
hypothetical scenarios based on potential changes to the water regime across the African 
continent. 
 Within the foundation that has been laid marking the pathway between 




exacerbate existing weaknesses in the capabilities of political, social, or economic 
systems to respond to the crises that scarcity (or abundance) will create.  The first area 
where the environment and human societies are hypothesized to interact is in the realm of 
political capability.  Nations with stable political systems, accepted norms for changes in 
leadership, and whose legitimacy is derived from within the nation rather than decreed by 
exogenous interests can be expected to more effectively respond to the changes that 
environmental degradation or scarcity would bring.  The literature has demonstrated that 
political systems in transition have a higher probability of conflict and that Sub-Saharan 
African nations fall into this range.  Hence, the next hypothesis is built on the interaction 
between political stability and environmental changes. 
H6: Environmental degradation in combination with political instability increases the 
probability of conflict. 
 
 The review of the literature has also established that institutions mediate between 
the environment and its effect on human society.  That intervention may occur through a 
variety of mechanisms; this study looks at three: the capacity of offices within the 
bureaucracy responsible for managing water resources, group cohesiveness, and 
institutional inclusivity.  Exclusion from government is one potential source of grievance.  
In addition, functioning governmental institutions provide a nation with the capacity to 
adapt to changes, including those emanating from the ecosystem.  The interactions and 
the mechanism have been explored via case studies (Kahl 2006) and are the basis for the 
following hypotheses that environmental scarcity can affect a state’s ability to exercise its 




institutional capacity, groupness, and institutional inclusivity mediate between the 
environment and conflict. 
H7: Nations that exhibit greater institutional capacity to manage water resources have a 
lower probability of conflict. 
H8: Nations with more open political institutions will have a lower probability of 
conflict.  Furthermore, this will hold true even in the presence of environmental change 
or environmental scarcity. 





Chapter 3: Research Design 
 
Methodological Overview 
 Methodological concerns permeate this young area of research.  One shortcoming 
of the Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) study is the lack of variation across two of their three 
environmental variables.  Data for land degradation was available for only one year 
during the period under study, 1990.  Hague and Ellingsen describe human–induced soil 
degradation as being divided into four categories: none, low, medium and high, based on 
a visual inspection of a 1990 map showing the geographical extent of four types: water, 
wind, chemical and physical soil degradation.  Hauge and Ellingsen do not indicate how 
the four types have been aggregated into a single measurement.  Data for per capita water 
resource availability was available for one year during the period under study but not the 
same year for each nation.  Their solution in both of these instances was to replicate the 
single-year values they had over the years of missing data, thus reducing the reliability of 
their results.  Thus, each nation’s land degradation value for 1990 was used for every 
other year.  The water resource availability data was available for different years between 
1970 to 1997 with about half of the data from 1987.  Again, Hague and Ellingsen 
replicated the single value across all years in their dataset. 
 The Homer-Dixon case studies have been criticized for choosing cases with both 
conflict and environmental scarcity (Levy 1995).  Much of this criticism of Homer-
Dixon’s work is another episode in the perennial discussion over the merits of 




question of environmental change and conflict yet it has generated a great deal of 
verbiage (Homer-Dixon 1994, Levy 1995; Homer-Dixon and Levy 1995; Gledditsch 
1998; and Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon 2001).  Case studies can be valuable 
to theory building and works by Graham Allison (1971) and Arend Lijphart (1975) are 
examples of such.  Statistical and quasi-experimental designs are well suited to explain 
causal effects, to assess what seems to be happening.  By aggregating data, large-N 
statistical studies lose the unique and valuable details of each individual observation. A 
statistical study can assess the health of the forest but is incapable of assessing the health 
of individual trees.  Case studies are better suited to explore causal mechanisms - how it 
is happening.  They lose sight of the big picture and their narrow focus limits the ability 
to generalize from their findings.  Case studies are effective at assessing the health of 
individual trees but are ineffective at understanding the forest.  Both analytical methods 
are required to show causality; the issue is not which method is better but whether the 
researcher has chosen the method appropriate to answer the questions raised.9   
 This analysis addresses the criticisms of the Homer-Dixon work by moving 
beyond case studies to conduct a quantitative analysis over a group of nations and a series 
of years that include varying levels of conflict and varying degrees of scarcity.  This 
analysis addresses the shortcomings of Hauge and Ellingsen by extending the number of 
years covered back to 1965 or independence and forward to 2000.  It will also introduce 
variation in the water resources variable by using meteorological data on total annual 
precipitation to provide a more robust data point. 
                                                 




 The ranges of existing data sets have also limited both the temporal and spatial 
scopes of quantitative conflict studies.  As a result, they under represent developing 
nations in general, and African nations in particular.  This study will cover all post-
colonial years for each African nation beginning with 1965.  It will also assess whether 
there are differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; there is reason to 
suspect different causal dynamics at work during each period.  African nations were the 
site of proxy wars during the Cold War.  In the absence of a superpower rivalry, African 
leaders lost their patrons and foreign aid dollars which had flowed to Sub-Saharan Africa 
were redirected to nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Opposition 
groups in Africa have adapted, becoming more entrepreneurial and relying on natural 
resources to fund their arms purchases. 
 Both Timberlake and Tinker (1985) and Homer-Dixon (1995) cautioned that the 
complex interactions among polity, economy, society, and environment would make it 
difficult to clearly specify the relationships among them. Because of these 
interconnections among the variables, some multicollinearity will likely exist among the 
variables.  This complexity also suggests that interaction among variables may be 
important.  Likely candidates are interactions between population growth and 
precipitation and, between infant mortality and precipitation, and between GDP and 
precipitation. 
 The dependent variable in the case study literature is typically the particular 
conflict(s) in the nation(s) of interest.  Large-N studies use a dichotomous dependent 
variable representing a battlefield death threshold or the ability of the state to exercise 




variable, something that is present or absent; rather it encompasses a wide range of 
conditions from societal tension to armed conflict by insurgents against the state 
(revolution) or by the state against segments of its polity (genocide).  Not all issues that 
will create tension within the society will provoke violence; yet most quantitative studies 
use a dichotomous dependent variable for conflict and each data set uses a different 
definition of conflict. 
 A more precisely defined dependent variable offers the possibility of discerning 
more specific conditions under which environmental change contributes to civil disorder.  
Operationalizing domestic conflict into mutually exclusive categories finer than the 
presence or absence of conflict is difficult because the definitions for different levels of 
conflict overlap.  Environmental degradation may contribute to the outbreak of some 
levels of conflict but not others; alternatively, the manner in which the environment 
matters may differ across levels of conflict.  Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) found a 
difference in the effect of environmental variables between low-level conflict and major 
conflict.  This suggests that there may be differences across other levels of conflict. 
 One option for classifying each observation is by categories that differentiate 
among differing intensities of societal tension and conflict.  Conceptually a continuous 
measure of the intensity or extensiveness of conflict makes sense.  In practice it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to objectively measure the quantity or the contentiousness of 
conflict hence the reliance on a dichotomous variable.  A compromise could be to 
categorize according to type, but this solution is also fraught with difficulty.  It is 
impossible to identify a fully inclusive set of mutually exclusive categories other than the 




the same time (or during the same time period).  Furthermore, if the objective is to 
construct a variable that reflects the continuum, a categorization scheme based only on 
type  does do not qualify as interval, let alone ratio, level data.  For these reasons, 
categories according to type must be rejected. 
 While falling short of the ideal more continuous variable, a categorization scheme 
based on level of conflict can provide more information than the single dichotomous 
variable and, therefore, this study will employ a dependent variable categorized 
according to level of conflict in addition to a dichotomous one. 
 The categorization by characteristics suggested by Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
(1997) is a second model for disaggregating the dichotomous dependent variable.  
Previous studies have provided no compelling reason to suggest that any one method of 
operationalizing conflict will be superior.  Each has strengths and weaknesses.  There 
may be value in contrasting the results of comparable analyses across different codings of 
the dependent variable.  This study will contain a separate analysis using two different 
classification schemes for the dependent variable: 1) nominal yes-no categories used in 
the majority of quantitative studies on civil conflict and 2) categorization by level of 
conflict.  
 Before testing any hypothesis, the baseline model is compared model against the 
expectations set forth in the existing literature to confirm that the work is beginning from 
similar baselines.  This will imitate studies by Henderson (2000), de Soysa (2002), and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) who find that the probability of conflict is a function of 
economic variables, political variables, social variables, and ethnic variables.  Among the 





 As noted above, a more finely parsed dependent variable offers the possibility of 
discerning more precisely defined conditions under which environmental change 
contributes to the outbreak of civil disorder.  There are some options for the dependent 
variable data, both for the dichotomous dependent variable and for the categorical 
dependent variable.  In quantitative research on civil war, the dependent variable is 
typically measured by one of a small number of data sets and, therefore, defined by the 
rules used to code the data.  Most data sets begin with a definition of civil conflict that 
includes violence, interactions between insurgents and military forces of the state, and a 
threshold number of deaths in a year and/or over the course of the conflict that may or 
may not include civilians as well as combatants. 
 Singer and Small’s Correlates of War Project is frequently used for studies with a 
dichotomous dependent variable.  Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s Armed Conflict data set 
and the State Failure Task Force are two of the more widely used sources for studies 
based on a categorical dependent variable.  Civil war for Singer and Small requires a 
threshold of 1000 combined military and civilian deaths per year.  Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg use three categories to classify intra-state conflict: minor armed conflict, 
intermediate armed conflict and war.  Minor armed conflict requires a minimum of 25 
battle-related deaths and no more than 1000 such deaths during the course of the conflict.  
Intermediate armed conflicts have fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths in any given year 
but break the 1000-death threshold for the conflict’s duration.  Conflicts are classified as 
war when they cross the 1000-death threshold in any given year.  The State Failure Task 




categories of severe political conflict and regime crises: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, 
adverse or disruptive regime transition, and politicide/genocide. 
 While widely used and well regarded, these data sets fall short for a number of 
reasons.  Two of the data sets fail to cover the years of interest in this study, 1965-2000.  
Singer and Small cover the years 1816-1992 while Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data 
cover the years 1989-2003.  The State Failure Task Force data set begins with a definition 
of conflict that is limited to the end of the continuum that represents catastrophe; this 
limitation impedes the ability to apply the findings to a broader universe; it also precludes 
examining the effect of the independent variables across a broad range of conflict.  An 
additional complication with this data is that any given conflict may be plausibly 
assigned to more than one category necessitating the use of a series of dichotomous 
variables for each type.  Finally, Hauge and Ellingsen’s findings that the environment is 
more important in low-level conflicts may indicate that the State Failure Task Force 
typology will not be a useful means to disaggregate the dependent variable in this study. 
 Monty Marshall’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Uppsala 
University’s States in Armed Conflict Database (SACD) version 2.1 are two alternatives 
to Singer and Small, Wallensteen and Sollenberg, and the State Failure Task Force that 
cover the years of interest in this study and that have been coded across the full 
continuum of conflict.  Marshall’s Major Episodes of Political Violence is a list of 324 
episodes of armed conflict for the period 1946-2006.  The listing is a compilation from 16 
sources, including Singer and Small’s Correlates of War project and Wallenstein and 
Sollenberg’s armed conflict data.  Marshall does not attempt to mediate among the 




conflict, the Major Episodes of Political Violence data set codes thd case as being in 
conflict.  For the purposes of this study, a nation year is coded as 1 for conflict if it is 
included in Marshall’s list as being active during any of the years of interest and if the 
type is not listed as international.  All years not coded 1 are coded 0 to indicate the 
absence of civil conflict. 
 The Uppsala University database, States in Armed Conflict Database, begins from 
the following definition of conflict: “An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and /or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths.”  Those cases classified as conflict are subdivided into categories following 
Wallenstein and Sollenberg, which was described above. 
 This research will examine cases of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1965 to 
2000.  The initial year, was chosen as a point in time when most Sub-Saharan African 
nations had gained independence and therefore had meaningful data available for 
inclusion in the analysis.  The terminal year was dictated by the availability of 
precipitation data, a key independent variable.  The latest year included in the Hague and 
Ellingsen analysis was 1992.  This study seeks to extend that analysis to both cover a 
longer range of time and to test whether there are differences in conflicts during the Cold 
War and during the post-Cold War period.  The unit of analysis is the nation-year, an 
annual observation for each of the 42 states in the data set.  There are a total of 1512 
nation-years with data and this comprises the universe.  This study will use two different 
measures for the dependent variable.  The first is a dichotomous variable, compiled from 




of civil war and 1 for the presence of civil war for each nation year.  The second 
dependent variable is multivariate and measures levels of conflict.  It was compiled and 
coded by staff at PRIO in collaboration with the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research at Uppsala University. It is coded 0 for the absence of civil conflict, 1 for cases 
of minor civil conflict, 2 for cases of intermediate civil conflict, and 3 for cases of civil 
war. 
Independent Variables 
 Studies of civil conflict have found that variables such as regime type, a measure 
of economic development, the degree of ethnic homogeneity, per capita GDP, and export 
dependence are significant predictors of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The studies on 
environment and conflict included measures for per capita GNP, regime type, income 
inequality, political instability, population density, deforestation rates, extent of land 
degradation, per capita fresh water resources, infant mortality, and the human 
development index.  This analysis draws on the findings of both civil conflict and 
environmental conflict into a single model designed to reflect the complexity suggested 
by the literature; it includes a wide range of the social, economic, political, and 
environmental independent variables that these prior studies have found to be important 
predictors of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The complete list is also compiled in 
Appendix B.  All variables have been transformed as needed to conform to the 





 The political variables measure the type of political regime; the duration of the 
regime; and the extent to which changes from one leader to another are regular and 
institutionalized, the election of the executive is competitive and open to non-elites, and 
the presence and openness of institutions for political participation.  These variables will 
be taken from the Polity IV data.  Regime stability (p4durable) is measured by the 
number of years the government has been in power and is expected to reduce the odds of 
conflict.  The regime type variable (p4polity) is based on Polity IV indices for 
institutionalized democracy and autocracy.  The regime type index will be obtained by 
subtracting the score for autocracy from the score for democracy, yielding a variable with 
a range of 10 (most democratic) to -10 (most autocratic).  Following the consensus in the 
literature, this result has been squared (politysq) and is expected to vary inversely with 
conflict. 
 The effect of time on this analysis is accounted for in two ways.  First, 
autocorrelation is a concern when country-year is the unit of analysis and the dependent 
variable measures the incidence of conflict.  Nations in conflict have a high probability of 
being in conflict in the subsequent year; the same relationship holds true for years at 
peace as well.  To reduce the effect this endogeneity has on the model and following the 
work of Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), the dependent variables will be lagged one year 
(lagMEPV and lagSACD).  In accordance with existing theory, each lagged dependent 
variable is expected to vary positively with the dependent variable. 
 Second, there is reason to hypothesize that the major changes which occurred in 




conflicts.  While the Hauge and Ellingsen study (1998) did not find a difference between 
Cold War and post-Cold War years, their data set ended in 1992, which may not have 
included enough post-Cold War years to detect discernable patterns.  Hence this study 
will include a control variable coded 1 for each Cold War year (those years up to and 
including 1988) and 0 for each post Cold War year (all years 1989 and after).  Further, 
this study will posit that Cold War (coldwar) will vary in opposition with conflict, i.e. 
conflict is more likely in post-Cold War years than in Cold War years. 
 The relationship between environment and conflict is mediated by institutions.  
Institution is not a concept that is easily quantifiable for two reasons.  First, an institution 
is an abstract concept that can be measured only indirectly.  Second, there are many 
aspects to the intangible constructs that could contribute to its effect.  This study 
operationalized institutions in three different ways.  The concepts of groupness and 
institutional inclusivity are discussed here; the capability to manage water resources is 
expanded upon below in a discussion specific to water variables. 
 Groupness is a construct which includes the fact that the individuals in a society 
have many identities, the extent to which those identities overlap, and the extent to which 
individuals depend on those identities for security; a variable has to be able to capture all 
of those meanings.  Inclusivity represents the extent to which groups are empowered to 
participate in political decision-making as well as the extent to which the institutions 
enable groups to influence decisions.  In addition, inclusivity can be directed at multiple 
levels of political institutions - local, provincial and national – as well as at the layers 




national institution operating in a provincial or local field office.  The variable that 
represents this construct must be able to incorporate all of those different nuances. 
 Were this study looking only at a time period proximate to the era of 
independence, a variable to indicate the colonial power might be an adequate cognate for 
an institutional variable because institutions at that time closely mirrored those of the 
colonial power.  Since this analysis is looking at a much longer period that extends well 
beyond independence, institutional variables must be able to represent the dynamics of 
institutions over the entire course of the study.  The indicators must also be able to 
capture as many aspects of the groupness and inclusivity concepts as possible.  
Inclusivity is the political aspect of the institutional factor and will be discussed here.  
Groupness, more representative of societal institutions, will be addressed in the section 
on the social environment below.  There is some quantitative data on governance that 
would capture aspects of inclusivity at both national and lower governmental levels; 
unfortunately, these measures do not extend back much earlier than the mid-1980s and 
they do not fully cover the universe of Sub-Saharan African nations.  
 The Polity dataset includes a composite variable on executive recruitment that 
measures the competitiveness, the openness, and the regularity of the process by which 
political elites come to occupy their positions and is based on structural components that 
measure the transfer of executive power.  Those structural components are (1) the 
regularity of the manner in which the chief executive is selected: unregulated seizure of 
power by force, the designation by the political elite in the absence of competition, or a 
regulated process governed by rules of hereditary succession or through competitive 




to compete to join the political elite: an uncontested selection process or a competitive 
election with two or more parties or candidates, and (3) the extent to which the selection 
process, at least in principle, is open to all members of the polity: in nations with a single 
chief executive: closed to all but those with successions rights through hereditary descent 
or open to all; in nations with dual executives, one position closed to those with 
hereditary succession rights and the other selected by political elites, or one position 
closed to those with hereditary succession rights and the other selected through an 
election process. 
 Regular, open, and competitive elections are a means of empowering citizens to 
participate actively in political decision-making and choice of the chief executive is one 
means by which polity members are able to participate in and influence the political 
decision-making process; as noted earlier, the variable for institutional inclusivity must 
be able to measure societal groups’ ability to participate in and to influence the political 
decision-making process. 
 Executive recruitment is a component of regime type and is highly correlated with 
it (0.51) but they are distinct variables.  Polity is a scalar variable that weights the 
categorical component concepts differently.  Thus, while the executive recruitment 
components are included in the polity measure, they are not included equally, either in 
proportion to one another or in proportion to the other component concepts.  
Furthermore, polity includes elements that are unrelated to inclusivity, such as the extent 
to which executive decisions are effectively constrained by a constitution, a legislature or 
a judicial system.  Because of their high correlation, however, when executive 




squared will be dropped.  This variable (p4exrec) is expected to vary inversely with 
conflict. 
 Executive recruitment fails to adequately represent the extent to which the 
empowerment and participation extend to local and provincial levels of government.  
This aspect of inclusivity will be captured through an index of civil liberties as reported 
by Freedom House.  The Freedom House annual Freedom in the World survey measures 
freedom as experienced by individuals.  They define freedom as the opportunity to act 
spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other 
centers of potential domination and their coding is derived from civil liberty as it is 
referenced in Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Civil liberty allows for the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state; the ratings generally reflect 
the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental and are 
therefore well-matched with the objectives of this study.  Where executive recruitment 
represents the actions of political elites and decision-makers and the actions they take that 
provide for empowerment, civil liberties represents the actions of individuals and the 
extent to which they are able to take actions to participate in and to influence the actions 
taken by the political elite.  Civil liberties is coded with 1 representing a high degree of 
civil liberties and 7 representing the absence of civil liberties, hence this variable 
(civil_liberties) is expected to increase the likelihood of conflict. 
 Patronage and clientelism, discussed earlier, are captured indirectly through the 
variables for regime type, minorities at risk, civil liberties, and executive recruitment.  




the democracy range of the regime type variable or the open end of the executive 
recruitment scale.  Similarly, a political system that is based on patronage networks is 
more likely to create conditions that will systematically disadvantage minority groups or 
that will limit the opportunities for individuals to freely express beliefs or to freely 
organize with others on behalf of those beliefs.  While patronage might more easily be 
associated with the distribution of rents from marketable resources, it may also be an 
important factor in the state’s decisions about the distribution of resources to relieve 
hardships caused by natural events related to water resources such as droughts or floods. 
Economic Environments 
 The economic variables will indicate the opportunity for challenger groups to 
both organize and finance their ventures.  Greater openness to trade increases the 
opportunity cost of civil war sufficiently to deter the most intense of civil conflicts but 
the increased trade that occurs with increased openness breaks down the internal ties 
among and between the groups in a society thus reducing the opportunity cost of lower 
level civil wars.  Trade openness also represents the institutional capacity of a 
government to develop policies that will advance a regime’s objectives, such as economic 
growth, poverty alleviation, or adaptation to environmental change, all of which could be 
expected to reduce the likelihood of conflict (Bussmann et al. 2005, Easterly and Levine 
2003; Martin et al.2007).  The trade openness variable (tradeopen) is calculated from the 
World Development Indicators data as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (World 
Bank 2001) and is expected to vary inversely with conflict. 
 Ford (1995) found the Mathusian assumption of a direct link between population 




population density in his work and found a direct positive effect on conflict.  Goldstone 
(2001) disputes the direct causal effect and suggests that population’s effect is context-
specific, citing as examples rapid urbanization in combination with slow economic 
growth or an insufficient job supply in conjunction with an increase in the number of 
highly educated job seekers.  Urdal (2005), looking specifically at the different aspects of 
population pressure espoused by Homer-Dixon and others, does not find that high 
population growth rates, high urbanization rates, or large refugee populations are 
associated with increased conflict. 
The literature provides no consensus on population’s effect and this study will 
follow the example set by Goldstone.  The environment-conflict question is a 
sophisticated one that, thus far, has not lent itself to parsimony or direct effects.  The data 
available for Sub-Saharan Africa over the 1965-2000 period is not robust enough to use 
urbanization or employment, therefore this study will include variables for both 
population and per capita GDP to approximate Goldstone’s suggested contexts and will 
test Goldstone’s assertion of an interaction effect.  The model includes per capita GDP, 
taken from World Bank data (World Bank 2001), and population density, from UN 
Population Division data (United Nations Population Division 1999), as indicators of 
demand-induced scarcity.  Economic growth, measured as per capita GDP (gdpperca) is 
expected to vary inversely with conflict; whereas population density (popdense) is 
expected to vary positively with conflict. 
Social Environments 
 Ethnic identity is an important component of African societal structure, is an 




political and economic goods are distributed as they are, and can approximate how social 
divisions in Sub-Saharan Africa operationalize the societal aspect of institutions.  There 
are several options for using ethnicity to represent groupness in this model.  One is the 
number of ethnolinguistic groups in the country.  However a simple count of the 
ethnolinguistic groups cannot reflect vital information such as the relative size of the 
groups.  Many researchers use a measure that captures the presence or absence of 
dominant groups, defined as the percentage of the population in the largest linguistic 
groups, but such a measure represents group size which is only one aspect of groupness 
in a society.  Another option is to use the presence of minorities coded as being at risk by 
the Minorities at Risk project.  Both an ethnolinguistic factionalization and minorities at 
risk variable would be coded 0/1 and be constant or nearly so for each nation across the 
years.  Hence, from a methodological perspective, there is no advantage in using one 
variable over the other; neither introduces additional variation across the measurement of 
the construct.  Most of the cited literature which includes a variable for ethnicity uses 
ethnolinguistic factionalization (Jenkins and Kpsowa 1990, Jenkins and Kpsowa 1992, 
Kpsowa and Jenkins 1993, Auvinen 1997, Henderson 1998, Elbadawi and Sambanis 
2000, Henderson 2000, Henderson and Singer 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, deSoysa 
2002, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Murdoch and Sandler 2002, Elbadawi and Sambanis 
2003, Fearon 2005, Humphries 2005, Regan and Norton 2005).  This study will employ 
the minorities at risk coding; it more accurately operationalizes the manner in which 
ethnicity represents groupness and thereby contributes to conflict.  The presence or 
absence of multiple identities, in itself, would be neither necessary nor sufficient to 




presence of a dominant group, is not the best choice for this variable.  It is the systematic 
inclusion of groups in or exclusion of groups from government based on ethnic identity 
that creates the necessary preconditions for conflict.  The Minorities at Risk Dataset 
defines a minority group as an “at-risk group” if the group collectively experiences 
discriminatory treatment and the group engages in political mobilization and collective 
action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.  Minorities at risk (MAR) 
reflects the systematic exclusion of groups and is, therefore, a more appropriate choice 
for this variable; it is expected to vary with conflict.  The Minorities at Risk Dataset 
could be used to code a variable to indicate the presence or absence of an at-risk minority 
group or to indicate the number of at-risk groups in the nation.  Both codings were tested 
using correlation against all other variables in the baseline theoretical model and in the 
statistical models and yielded similar results.  This study will use the dummy variable 
coding because its correlation coefficients were typically two to three percentage points 
lower than the categorical coding, indicating a somewhat smaller probability of a linear 
association with other variables. 
 The government’s inability to provide for the basic needs of the population can be 
one source of grievance among the citizens that can contribute to the outbreak of conflict.  
Thus, this study includes a social variable that represents the government’s ability to 
ensure the health and well-being of its people.  There are many highly correlated 
indicators for basic health and education available to choose from including the numbers 
of doctors, nurses or clinics per capita; literacy rate; female literacy rate; and infant 
mortality.  The human development index would also be a potential choice; however, it is 




mortality rate (infmort) because data, taken from UN Population Division, are available 
across the range of years and nations being studied and because the State Failure Task 
Force found it to be a strong indicator of a country’s overall quality of life (State Failure 
Task Force 1999); it is expected to vary with conflict.  
Natural Environments 
 The water-related hypotheses raise questions about the effect that changes in 
water resources and their interannual variability and that institutional capabilities to 
manage those resources have on conflict.  The environment is represented in this model 
in three ways, as a measure of availability, which reflects scarcity; as a measure of 
environmental change, which when combined with availability indicates scarcity; and as 
a measure of the institutional capacity to manage water resources.  Environmental change 
is represented in this model by two variables derived from total annual precipitation in 
the Tyndall Center’s climate data, per capita precipitation and deviations from the 100-
year mean. 
The state of a nation’s water infrastructure affects the extent to which it is 
vulnerable to or is prepared to adapt to changes in precipitation.  Water infrastructure is 
physical structures, either natural or manmade, capable of storing water to deliver it 
during periods of low rainfall, both because of seasonal variations and because of 
drought.  Water infrastructure is also structures, natural or manmade, capable of 
containing or alleviating the impact of flood waters.  This infrastructure might take the 
form of dams, irrigation schemes, land use practices that periodically leave drought-prone 
lands fallow after several years of use or that leave flood-prone lands uninhabited during 




maintenance, and, in the case of manmade structures, also to manage their construction.  
Infrastructure is inversely related to risk: the higher or greater the infrastructure, the 
lower the risk.  The presence of infrastructure represents capacity to adapt to both 
variability and extremes.  In Sub-Saharan Africa drought is more common than flood, but 
the continent is vulnerable to both extremes.  Sub-Saharan Africa is the more affected by 
drought than anywhere else in the world: in 2005 more than 20 million people were 
affected by drought in the Horn of Africa alone; drought is endemic to large swaths of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to the Horn, the Sahel, East Africa and southern Africa 
experience recurring drought every three to five years (United Nations Development 
Program, 2006, 157).   
The poor are at greatest risk from weak infrastructure: they tend to work the least 
productive land, which will be the first to lose soil moisture during drought, or they tend 
to live and work in the lowest-lying and flood-prone areas, which are the first to flood, 
the most frequently hit, and the hardest hit by floods (United Nations Development 
Program, 2006, 157).  As has already been discussed, Sub-Saharan Africa has a large and 
growing number of people in poverty and therefore, an increasing vulnerability to the 
debilitating effects of droughts and floods. 
This study operationalizes institutional capacity to manage water resources and 
water resource infrastructure using measures for participation in treaties over shared 
water resources, World Bank lending for water projects and by the percent of irrigated 
cropland.  Humans put water to use for irrigation more than for any other purpose.  As a 
result, irrigation and agriculture are the largest consumers of water in a society.  




changes to accommodate changes in diet, including the consuming more animal-derived 
protein, which requires more water to produce than grains (United Nations Development 
Program, 2006, 137).  Previous studies have used per capita water resources as the 
environmental variable of interest (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
and deSoysa 2002) but per capita water resources is available for only one year of the 35-
year range covered in this analysis and the data for each nation is available for a different 
year.  This study tests several alternatives that both introduce needed variation in the 
explanatory variable and that measure several different aspects of water’s relationship to 
the political arena. 
Building the Water Variables 
 Water resource availability is measured within political boundaries yet these 
political boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers without regard for rivers – 
either their courses or their distribution across the land.  Lacking a historical basis for the 
inclusion of a river in one nation or another and lacking a statistically supportable 
relationship between the number of rivers and the size of a nation, it is difficult to 
substantiate a claim of a relationship between the number of rivers and conflict.  This 
study measures water resources using several different approaches, each of which 
captures, in a different manner, the means by which water resources are hypothesized to 
contribute to the presence of conflict in a nation.  Not all potential approaches for 
measuring the various aspects of the water variable are equally robust; some have the 
same shortcomings as the original used by Hauge and Ellingsen: they are static and, as 




 One static measure is the number of international river basins in each nation.  As 
with the water availability variable, there is variation across nations but no variation 
across time; the number of river basins in any given country does not change unless the 
nation’s borders change.  A second static measure that probes the relationship between a 
nation and its water resources from a different perspective is the percent of the nation that 
lies within an international river basin.  Rivers do sporadically change their course in 
response to floods as well as over the very long term as a result of the cumulative erosive 
force of the water as it travels over the material which makes up the riverbed.  Softer 
materials will erode more rapidly than harder materials and thereby slowly alter the 
river’s geospatial location.  Changes in political boundaries may also cause a one-time 
change in the value of either of these otherwise unvarying variables.10
 Both measures were calculated based on data on international river basins 
contained in Glecik’s 2000-2001 biennial report on the world water resources.  Neither of 
these measures was highly correlated with other possible water variables, and from that 
standpoint, either would thus be a good candidate for inclusion.  They were tested in 
several models and were never found to be significant.  While other variables that have 
been used are also never significant, these two were ultimately rejected because they lack 
a plausible theoretical argument to justify their inclusion in this study. 
 The human construct of a territorial boundary has no meaning to the geologic and 
geographic reality of a river basin.  Nor have humans heeded river basins’ drainage area 
when drawing boundary lines on a map; in fact, they have typically done the opposite and 
                                                 
10 National borders have changed twice in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 35 years 
covered in this study, once with the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia and again with 




used the river as the boundary line thereby dividing the river basin among political 
entities.  Hence, a variable to note the presence or absence of an international river basin 
in an Africa nation would have no meaning; every African nation has territory in at least 
one major transboundary river basin.  Gleditsch et.al. (2006), in a study on international 
conflict and shared rivers reported that a regional variable for sub-Saharan Africa 
indicated less international conflict in the region than the rest of the world but noted that 
the finding is not as counterintuitive as it appears; most conflict in Africa is civil rather 
than international.  If this effect spills over to the domestic arena, as African nations 
participate at different rates in international water treaties, they gain institutional 
capacity.  The engagement in treaty-making is indicative of a nation’s level of 
institutional capacity to successfully negotiate and sign international treaties while the 
actions necessary to fulfill the negotiated obligations are an indicator of a nation’s 
institutional capacity to regulate the use of its water resources.  Hence, the participation 
in treaties as well as the number of treaties to which a nation is a signatory are indicators 
that the nation possesses the institutional capacity to mediate among conflicting views 
and to address grievances without using violent force.  Data on international treaties has 
been operationalized to represent institutional capacity: as the proportion of the 
cumulative number of water treaties signed to the number of international river basins.  
These variables have been coded using information on international treaties for water 
resources available from WATERLEX11, the FAO’s searchable online database of 
international agreements on international water sources, and the International Freshwater 
                                                 




Treaties Database12, a part of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database.  The 
variable for the number of treaties signed each year is coded as 0 for all years when no 
treaties were signed during the calendar year; for all other years the variables is coded 
with the integer which represents the number of treaties signed.13  Those nations who 
were independent before 1965, the first year of the study, and who had signed 
international treaties governing shared water resources will have the cumulative number 
of water treaties signed as of 1965 as their initial value.  The cumulative number of water 
treaties for each year is then calculated as the number of water treaties signed in that year 
added to the total number of water treaties signed in all prior years.  It is reasonable to 
expect that the number of water treaties in which a nation engages is related to the 
number of international river basins within that nation’s territory.  Therefore, the variable 
is normalized by dividing the cumulative number of water treaties by the total number of 
river basins. 
 Another means that may be used to measure institutional capacity to manage 
water resources is through World Bank funding for water development projects.  As with 
international treaties, this study asserts that a nation will have demonstrated a minimum 
level of institutional capacity to manage the funding and the development projects they 
support prior to project approval and receipt of the funds.  While misuse of funds is 
certainly a problem across the continent, in general, those nations that proved themselves 
unable to manage the funds, complete the projects, and repay the debt were less likely to 
see additional funds for new projects. 
                                                 
12 http://ocid.cacse.org/tfdd/treaties.php; accessed 10/22/2004 
13 Most frequently, that integer is 1 but there are 26 nation years when it is a number 




World Bank historical data on aid was the source for two variables on lending for 
projects that included water-related components such as dams (but not projects or 
amendments exclusively for electricity generation), irrigation, and sanitation.  Each year 
that World Bank data showed a nation being awarded a water-related project, the value of 
the award is weighted by the average of that year’s GNP and the preceding four years to 
control for the likelihood that larger economies are likely to receive larger loans and the 
fact that the funds are spent over time.  Years in which no World Bank water projects are 
awarded are coded with a 0.   
World Bank loans are typically multi-year but the data source did not consistently 
indicate either the duration of the funding or the start date.  To simulate the effect of 
disbursing the funds over a period of time, a second variable is created that is a rolling 
average of all loans awarded in the current year plus the four preceding years.  The value 
is then weighted by the annual GNP to account for the likelihood that larger economies 
are likely to receive larger loans. 
 As noted earlier, the measure for annual per capita water resource availability that 
Hauge and Ellingsen utilized was static across their study’s temporal dimension and that 
limited the accuracy of their results.  As a way to approximate the static water resources 
variable and introduce variation into that static variable, this study includes variables 
derived from total annual precipitation and the size of each nation.  Total annual 
precipitation in millimeters is taken from the Tyndall Center’s TYN CY 1.1 data set 
(Mitchell et al. 2002)14 to create a measure of volume for each nation-year and is 
                                                 
14 New et al. (2000) gridded total annual precipitation observations made by national 
meteorological agencies.  The gridded data were aggregated using political boundaries by 




multiplied by land area; it is then divided by 10 to approximate the thousand cubic liter 
volume and scale of Hague and Ellingsen’s variable: 
 
Total Annual Precipitation (mm) X Land Area (‘000 Ha)/10 
 
The result of this mathematical calculation is significantly larger than the rest of the 
dataset, therefore annual precipitation weighted by land area is log transformed to yield 
meaningful coefficients and effect sizes. 
This variable is the foundation for the per capita precipitation variable used in the 
theoretical models.  This measure will mirror per capita water resources used by Hague 
and Ellingsen and is derived by dividing annual precipitation weighted by land area by 
total population.  The resulting variable, per capita precipitation, is expected to vary 
inversely with conflict.  A connection between water resource availability and conflict 
might also be drawn through economic capacity; water is a necessary input to many, if 
not all manufacturing processes as an ingredient, as a coolant, or as a cleaning agent.  
Therefore, the per capita precipitation will be used in conjunction with an interaction 
term between per capita precipitation and per capita gdp..15
 Precipitation is not constant from year to year.  Ecosystems and human societies 
construct themselves knowing that the amount of annual precipitation tends to fall within 
                                                 
15 One might expect that in economies with large agricultural sectors that precipitation, an 
important input in agriculture, would be highly correlated with GDP, making it difficult 
to discern whether the observed effect was due to precipitation of GDP.  Correlations 
between GDP and precipitation are small and well within a range that is acceptable for 
inclusion as distinct variables.  Bivariate correlation between annual precipitation in 
millimeters and gdp is -0.1403 and between the volume of precipitation per capita and 




established bounds.  Human societies decide where to build settlements and what size the 
settlements should be based, in part, on historical precipitation trends.  Therefore, this 
study also includes a variable to measure the extent to which annual precipitation 
deviates from those historical trends.  The difference between each nation-year’s annual 
precipitation and the 100-year long-term average was calculated.  The long-term average 
was that of the Twentieth century, 1900-2000.  Deviations below the average indicate 
drought and deviations above the average indicate floods.  Hence this variable can be 
expected to present a U-shaped relationship and is therefore also squared to meet the 
requirements of a linear model.  It is expected to vary positively with conflict. 
 The vast majority of the African population relies on open streams or groundwater 
accessed via wells rather than reservoirs for their water needs therefore, annual 
precipitation data is a plausible substitute for the sparse water availability data.  However, 
precipitation is not identical to per capita water availability; not all precipitation is 
available for consumption.  Furthermore, a small number of rain gauges represent a very 
large area with a wide variety of precipitation patterns.  Thus, it is necessary to test the 
viability of using a weighted precipitation variable as a proxy for water availability in 
African nations. 
This validation was conducted using a two step process.  First, total renewable 
water resources (Gleick 2000) was correlated against weighted precipitation (Mitchell, 
Hulme and New 2002).  The renewable water figures are for a variety of years ranging 
from 1970 to 1992.  In each case, the newly generated value for annual precipitation 
weighted by land area was included for the year to which the per capita water estimate is 




hence annual precipitation weighted by land area is taken from 1990, while renewable 
water resources for Ghana are available for 1970, hence annual precipitation weighted by 
land area is taken from 1970.  Since the water resource availability figure represents the 
resources of the entire country, the precipitation figure, which is representative of a 
geographical point (or an average of multiple points) was multiplied by the total land area 
to provide a comparable nationwide measure. 
The 0.77 correlation over 42 observations was strong enough to warrant further 
testing using the second step, a simple regression analysis with renewable water 
resources as the dependent variable and annual precipitation weighted by land area as the 
independent variable.  Precipitation weighted by land area was significant at the 0.001 
level and the R-square indicates that the weighted precipitation variable explains more 
than 60% of the variation in the water resource availability variable.  Annual precipitation 
and population data are available with no missing values for all years of this study and 
the high correlation between the annual precipitation and water supply indicates that they 
are closely enough related to substitute the variable with data across the entire range of 
years under consideration for a variable with data for only one year of the 40-year time 
span.4  The correlation table, regression results, and residual plot are reproduced in 
Appendix E. 
                                                 
 4De Soysa (2002) used the same method to support substituting HDI for 





Description of Methods 
 This study employs Stata version 8 to analyze a series of theoretical models using 
regression-based statistical techniques on data gathered from international governmental 
organizations and academic research centers.  The specific regression-based techniques 
are determined by the nature of the dependent variable and the extent to which the data 
are able to meet the underlying assumptions of the statistical tests.  The objective is to 
ascertain whether the inclusion of variables on environmental change improves the ability 
to predict conflicts in Africa over models that rely primarily on economic and political 
variables.  Many of the studies that comprise the existing literature have been conducted 
using a binary dependent variable and logistic regression therefore, the models are first 
tested using a binary dependent variable and logistic regression and are then tested using 
a categorical dependent variable and ordered logistic regression.  These results are then 
compared to determine whether the data explain civil conflict better as a dependent 
variable with multiple categories or as a binary dependent variable.  The use of multiple 
methods for coding the dependent variable is also used to ascertain whether 
environmental degradation contributes differently to the outbreak of particular levels of 
African conflicts.  The different methods of operationalizing conflict will necessitate the 
use of statistical methods not typically used in studies of civil conflict. 
In each case the baseline equation is: 
Conflict = lagged dependent variable + tradeopen + p4polity + politysq + 
popdense + gdppercap + MAR + infmort + p4durable + coldwar. 
The variables representing the numerous ways of operationalizing water resources are 




baseline and against one another.  The interaction variables are added, one at a time to the 
baseline equation and the results are compared against the baseline. 
 As discussed earlier, conflict is a continuum and the dependent variable drawn 
from the SACD dataset has to be thought of as an imperfect representation of that 
continuum.  A model based on a continuous dependent variable cannot be tested using 
ordinary least squares regression; the dependent variable codings push the limits of 
several assumptions inherent in ordinary least squares regression, including that the range 
not be truncated and that the data be interval or near interval.  While the zero to three 
range of the SACD data is considerably greater than the zero to one range of the MEPV 
data, it is not sufficient to effectively or reliably use ordinary least squares regression.  
Furthermore, the data, while certainly possessing characteristics of ordinality inherent in 
the scale of battlefield deaths used to determine the coding, do not reach the degree of 
intervalness required for ordinary least squares regression. 
 Therefore, this analysis is also run using ordered logistic regression rather than 
ordinary least squares regression.  As already noted, the levels of the dependent variable 
are clearly ordinal and coded from least (no conflict) to greatest (war).  Ordered logistic 
regression, like all statistical tests, has its own set of limiting assumptions.  Ordered 
logistic regression is based on the proportional odds assumption, also referred to as the 
parallel odds assumption; this assumes that the coefficient for each independent variable 
is the same across all categories of the dependent variable. 
 The results of both statistical models are then examined to ascertain the extent to 
which the model fits the data.  There are some variations in the specific tests used to 




the validity and significance of each model.  First, the likelihood ratio chi squared test, 
tests the null hypothesis that no linear relationship exists between the dependent variable 
and the combined independent variables. 
 The second statistical test used to verify the model is one that endeavors to mimic 
the R-squared statistic of ordinary least squares regression, which represents the 
proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables; 
R-squared  varies between 0 and 1.  Because variance in logistic regression-based models 
depends on the distribution of the dependent variable, there is no analog to R-squared 
however, there are several alternative tests, generally called pseudo R-squared, that 
endeavor to approximate the R-squared and are all hampered by their inability to range 
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1.  The tables displaying results for each model 
include both McFadden and Nagelkerke pseudo R-squared values so that the reader may 
see the differences however, the discussion refers only to McFadden’s pseudo R-squared.  
 Each logistic-based statistical model has post-estimation tests available to assess 
the model’s ability to fit the data.  Logistic regression is an attempt to predict with 
accuracy whether a case falls into one or the other of the two dependent variable 
categories.  Stata’s lstat command yields a two by two table illustrating how the model 
predicted the cases and percentages of cases that are correctly classified overall. 
 An underlying assumption in ordered logistic regression is that the model is 
comprised of multiple equations, each with the same coefficients and unique constants, 
known as the parallel odds or proportional odds assumption.  A Brant test is run on all 




Brant indicates the validity of the assumption for the model as a whole and for the 




Chapter 4: Discussion of Results 
 
 The baseline model used in this analysis drew from two related yet distinct 
literatures: literature on civil conflict in general as well as studies on civil conflict in 
Africa and literature on the environment and conflict.  The intent is to demonstrate that a 
combination of these two approaches into a single model better reflects the complexity 
suggested by the literature by including a wider range of the social, economic, political, 
and environmental independent variables that these prior studies have found to be 
important predictors of conflict.  This chapter will begin with a review of the baseline 
model to ascertain whether the variables selected follow the expectations set forth in the 
existing work.  The discussion will then proceed to consider the evidence as presented by 
the data confirms the hypotheses set forth earlier; this discussion will be arranged to 
follow three themes “Does the Environment Matter?”, “Under What Circumstances?”, 
and “By What Means?” 
 This chapter will show that the environment does matter and that water resources 
increase the likelihood of conflict by reducing the opportunity costs of engaging in 
conflict for opposition movements.  Rather than depending on the revenue generated 
from a resource, this chapter will show that increases in water resources create conditions 
that result in a surplus labor force in search of an income and that opposition movements 
promise of income thereby “employs” the surplus labor. 
 This chapter will further show that water resources increase the likelihood of 
higher-level conflicts and that changes in water resource availability have greater 




that water resources beyond a threshold level of scarcity increase the odds of conflict but 
will show that surplus water resources reduce the odds of conflict.  Further, this chapter 
will show that low-level conflict is more likely in the post-Cold War and that changes in 
long-term water resources are more likely to contribute to post-Cold War conflicts. 
 Finally, this chapter will show that institutional capacity alone has a strong 
influence on the likelihood of conflict and that the relationship between institutional 
capacity and conflict is complex, and at times, contradictory.  Open political systems 
reduce the likelihood of conflict but the capacity to manage water resources increases that 
likelihood.  This chapter will not find evidence that environmental stressors exacerbate 
existing political weaknesses or that greater civil liberties mediate the relationship 
between water resources and conflict, nor will this chapter will show that open political 
institutions mediate the effect of precipitation on conflict by increasing the opportunity 
cost of  engaging in violence against the state. 
Baseline Model 
 It is necessary to pause for a moment to clarify the nomenclature for the terms 
theoretical model and statistical model.  The former term will be used to refer models 
which are the result of the addition of an explanatory variable to the baseline.  The latter 
will be employed when distinguishing among the use of logistic regression, ordered 
logistic regression. 
 In general the variables in the baseline equation conform to expectations for the 
direction of the relationship as established by existing research (see Table 3): the lagged 
dependent variable, per capita gross domestic product, the presence of minorities at risk, 




openness to trade, regime type squared polity, population density, and Cold War reduce 
the odds of conflict, all as expected.  The only anomaly is for political stability.  While 
the variables in the baseline model generally follow expectations for direction of 
relationship with conflict, several do not meet any significance criteria.  Infant mortality 
provides the most surprising anomaly given its role in the State Failure Force Task study 
as an indicator for social well-being.  The other variables that fail to meet the significance 
test are political stability and population density.  The implications of these results are 
discussed below.  The baseline variables are reasonable initial characterization of the 
explanatory factors in civil conflict. 
 The various measures of model fit suggest that the baseline model fits the data 
reasonably well.  Knowledge of the independent variables reduces the error beyond what 
would be obtained by chance by 69.7% and the model correctly classifies 94.1% of the 
observations. 
Baseline Variables 
 Regime type squared generally conformed to expectations in terms of varying 
inversely with conflict; this confirms previous findings that the more democratic or 
authoritarian a government, the less likely it is to experience civil conflict.  However, the 
variable’s significance was not as strong as previous literature indicated could be 
expected; it was significant at some level, including the 0.10 threshold, across every 
statistical model and theoretical model and, in the few cases when it was not, its p-value 
was within thousandths of a percentage of the 0.10 threshold.  In addition, its effect size 
is relatively small; a unit increase or decrease in the regime type score changes the odds 




 One baseline variable that was surprisingly unremarkable was the length of time 
since the last regime change.  The coefficients for political stability neither met the 
expectation that the indicator would vary inversely with conflict nor were they ever 
significant, even at the 0.10 level, across any of the theoretical models using logistic 
regression as the statistical test.  This intriguing result will be explored in detail in the 
discussion of Hypothesis 6 on environmental change and regime stability. 
 The lagged dependent variable conformed to expectations; it was significant at 
greater than 0.0000 and varied positively with conflict across all statistical models and 
across all theoretical models.  The large effect size provides strong confirmation for prior 
research, which asserts that a nation’s state of peace or conflict in the prior year is a 
strong predictor of peace or conflict in the subsequent year. 
 Trade openness also conformed to expectations; it was significant at least 0.05, 
and often to 0.001, and varied inversely with conflict across all statistical models and 
across all theoretical models.  Trade openness has a significant impact on conflict; for 
each percentage increase or decrease in trade openness, the odds of conflict increase or 
decrease by 1.7 percent.  Although the statistical model for ordered logistic regression as 
a whole failed to meet the parallel odds assumption, the trade openness variable did meet 
this condition indicating that openness to trade consistently predicts conflict across the 
continuum represented by the categories.  The results of this study confirm that openness 
to trade increases the opportunity cost to rebels of engaging in civil conflict. 
 A nation’s per capita gross domestic product failed to meet the expectations set by 




is significant, it is always art of an interaction with other variables.  Further discussion of 
per capita gross domestic product will occur at  those points in the analysis. 
 Population density failed to meet the expectations set forth by the previous studies 
that espouse population pressures as driver of civil conflict.  It was rarely significant but 
the sign supported the assumption that population density varied with conflict.  Recall 
that the literature was inconclusive on the population variable and that Goldstone 
suggested one ought not to consider population growth and economic growth separately 
but in tandem; that the synergistic effects of changes in economic conditions with 
changes in demographic conditions was the more appropriate lens through which to 
search for effects.  The interaction term between population density and growth in gross 
domestic product was not significant, and in fact was so unremarkable that the results are 
not included.  This study supports the finding of Urdal (2005); countries experiencing 
population pressures are not also experiencing and increased likelihood of civil conflict. 
 It was noted earlier that the literature has failed to produce a consensus on the role 
that population pressures play in contributing to civil conflict.  Previous findings ranged 
from a direct positive effect between population density and conflict, no significant 
relationship between population and conflict, and a suggestion that the relationship is 
contextual.  This research cannot confirm either the direct positive effect or the 
contextual relationship between population and economic conditions.  This research does 
support the claim that the Malthusian assumption of a link between population and 
environmental conflict does not hold. 
 The presence of at-risk minorities, an indicator of social division and ethnic 




conflicts.  Although universally positive, as expected, it was not always significant at the 
0.05 level but did always meet the 0.10 threshold; in the baseline theoretical modes, 
where there is greater confidence in the finding of significance, the presence of a 
minority group at risk of experiencing discriminatory action increases the odds of conflict 
by more than 150 percent.  Further comment on at-risk minorities as an indicator of group 
inclusivity or exclusivity is reserved for the discussion below on Hypothesis 9. 
 The lack of significance of infant mortality in the baseline model and across all 
theoretical models and all statistical models was one of the more surprising findings.  The 
lack of significance is particularly curious given its role as an indicator of well-being in 
the State Failure project.  The variable always confirmed the assumption that it would 
vary with conflict but was never significant, not even at the 0.10 level.  The differences in 
the findings may be attributable to the different dependent variables.  Recall that this 
study considered using the State Failure Task Force categories as the dependent variable 
and rejected them because they represent only the catastrophic end of the conflict 
continuum.  The difference in findings between this study and the State Failure Task 
Force study indicate that the State Failure Task Force’s work is more akin to the “canary 
in the coal mine”; it is able to detect the “deleterious living conditions” only in the most 
extreme cases of conflict (State Failure Task Force 1999, 51). 
 The baseline model, on the whole, performed as expected, indicating that this 
baseline model accurately reflects current understanding about the nature of conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  As such, it presents a valid starting point against which to judge 













4.6709 *** 4.7308 *** 4.6991 ***
0.2599 0.2817 0.2632
trade openness -0.0172 *** -0.0092 -0.0170 ***
0.0049 0.0060 0.0049
regime type -0.0202 -0.0164 -0.0216
0.0337 0.0378 0.0337
regime type squared -0.0144 * -0.0138 * -0.0145 *
0.0064 0.0070 0.0064
population density -0.0003 0.0005 0.0000
0.0028 0.0032 0.0028
per capita gdp 0.0000 -0.0008 * 0.0000
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
minorities at risk 1.0639 ** 0.7289 + 1.0636 **
0.3937 0.4155 0.3929
infant mortality 0.0060 0.0084 0.0060
0.0046 0.0051 0.0046
political stability 0.0095 0.0099 0.0092
0.0090 0.0111 0.0090
Cold War -0.7863 * -0.8617 ** -0.8012 *
0.3125 0.3295 0.3125




precipitation per capita -0.0003
0.0002




constant -2.9114 *** -3.2027 *** -2.9970 ***
0.8072 0.9040 0.8138
N 1224 1119 1224
Chi squared 732.8223 685.1202 733.8636
log likelihood -236.5357 -204.9724 -236.0151
pseudo R squared 0.6077 0.6256 0.6086
nagelkerke R squared 0.7189 0.7336 0.7196
Correctly Classified 94.12% 94.55% 94.12%
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = 
significant at a 0.1 level
 
Does the Environment Matter? 
H1: Models of civil conflict that include environmental variables are better predictors of 
that conflict than models without environmental variables. 
 This study employed two different variables to represent water resources: annual 
per capita precipitation and difference from the 100-year precipitation average (1900-
2000).  The first is a measure that approximates, on a per capita basis, the volume of 
water available for use currently in the environment and the second is a measure of 
environmental change.  It is most plausible to assert that water resources will have an 
effect on the incidence of conflict as the quantity of precipitation and changes in its 
timing affect ongoing trends in a nation’s demography or economy thus the use of a 
measure of precipitation available per capita and its interaction term with per capita gdp.   
The following discussion will first consider how the each of the variables 
performed and then turn to considering whether the assembled evidence confirms or fails 
to confirm the stated hypothesis.  Although the study has utilized different variables to 
represent the different manners in which changes in environmental conditions might 
contribute to conflict, finding evidence that the addition of any one of the these variables 
results in a better fitting model will be sufficient to confirm the hypothesis.  All results 
are displayed in Table 3. 
 Total available precipitation per capita conforms to expectations and varies 
inversely with conflict but fails to meet any threshold of significance.  This construction 
of the variable most closely resembles the measure Hague and Ellingsen used in their 
1998 study and these results, which represent variation across time, cast significant doubt 




precipitation variable based on the difference from the 100-year precipitation average 
was also never significant, although it always varied with conflict, as expected.  The 
results of this study do demonstrate that precipitation during the last thirty five years of 
the Twentieth Century has not varied significantly enough outside of the ranges 
established during the course of the century to have a discernable effect, this despite the 
fact that during the same period, average global temperatures were setting new records. 
This study provides some evidence to support an assertion that water resources 
are a function of economic output and are a reliable predictor of conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The interaction term of per capita precipitation and per capita gross domestic 
product is significant at the 0.01 level although the effect size is negligible.  A one-unit 
increase in the interaction term changes the odds of conflict by less than 0.05 percent; 
every other variable has a larger effect on the odds of conflict than per capita 
precipitation and the interaction term. 
 Having established that water resources do contribute, albeit in a very small 
manner, to the incidence of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, the discussion will next 
turn to consider whether the weight of the evidence supports an argument that a particular 
conceptualization of the water resource variable is more effective than another.  There are 
several statistical tests that can provide insight into the effectiveness of the theoretical 
models.  The R-squared statistics discussed above are one means.  These generally find 
that per capita precipitation produces the larger R-squared, albeit by a small amount; the 





 The Bayesian information criterion is another measure of the overall fit of a 
model and provides a means to compare across models whether or not they are nested.  
The measure is known to preference more parsimonious models and thus may not be the 
most appropriate choice for comparisons between the baseline and other models that have 
more variables.  It can however, be used to compare the results among the theoretical 
models to aid in determining which of the theoretical models for precipitation best fits the 
data on Sub-Saharan African conflict which have the same number of explanatory 
variables and differ only by the water resource variables in question.  This measure 
preferences per capita precipitation over difference in precipitation from the long-term 
average by more than 50 points.  Deviance reflects the error associated with the model 
when all of the independent variables are included: the smaller the deviance, the better 
the fit.  Using deviance as a measure of the overall fit of a model also preferences per 
capita precipitation over difference in precipitation from the long-term average. 
 This study supports the hypothesis that water resources contribute to conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  While the expectation was for the precipitation per capita to vary 
inversely with conflict and thus provide confirmatory evidence for an assertion of 
scarcity contributing to conflict, instead the data strongly support the opposite that 
abundance water resources reduce opportunity costs for rebels to recruit.  Since the 
scarcity argument has some validity, both theoretically and in past empirical tests, 
perhaps the relationship between water and conflict is not limited to either extremes of 
scarcity or abundance, but to both.  This possibility is tested in Hypothesis 2 and the 




H2: Water resources exhibit a U-shaped relationship with respect to conflict: extremes of 
both scarcity and abundance increase the probability of conflict. 
 This hypothesis is tested using annual precipitation’s deviation in percent from 
the average precipitation of the Twentieth Century.  It is necessary to use percent change 
from a long term average and not actual change because nations have widely varying 
amounts of precipitation available for use and is large changes from the norm that will 
generate stress.  To illustrate, a three-inch change in precipitation in a nation that 
typically receives an average of three inches of precipitation per year is a catastrophic 
change whereas a three-inch change in annual precipitation to a nation whose average is 
100 inches per year is within the boundaries of normal variation. 
  The results of this analysis cannot confirm Hypothesis 2, nor, therefore provide 
evidence that episodes of both drought and flood contribute to destabilizing governments.  
Hypothesis 2 has established that there is neither a linear nor a curvilinear relationship 
between annual precipitation’s deviation from a long-term mean.  This study will later 














4.6991 *** 4.7045 ***
0.2632 0.2640
trade openness -0.0170 *** -0.0166 ***
0.0049 0.0049
regime type -0.0216 -0.0215
0.0337 0.0338
regime type squared -0.0145 * -0.0143 *
0.0064 0.0064
population density 0.0000 0.0000
0.0028 0.0028
per capita gdp 0.0000 0.0000
0.0002 0.0002
minorities at risk 1.0636 ** 1.0720 **
0.3929 0.3930
infant mortality 0.0060 0.0060
0.0046 0.0046
political stability 0.0092 0.0094
0.0090 0.0089
Cold War -0.8012 * -0.7957 *
0.3125 0.3121








constant -2.9970 *** -3.0275 ***
0.8138 0.8145
N 1224 1224
Chi squared 733.8636 734.3156
log likelihood -236.0151 -235.7891
pseudo R squared 0.6086 0.6089
nagelkerke R squared 0.7196 0.7200
Correctly Classified
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 
0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 level
 
Summary: Does the Environment Matter? 
 The environment, operationalized as water resources, matters, albeit with some 
new understandings.  Water as a function of per capita water availability and economic 
output is a reliable predictor of conflict, albeit with a very small effect.  Contrary to 
previous findings on water resources, it is abundance of water, not its scarcity, that 
increases the likelihood of conflict.  Water’s largest contribution to Sub-Saharan 
economic output is through agriculture and in a rain-fed economy surplus water 
contributes to a surplus labor force in search of an income and thereby reduces the 




Under What Circumstances? 
 
H3: Water resource scarcity is more likely to contribute to low-level conflict than to 
intermediate-level conflict or war. 
This hypothesis will be tested using two different methods: ordered logistic 
regression and a series of logistic regressions with the dependent variable coded for the 
absence or presence of any level of conflict, low-level conflict, intermediate-level 
conflict, and war.  In both methods, the dependent variable is based on the conflict 
categories defined by the States in Armed Conflict Database. 
 An ordered logistic regression model requires that the dependent variable 
categories be rank ordered while allowing for unequal or unknown distances between the 
categories.  This statistical model assumes that the dependent variable is by nature 
continuous but observable only as categories.  Civil conflict, as previously described, 
meets this assumption.  The States in Armed Conflict Database’s categories can be rank 
ordered and are coded from lowest, no conflict, to highest, war.  An inviolable 
assumption of ordered logistic regression is that the model comprises multiple equations 
with the same betas (coefficients) and different intercepts (constants); it is also referred to 
as a proportional odds model.  Using ordered logistic regression will test the hypothesis 
that the effect of environmental change differs across the various levels of conflict. 
 The baseline theoretical model (Table 5) performs in a manner similar to the 
baseline model using logistic regression: the lagged dependent variable, per capita gross 
domestic product, the presence of minorities at risk, and higher levels of infant mortality 




squared, and Cold War reduce the odds of conflict, all as expected.  Only population 
density and political stability do not have signs in the expected direction, while 
population density, per capita gross domestic product, and infant mortality are not 
significant at any level.  The interesting anomaly in the comparison of this theoretical 
model with the baseline logistic regression model is that the length of time since the last 
regime change becomes significant in this model but the direction of the relationship 
remains counter to expectations.  A close examination of the data reveals that over a 
range of zero to 89, a quarter of the nation years have a value of two or less, more than 
half of the nation-years have a value of less than seven, and the mean is 12.1. 
 As with logistic regression, the R-squared statistics are not interpretable in the 
same manner as ordinary least squares regression.  They will have a lower bound of 0 but 
the upper bound is some unknown number less than 1, making it difficult to determine 
whether the resulting statistic constitutes a good fit between the theoretical model and the 
data.  Nonetheless, R-squared-like statistics of 0.4792 for pseudo R-squared (McFadden), 
0.4693 for adjusted McFadden R-squared, and 0.4869 for Nagelkerke R-squared do not 
provide convincing evidence that the ordered logistic model is a good fit for the baseline 
data. 
 Adding either of the two water variables, per capita precipitation and difference in 
precipitation from the long-term average, failed to confirm the hypothesis using ordered 
logistic regression, however, there is evidence indicating that the odds are not equal 
among the conflict levels.  Neither variable was significant at any level and the R-squared 








lagged dependent variable 2.2937 *** 2.3424 *** 2.2936 ***
0.1220 0.1353 0.1220
trade openness -0.0112 ** -0.0063 -0.0113 **
0.0038 0.0045 0.0038
regime type -0.0183 -0.0159 -0.0181
0.0277 0.0319 0.0278
regime type squared -0.0146 ** -0.0151 * -0.0146 **
0.0053 0.0060 0.0053
population density -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0020
0.0020 0.0024 0.0020
per capita gdp 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000
0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
minorities at risk 1.0507 ** 0.7574 * 1.0525 **
0.3353 0.3513 0.3360
infant mortality 0.0040 0.0068 + 0.0040
0.0035 0.0039 0.0035
political stability 0.0147 * 0.0166 0.0149 *
0.0070 0.0102 0.0070
Cold War -0.4642 + -0.6012 * -0.4642 +
0.2464 0.2665 0.2467
precipitation per capita -0.0003
0.0002




constant 1 2.6723 *** 2.8097 *** 2.6415 ***
0.6378 0.7050 0.6414
constant 2 4.4196 *** 4.6637 *** 4.3877 ***
0.6641 0.7398 0.6678
constant 3 5.4101 *** 5.6183 *** 5.3773 ***
0.6836 0.7608 0.6874
N 1218 1113 1218
Chi squared 812.7677 733.8998 812.9564
log likelihood -441.6343 -370.3963 -441.5400
pseudo R squared 0.4792 0.4977 0.4793
nagelkerke R squared 0.4869 0.4828 0.4870
brant_chi2 73.4934 -148.3494 73.4900
brant_p 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
difference from long term 
precipitation
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = 
significant at a 0.1 level
Difference from long-
term averagePrecipitation per capita
Table 5: Odds of Civil Conflict in Africa, 1965-2000
Ordered Logistic Regression
Baseline
Brant chi2/p Brant chi2/p Brant chi2/p
lagged dependent variable 13.9175 15.1519 14.1605
0.0010 0.0005 0.0008
trade openness 0.1057 0.7731 0.1016
0.9485 0.6794 0.9505
regime type 0.3383 1.7118 0.3589
0.8444 0.4249 0.8357
regime type squared 0.7958 3.5797 0.7929
0.6717 0.1670 0.6727
population density 5.6102 5.1315 5.8161
0.0605 0.0769 0.0546
per capita gdp 1.2156 0.6596 1.1265
0.5446 0.7191 0.5694
minorities at risk 5.6754 1.8589 5.6401
0.0586 0.3948 0.0596
infant mortality 0.8553 0.5631 0.8546
0.6521 0.7546 0.6523
political stability 0.9804 0.9419 0.9869
0.6125 0.6244 0.6105
Cold War 8.1254 10.2163 8.1046
0.0172 0.0060 0.0174
precipitation per capita 13.4046
0.0012




difference from long term 
precipitation
Difference from long-
term averagePrecipitation per capita
 
 Other measures to assess the ordered logistic regression model’s overall fit 
indicate that the model does not fit the data well.  As observed in the logistic regression 
model, alternatives to R-squared are in the 0.48 range.  Intrinsic to ordered logistic 
regression is the parallel (or proportional) odds assumption, which specifies that the 
model be a multi-equation model in which the beta coefficients are identical for each 
independent variable (Long and Freese, 2003).  The post-estimation Brant test confirms 
that all theoretical models violate the parallel odds assumption.  Therefore, the hypothesis 
will be tested with a series of dichotomous variables coded from the categories of conflict 
as defined by States in Armed Conflict Database. 
 Table 6 presents the frequencies of the four categories. 
Table 6: SACD Conflict Categories  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
Any conflict 1094 77.59 77.59 
Low conflict 109 7.73 85.32 
Intermediate conflict 47 3.33 88.65 
War 160 11.35 100.00 
 
The distribution of cases across the categories reveals that intermediate-level conflict has 
too few cases to stand alone.  Intermediate-level conflict could plausibly be combined 
with either low conflict or war.  Because the coding of intermediate conflict includes a 
requirement that total number of deaths cross the 1000-person threshold and the coding 
of war requires an annual total person death threshold of 1000, intermediate level conflict 
will be combined with war when generating the series of dichotomous variables.  Thus 
the four categories of conflict as defined by the States in Armed Conflict Database will 
be used to generate three dichotomous variables: 1) any conflict, where zero is assigned 




conflict, where zero is assigned to all cases that are not coded as low level conflict and 
one is assigned to all cases coded as low-level conflict; and 3) intermediate-level conflict 
combined with war, where zero is assigned to all cases coded as no conflict or low-level 
conflict and one is assigned to all cases coded as intermediate-level conflict or war. 
The baseline variables (Table 7) reveal some differences between the models 
using States in Armed Conflict Database categories of conflict and the Major Episodes in 
Political Violence dichotomous variable.  Infant mortality, which has hitherto failed to 
register as significant, is significant in the no conflict model, suggesting that the universe 
of cases has a significant effect on the results.  The universe of cases in the model using 
Major Episodes in Political Violence is not identical to the universe in the model using 
the States in Armed Conflict Database categories.  The former has data for all countries 
and all years 1965-2000; the latter covers only post-independence years for each country.  
Hence, cases in the Major Episodes in Political Violence model that were not yet 
independent by 1965 but have infant mortality data available are included in that baseline 
model.  In contrast, those same cases, nations not yet independent, have no data in the 
model using the States in Armed Conflict Database categories and the nation-years 
without data are dropped when running the statistical tests.  These results, therefore, 
suggest that post-independence, infant mortality is a reliable predictor of conflict. 
The discussion will now turn to consider how the baseline variables perform 
across the three levels of conflict.  The majority of the variables perform consistently 
whether the dependent variable is any conflict, low-level conflict, or intermediate-level 
conflict and war.  Minorities at risk is an interesting exception; it varies considerably 




minority at risk are twice as high as the odds of war.  These results affirm that ethnicity 
itself has not typically been the source of conflict on the continent; rather it has been the 
means by which mobilizers have been able to generate support for other causes.  The 
minorities at risk indicator was selected for this study over the more widely used 
ethnolinguistic factionalization variable on the basis that it better represented the 
systematic inclusion or exclusion of groups from the government.  The results indicate 
that nations that exclude groups from participation in the polity based on ethnicity are 
more likely to experience low-level conflict than intermediate level civil conflict or war. 
Having established the continued validity of the baseline model, the discussion 
now considers whether the evidence can support the hypothesis.  The volume of per 
capita precipitation varied in significance and in effect size across the categories.  It was 
significant in distinguishing between the presence and absence of conflict and in 
distinguishing low-level conflict, but generally, only at the 0.10 level however, the effect 
size is negligible for both per capita precipitation and the interaction term between per 
capita precipitation and gross domestic product.  The single exception is for per capita 
precipitation in the low-level conflict model where a one-unit change in the annual 
volume of water available per person reduces the likelihood of conflict by 0.1 percent.  
As discussed above, the States in Armed Conflict Database includes only the years each 
nation was independent; therefore, the missing cases will be from the Cold War years.  
This suggests that the results are influenced by the selection of cases.  These differences 
also suggest that there may be differences in the causes of conflict from the Cold War to 




The water resource variable fails to provide convincing evidence confirm that 
changes in water availability are more likely to contribute to low-level conflict than to 
intermediate level conflicts or war, while the variable is significant, its effect size is very 
small.  These results are inconsistent with Hague and Ellingsen (1998, p. 314) who found 
that environmental degradation had a stronger impact on the incidence of smaller armed 
conflicts than on larger ones; size for Hague and Ellingsen was determined by the number 
of battlefield deaths proportionate to total population.  An important difference between 
Hague and Ellingsen’s study and this study might account for the different results: Hague 
and Ellingsen assess deaths across the four-year period 1989-1992 whereas this study’s 
dependent variable is based on deaths across a 35 year time span.  This study’s findings 
suggest that, in Sub-Saharan Africa during the post-colonial era, precipitation is not a 
strong predictor of low-level conflict. 
The findings with respect to infant mortality in the baseline cases raise an 
intriguing question in light of the decision not to use the State Failure Task Force 
categories as a categorical dependent variable.  Recall that the State Failure Task Force 
data categorizes conflicts as genocide, ethnic wars, revolutions, and adverse regime 
changes.  While the decision to reject the data as a dependent variable for the purpose of 
examining the effects of water resources on various levels of conflict remains valid, the 
results above suggest that using these categories as a dependent variable might produce 
useful results in identifying which types of catastrophic conflict might be influenced by 
variations in water resource availability and whether or not the mobilization explanation 
holds in those cases. 
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lag any conflict 3.8544 ***
0.2210




trade openness -0.0128 ** -0.0032 -0.0155 *
0.0041 0.0046 0.0067
regime type -0.0378 -0.0113 -0.0687
0.0285 0.0327 0.0533
regime type squared -0.0196 *** -0.0152 * -0.0234 *
0.0057 0.0064 0.0096
population density -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0017
0.0024 0.0027 0.0036
per capita gdp 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
minorities at risk 1.0211 ** 1.3920 ** 0.7842
0.3227 0.4982 0.5237
infant mortality 0.0081 * 0.0064 0.0054
0.0039 0.0045 0.0064
political stability 0.0107 0.0103 0.0119
0.0073 0.0080 0.0120
Cold War -0.6932 ** -0.7137 * -0.4577
0.2671 0.3036 0.4338
constant -2.9680 *** -4.0492 *** -3.6600 ***
0.6809 0.8758 1.0808
N 1224 1224 1224
Chi squared 612.9590 161.8974 643.0246
log likelihood -306.2902 -240.5645 -141.5965
pseudo R squared 0.5002 0.2518 0.6942
nagelkerke R squared 0.6228 0.3032 0.7699
precipitation per capita 
X gdp
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 
level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 
level




















precipitation per capita 
X gdp
lag intermediate conflict 
and war
precipitation per capita



















0.6584 + 1.0720 * 0.5175
0.3397 0.5128 0.5655




-0.7628 ** -0.9349 ** -0.5676
0.2870 0.3307 0.4679
-0.0004 + -0.0007 + -0.0001
0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
0.0001 * 0.0001 + 0.0000
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001







*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = 
significant at a 0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 level




These results are not consistent with those of both Homer-Dixon (1995) and 
Hague and Ellingsen (1998), whose works support the finding that environmental 
variables contribute to minor conflict more than to major conflict.  The differences in 
approach explain the different findings.  Homer-Dixon’s work is case study where both 
conflict and environmental degradation are present, making it difficult to generalize 
beyond the case.  Hague and Ellingsen base their conclusion on the difference in their 
dependent variables.  However, their two variables for “major” and “minor” conflict do 
not share the same temporal distribution; the former spans 7 years, 1989-1996, whereas 
the latter spans only 4 years, 1989-1992.  It is possible that the difference that Hague and 
Ellingsen found is due to the difference in the time periods each variable covers rather 
than the battle-death threshold to which they attribute the difference.  This study uses 
similar levels of conflict to distinguish between its categories and compares those 
categories across identical time spans, 1965-2000.  Thus, the results of this study add a 
nuance not seen before in studies of African conflict and environmental degradation.  
Specifying the dependent variable into gradations finer than the presence or absence of 
conflict brings new understanding to the environment-conflict debate.  Environmental 
change, and specifically changes in water resources availability, has, at best, only 
nominally greater explanatory power on low-level conflict than on other categories of 
conflict over the longer time frame, 1965-2000. 
 
H4: Changes in water resources must reach a threshold of abundance or a threshold of 




 Several authors have suggested that human communities adapt to environmental 
change until the environmental change crosses a threshold (Glantz 2002, Homer-Dixon 
1995, 1999).  Water scarcity has been defined variously as 7,300 cubic meters per person 
per year (UN), less than 1,000 cubic meters per person per year (Sharma), and less than 
5,000 cubic meters per person per year (Hague and Ellingsen).16  Hague and Ellingsen 
have also denoted a level of water abundance at 20,000 cubic meters per person per year .  
In order to test for the presence of a threshold effect, it is necessary to first identify the 
value of the precipitation variables, generated as correlates to these cubic meters per 
person per annum values, that corresponds to the established thresholds,  This is 
accomplished via a multi-stage process.  The first step is a series of bivariate regressions 
(see Table 8) using the same limited set of data employed to ascertain the validity of 
substituting annual volume of precipitation for annual per capita water supply.  These 
bivariate tests establish the functional relationship between the correlate precipitation 
variable and annual per capita water supply to ascertain the relationship among known 
nation-years.  
Table 8: Regress Precipitation on Water Supply 
Variable Coefficient (beta) Constant 
precipitation per capita 7.0655 71.5420 
 
This relationship was then used to generate thresholds of abundance and scarcity that 
correspond to known water availability thresholds. 
 
                                                 
16 Sharma further defines water stress as more than 1,000 and less than 1,667 cubic meters 
per person per year and adequate water availability as more than 2500 cubic meters per 
person per year.  Hague and Elllingsen also reference categories for average water 




Table 9: Setting Threshold Values for Abundance and Scarcity 
 Hague and Ellingsen 
 abundance 
(20,000 cu m) 
scarcity 
(5000 cu m) 
UN 
scarcity 
(7300 cu m) 
Sharma 
scarcity 
(2500 cu m) 
precipitation per capita 212.8511 106.8693 123.1198 89.2057 
 
Finally, the thresholds of abundance and scarcity are used to generate dichotomous 
variables to indicate the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of abundant 
precipitation, in the case of the Hague and Ellingsen-derived abundance variable, or 
scarce precipitation, in the case of the Hague and Ellingsen-, United Nations-, and, 
Sharma-derived scarcity variables. 
Table 10: Frequencies of Abundance and Scarcity 
Threshold Variables 
 0 1 
Hague and Ellingsen Scarcity 1,391 121 
UN Scarcity 1,352 160 
Sharma Scarcity 1,428 84 
Hague and Ellingsen Abundance 438 1,074 
 
 Table 11 displays results that show that no scarcity threshold variables were 
significant at any level.  The results of this study cannot confirm the hypothesis that 
scarcity must reach a threshold before increasing the probability of conflict.  In light of 
these results, particularly in combination with the fact that no explanatory variable of 
change in precipitation from a long-term average reached a level of significance, this 
study suggests that water resources have not yet either reached the necessary threshold of 
scarcity or yet deviated outside of the range of adaptability in a sufficient number of 
cases to be distinguished from the background noise in the data. 
 While there is no evidence to support an assertion that scarce water resources 




assertion that of a relationship with conflict.  A nation with abundant per capita water 
resources, defined in this model as a surplus, has a 43.6 percent lower likelihood of 
conflict than a nation with adequate or scarce water resources.  This does not confirm the 
hypothesis that abundance increases the likelihood of conflict. 
These findings are somewhat counterintuitive.  As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, it is most plausible that precipitation acts to influence conflict through the 
economy.  To understand the finding that abundant per capita water resources reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, consider the source of economic output in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The manufacturing sector is small, small-scale, and labor-intensive; and therefore, does 
not require the large volumes of water of more industrialized economies.  Household 
consumption, another large component of water demand, is similarly small throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Few homes outside of the upscale sections of cities have running 
water in the home; the majority of Sub-Saharan African households carry water from 
communal sources to the home.  In most Sub-Saharan African nations agriculture is the 
largest economic sector, much of that sector is small-scale or subsistence farming, and 
much of Sub-Saharan African agriculture is rain-fed rather than irrigation-dependent.  
Thus, the largest user of water resources in Sub-Saharan Africa is rain-fed agriculture 
and, when there is abundant water available for this sector, there is less likelihood that an 
aggrieved peasant population will feel compelled to take up arms against the state. 
The second reason that these findings are counterintuitive is the expectation that 
the more precipitation that is available, i.e. the more abundant water is, the lower the 
likelihood of conflict.  It is important to note that while these results find abundant water 




conflict.  As discussed earlier, water is not a lootable resource, something that can be 
exchanged in the marketplace.  In its extreme abundant water, i.e. flooding, is as 
devastating to an economy as drought.  However, there was no evidence to support an 
argument that the positive relationship between increased levels of water resource 
availability and conflict are due to floods; the annual difference from long term average 
precipitation was not significant.  Nor was there evidence to support a curvilinear 
relationship, indicating a relationship between both drought and flood and conflict. 
Rather than supporting a grievance-based theory of conflict and therefore those 
who assert that water scarcity will lead to conflict, these findings support a mobilization-
based conflict theory.  Increased water resource availability reduces opportunity costs for 
the would-be rebel of participation.  In an agriculturally-based and labor intensive 
economy that is dependent on precipitation rather than irrigation for agricultural 
production, increased precipitation contributes to increased agricultural product, perhaps 
even small surpluses.  When there is sufficient precipitation to reduce the need for 
additional labor or to generate surplus product, there remains the barrier of an ineffective 
market and poor roads over which to transport the product to a market combined with 
high transportation costs to get the product to a marketplace where there might be enough 
demand to buy the product.  In these instances, sufficient water availability acts to free 
labor resources for other uses.  However, if there are few alternative opportunities 
available, the promises of the spoils of war are appealing to the potential recruit.  Instead 
of dependence on the revenue generated from a resource or commodity, we have 
evidence here of abundant water resources creating conditions of a surplus labor force in 
















b/se b/se b/se b/se
lagged dependent 
variable
4.6745 *** 4.6713 *** 4.6702 *** 4.6642 ***
0.2603 0.2599 0.2602 0.2613
trade openness -0.0175 *** -0.0171 *** -0.0179 *** -0.0169 ***
0.0049 0.0049 0.0050 0.0049
regime type -0.0201 -0.0201 -0.0187 -0.0211
0.0336 0.0337 0.0335 0.0339
regime type squared -0.0146 * -0.0143 * -0.0147 * -0.0151 *
0.0064 0.0064 0.0064 0.0065
population density -0.0020 0.0005 -0.0035 -0.0039
0.0048 0.0048 0.0046 0.0035
per capita gdp 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
minorities at risk 1.0628 ** 1.0645 ** 1.0675 ** 1.0508 **
0.3937 0.3937 0.3929 0.3883
infant mortality 0.0057 0.0061 0.0060 0.0084 +
0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0048
political stability 0.0096 0.0095 0.0099 0.0105
0.0090 0.0090 0.0090 0.0090
Cold War -0.7996 * -0.7823 * -0.7996 * -0.7710 *
0.3140 0.3132 0.3135 0.3139
















constant -2.8247 *** -2.9556 *** -2.8094 *** -2.6292 **
0.8325 0.8361 0.8177 0.8122
N 1224 1224 1224 1224
Chi squared 733.0128 732.8629 733.5720 735.5420
log likelihood -236.4405 -236.5154 -236.1609 -235.1759
pseudo R squared 0.6079 0.6077 0.6083 0.6100
nagelkerke R squared 0.7190 0.7189 0.7194 0.7208
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = 
significant at a 0.1 level
 
H5a: Civil conflict is more likely during post Cold War years than during Cold War 
years. 
 The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to relationships between 
nations of the developing world (and groups within their boundaries who are engaged in 
or harbor aspirations of armed resistance) and both their former colonial powers and their 
primary sources of economic and military aid.  In Sub-Saharan Africa these changes are 
alleged to have contributed to an increase in the incidence of conflict.  This assertion is 
first tested with the baseline theoretical model and then extended consistent with the 
theme of this study on water resource availability. 
 The results presented thus far provide strong evidence to support an assumption of 
a difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War time periods.  In baseline 
theoretical models for both logistic regression and ordered logistic regression, the cold 
war variable is consistently significant at a 0.05 level or better and varies inversely with 
conflict.  As expected, the Cold War years varied inversely with conflict, providing 
support for the assertion that the odds of a Sub-Saharan African nation being in civil 
conflict during the post cold war years are greater than during the cold war years.  It was 
significant in the logistic regression models; it was also significant in the ordered logistic 
regression model but the Brant test indicates that Cold War violates the parallel odds 
assumption and therefore that for some levels of conflict there is no difference in the odds 
of conflict between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.  The tests for different 
levels of conflict (see Table 7) reveal that the Cold War variable was significant in 
distinguishing between the presence or absence of conflict and between low-level conflict 




level conflict and war.  The Cold War variable was never significant for the theoretical 
model with the dependent variable coded for intermediate-level conflict and war.  Thus, 
there is no difference between historical periods in the likelihood of the deadliest of civil 
wars.  Based on the results of this research, the assertion of a difference in odds of 
conflict between the Cold War and post-Cold War can be qualified to assert that there is a 
difference in the odds of low-level conflicts, with this type being more likely in the post-
Cold War years.  The finding that the odds of low-level conflict are greater during post-
Cold War years can explain why Hague and Ellingsen found per capita water availability 
significant and this study did not; their analysis includes only post-Cold War years. 
 
H5b: Changes in water resource availability is more likely to contribute to conflict 
during post Cold War years than during Cold War years. 
 The analysis is next extended to consider whether there is an historical effect on 
water resources’ influence on conflict.  Interaction variables were generated between 
Cold War and the two previously-used water resource variables: volume of precipitation 
per capita and precipitation’s deviation from the 100-year long-term precipitation 
average.  These data do not support an assertion of a difference in the effect of per capita 
precipitation between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.  However, the difference 
from the 100-year precipitation average, which was not significant across the entire 
temporal range, shows some evidence of a temporal dimension to its influence on 
conflict.  The data support a finding of a difference between the Cold War and the post-
Cold War eras for changes in precipitation relative to long-term average precipitation.  




from the 100-year precipitation average, and the interaction term are significant to at least 
a 0.10 level and the effect size is large.  The sign is in the expected direction indicating 
that changes in water resource availability were more likely to contribute to conflict 
during the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War.  For each percentage increase in 
precipitation over the long term average, the odds of conflict during the post-Cold Ware 
are more than 800 percent greater than during the Cold War. 
These results confirm that the odds of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa differ 
in the Cold War and Post Cold War eras and that changes in long-term water resources 
are more likely to contribute to conflict in the post-Cold War than in the Cold War.  
These results also indicate that in the future studies whose temporal boundaries cross 
these historical periods include a control for this temporal dimension. 
The Cold War years of this study coincide closely with the years selected by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the baseline period for all studies 
assessing the possible impacts of a changed climate, 1960-1990.  It may be tempting to 
use these results to advance the cause for those who assert a connection between a 
changing climate and conflict.  That would be a grievous error.  The IPCC baseline 
period does not represent either a peak, a valley, or a neutral point in any environmental 
state critical to climate change assessments; the time period  represents political 
expediency, a consensus around a period of time prior to the beginning of the 
negotiations that resulted in the Framework Convention on Climate Change which would 
serve as the baseline against all future measurements of greenhouse gas emissions would 
be compared. Because there is no scientific basis for either the timing or the duration of 




expectation of significance in a correlation between water resource availability and the 
time period under study, whether it is referred to as the Cold War under the nomenclature 










lagged dependent variable 4.7384 *** 4.7474 ***
0.2824 0.2676
trade openness -0.0099 -0.0163 ***
0.0061 0.0049
regime type -0.0174 -0.0238
0.0376 0.0337
regime type squared -0.0134 + -0.0146 *
0.0070 0.0064
population density 0.0006 -0.0001
0.0032 0.0028
per capita gdp -0.0008 * 0.0000
0.0004 0.0002
minorities at risk 0.7430 + 1.0841 **
0.4169 0.3939
infant mortality 0.0084 0.0063
0.0051 0.0046
political stability 0.0102 0.0087
0.0110 0.0090
Cold War -0.7101 + -0.6597 *
0.3905 0.3234
precipitation per capita -0.0001
0.0004
precipitation per capita X gdp
0.0001 **
0.0001












constant -3.2918 *** -3.1659 ***
0.9133 0.8276
N 1119 1224
Chi squared 685.6675 736.4509
log likelihood -204.6988 -234.7214
pseudo R squared 0.6261 0.6107
nagelkerke R squared 0.7340 0.7215
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = 
significant at a 0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 level
 
Summary: Under What Circumstances? 
 The results of this study add a nuance not seen before in studies of African 
conflict and environmental degradation.  Specifying the dependent variable into 
gradations finer than the presence or absence of conflict brings new understanding to the 
environment-conflict debate.  There are distinct differences among the levels of conflict 
and these differences are inconsistent with the results of Hague and Ellingsen.  Hague 
and Ellingsen found that environmental degradation was more likely to affect the 
incidence of low or intermediate level conflict; this study only weakly supports a finding 
of water resources affecting the incidence of low-level conflicts.  There does not yet 
appear to be a threshold effect of scarcity that is discernable above the background noise 
of interannual precipitation variability.  None of the scarcity thresholds was significant in 
any statistical model nor was scarcity able to distinguish between any levels of conflict.  
However, the abundance model does support the assertion that of a relationship with 
conflict.  There is also a difference between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 
both in the baseline odds of conflict and in the effect of water resources on conflict: 
conflict is more likely in the post-Cold War and water resources are more likely to 





By What Means? 
 This study now turns to explore several mechanisms by which political systems 
and environmental systems might interact including political stability measured as the 
length of time since the last regime change; institutional capacity to manage water 
resources measured in four different ways as annual World Bank water project lending 
per million dollars in gross national product, annual World Bank water project lending 
normalized by the 5-year rolling average gross national product, cumulative number of 
signed water resource treaties per international river basin, and percent of arable land 
purposely provided with water; the openness of political institutions measured in two 
ways as civil liberties and as a composite variable comprised of indicators for the degree 
to which procedures for the transfer of executive power are institutionalized, the extent to 
which elections for executive office are competitive and the opportunity for non-elites to 
gain elective office; and the interconnectedness of social groups measured as the presence 
or absence of minorities at risk. 
H6: Environmental degradation in combination with political instability increases the 
probability of conflict. 
 Political instability could be operationalized in a number of different ways.  First, 
democracies tend to be stable, thus instability could be measured using either a nation’s 
democracy score or its polity score from the Polity IV data.  However, highly 
authoritarian nations can also be stable; thus neither of these is an appropriate choice to 
measure instability in this instance.  Second, following the finding that conflict is less 




instability can be measured as regime type squared.  Third, instability can be 
operationalized as the number of years since the last regime change.  This study will test 
instability measured in both ways, as regime type squared and as the number of years 
since the last regime change.   
 Two interaction variables were created using both measures of instability, each in 
combination with per capita precipitation.  The interaction term was not significant in 
either of the tests, the results of which are presented in Table 13.  Hence, these results 
cannot support the hypothesis that environmental degradation in combination with 
political stability increases the odds of conflict.  These findings cannot confirm the 
assertion that environmental stressors will exacerbate existing weaknesses in the 
capabilities of political systems to respond to the crises that scarcity creates.  This finding 
casts some doubt on the existing research upon which the hypothesis is based,  However, 
more than three fourths of the nation years have a regime type score of 0 or less and half 
of the nation-years have had a regime change in the past 7 years; thus, it is possible that 
Sub-Saharan African States exist in such a state of weakness that additional stressors 
such as environmental change are unlikely to have a discernable effect on them.   
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Table 13: Environmental Change and Political Instability
Regime Type and Per 
Capita Precipitation




lagged dependent variable 4.7383 *** 4.7169 ***
0.2832 0.2818
trade openness -0.0087 -0.0105 +
0.0061 0.0061
regime type -0.0152 -0.0164
0.0378 0.0375
regime type squared -0.0158 + -0.0119 +
0.0092 0.0072
population density 0.0005 -0.0002
0.0032 0.0032
per capita gdp -0.0007 + -0.0009 *
0.0004 0.0004
minorities at risk 0.7229 + 0.7428 +
0.4158 0.4189
infant mortality 0.0087 + 0.0075
0.0052 0.0052
political stability 0.0096 0.0258
0.0111 0.0177
Cold War -0.8628 ** -0.8690 **
0.3298 0.3297
precipitation per capita -0.0005 0.0000
0.0006 0.0003
precipitation per capita X 
gdp
0.0001 * 0.0001 **
0.0001 0.0001








constant -3.1678 *** -3.1502 ***
0.9104 0.9020
N 1119 1119
Chi squared 685.2335 686.6345
log likelihood -204.9157 -204.2152
pseudo R squared 0.6257 0.6270
nagelkerke R squared 0.7337 0.7348
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = 
significant at a 0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 level
 
H7: Nations that exhibit greater institutional capacity to manage water resources have a 
lower probability of conflict. 
 The question now turns to the manner in which institutions act and tests this effect 
in two different ways: first, which is examined in this hypothesis, is the state’s ability to 
manage water resources through treaties, through international funding for water resource 
development, and through the control of water for agricultural production, typically a 
nation’s largest water consumer; and second, as Kahl envisioned, mediating between the 
environment and conflict, which is examined in the next hypothesis. 
 The results, presented in Table 14, provide only weak evidence that institutions 
capable of managing water resources may matter in Sub-Saharan African civil conflicts; 
the proportion of a nation’s land under irrigated agriculture was significant at a 0.10 level 
although its effect size is small, increasing the percent change in odds by 1.4 percent for 
each percent increase in arable land under irrigation.  However, the data also indicate that 
as the percent of arable land under irrigation increases the likelihood of conflict also 
increases, not decreases as hypothesized.  Rather than serving as a mechanism for the 
state to develop the institutional infrastructure necessary to manage water resources, this 
indicates instead that irrigated agricultural land might be the equivalent of a lootable 
resource. 
 Throughout much of the thirty-five-year period of this study, African 
governments, their leaders, and their bureaucracies were infamous for corruption, 
patronage, and misappropriation of government funds.  These findings suggest that 
irrigated agricultural land (which yields more per acre than rain-fed land) was not put to 




was instead employed in a manner that made civil conflict more likely.  Actions such as 
ensuring that privileged clients were granted usage rights to the most productive land in 
the community when repeated over time or on a large scale are not inconsistent with the 
findings that higher percentages of irrigated agricultural land increase the likelihood of 
conflict. 
 The addition of variables to test the hypothesis that institutions mediate between 
the environment and conflict, provided weak evidence to support the hypothesis.  This 
relationship is further examined in the next hypothesis where the variables representing 
groupness and inclusivity are interacted with annual precipitation weighted for land area 
and volume of precipitation weighted per million dollars of annual gross national 
product, the significant water resource variables. 
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WB Lending per 5-
year Average GNP
5-year Average WB 
Lending per capita
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lagged dependent variable 4.7206 *** 4.6677 *** 4.8315 *** 4.6960 ***
0.2938 0.2600 0.2800 0.2626
trade openness -0.0267 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0173 ** -0.0179 ***
0.0061 0.0050 0.0054 0.0049
regime type -0.0138 -0.0220 -0.0236 -0.0181
0.0399 0.0340 0.0359 0.0335
regime type squared -0.0124 + -0.0148 * -0.0160 * -0.0148 *
0.0073 0.0064 0.0066 0.0064
population density -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003
0.0032 0.0028 0.0029 0.0028
per capita gdp 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
minorities at risk 1.1320 * 1.0851 ** 0.9961 * 1.0468 **
0.4617 0.3924 0.4063 0.3933
infant mortality 0.0043 0.0064 0.0074 0.0065
0.0049 0.0046 0.0049 0.0046
political stability 0.0124 0.0095 0.0138 0.0096
0.0100 0.0090 0.0108 0.0089
Cold War -0.9909 ** -0.7439 * -0.8411 * -0.8137 **
0.3413 0.3171 0.3317 0.3144
irrigated agricultural land 0.0003 +
0.0001
cumulative number of 
treaties per river basin
0.1161
0.1579








constant -2.2188 * -3.0454 *** -3.1509 *** -2.9423 ***
0.9390 0.8297 0.8828 0.8085
N 1039 1224 1150 1224
Chi squared 619.2603 733.3663 702.4121 733.8518
log likelihood -190.5745 -236.2637 -210.1190 -236.0210
pseudo R squared 0.6190 0.6082 0.6257 0.6086
nagelkerke R squared 0.7263 0.7193 0.7334 0.7196
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = 
significant at a 0.1 level
 
H8: Nations with more open political institutions will have a lower probability of 
conflict.  Furthermore, this will hold true even in the presence of environmental change 
or environmental scarcity. 
 This section operationalizes a nation’s institutional capacity in two different ways: 
as a measure of the extent to which a population enjoys civil liberties and as openness of 
executive recruitment.  Civil liberties, as measured by Freedom House, provides the first 
means to operationalize institutional capacity; it looks at institutions from the perspective 
of the individual in society by measuring the extent to which individuals are able to act 
spontaneously and without government interference.  All results for this hypothesis are 
presented in Table 15.  This measure of institutional capacity is also a strong predictor of 
conflict; a one-unit increase the civil liberties score, marking a reduction in civil liberties, 
increases the odds that a nation is in conflict by 55 percent. 
Open political institutions, the second indicator of institutional capacity, measures 
political inclusivity and is expected to reduce the probability of conflict.  To test this 
hypothesis the Polity IV composite variable for the openness of executive recruitment 
was added to the baseline model.  The variable is highly correlated with the broader 
polity variable for regime type therefore, in these theoretical models, that broader 
variable and its squared term are dropped to test the effect of the narrower construct.  
First, the executive recruitment baseline model confirms that the narrower variable can be 
used in place of the composite measure of regime type.  These data indicate with a high 
degree of confidence that in Sub-Saharan African nations with more open political 
institutions have a lower likelihood of conflict.  A one unit change in executive 




Trade openness also captures an aspect of openness in political institutions.  Trade 
openness, the ratio of imports plus exports to gross domestic product is a measure of the 
openness of economic institutions, as well as an indicator of the political institutions’ 
abilities to exercise some degree of control over the market.  As noted earlier, the 
variable was significant in the logistic regression models, but when the dependent 
variable was disaggregated into the categories of conflict, trade openness was significant 
in predicting the presence or absence of conflict and in predicting intermediate-level 
conflict and war but not in predicting low-level of conflict, indicating that effective trade 
policies reduce the odds of conflict overall and reduce the odds of the most violent 
conflicts.  The effect size, however, is small; each percent increase in openness reduces 
the odds of conflict by less than 2 percent.   
Having established that open political institutions matter in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the analysis now turns to consider whether these institutions act to mediate the effects of 
variations in water resource availability.  The interaction between water resources and 
political institutions was tested by creating two interaction terms, combining the 
institutional variables on executive recruitment and civil liberties with per capita 
precipitation.  Neither interaction term met a threshold of significance therefore, this 
study cannot confirm that open political institutions mediate the effects of environmental 
scarcity or change.   
This study confirms that nations in which groups are empowered to participate in 
and have an influence on political decision-making are less likely to experience conflict.  
Civil liberties measures freedom as experienced by individuals and therefore captures the 




openness of the highest levels of the government and captures the openness of political 
institutions.  These findings provide strong evidence to support the assertion that 
inclusivity reduces the likelihood of conflict but cannot confirm that environmental 
stressors are currently exacerbating existing political weaknesses to give rise to conflict.  
These results indicate only that nations that are able to establish, implement, and enforce 
political and economic policies such as those to control or direct economic growth, 




Table 15: Openness of Institutions
Civil Liberties
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lagged dependent variable 4.4977 *** 4.6257 *** 4.6849 *** 4.7624 ***
0.2863 0.3140 0.2614 0.2854
trade openness -0.0152 ** -0.0071 -0.0185 *** -0.0115 *
0.0052 0.0065 0.0048 0.0058
regime type 0.0494 0.0477
0.0427 0.0481
regime type squared -0.0181 * -0.0177 *
0.0072 0.0078
population density 0.0006 0.0021 0.0001 0.0001
0.0028 0.0034 0.0027 0.0031
per capita gdp 0.0001 -0.0008 + 0.0001 -0.0004
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004
minorities at risk 1.0617 * 0.7796 + 1.1422 ** 0.8400 *
0.4248 0.4519 0.4034 0.4271
infant mortality 0.0067 0.0082 0.0025 0.0041
0.0053 0.0059 0.0045 0.0050
political stability 0.0008 0.0007 0.0107 0.0102
0.0100 0.0121 0.0085 0.0105
Cold War -0.5731 + -0.6257 + -0.9272 ** -0.9427 **
0.3481 0.3660 0.2947 0.3167
civil_liberty 0.4404 ** 0.3410
0.1661 0.2082
precipitation per capita -0.0003 -0.0002
0.0011 0.0006








constant -4.9542 *** -4.7556 *** -2.1686 * -2.3519 *
1.1312 1.3068 0.9127 1.0759
N 1036 939 1226 1120
Chi squared 664.7139 620.4856 734.3233 686.7589
log likelihood -202.0040 -173.4336 -236.2173 -204.3663
pseudo R squared 0.6220 0.6414 0.6085 0.6269
nagelkerke R squared 0.7358 0.7520 0.7195 0.7346
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 0.05 level, + = 
significant at a 0.1 level
Civil Liberties 





Recruitment and Per 
Capita Precipitation 
precipitation per capita X 
gdp
precipitation per capita X 
civil liberties
precipitation per capita X 
executive recruitment
 
H9: Nations with more interconnected societies will have a lower probability of conflict. 
 The theoretical background section introduced the concept of groupness, the 
notion that societies organize themselves around interconnections of identity and 
affiliation.  The extent to which those identities and affiliations overlap one another 
contributes to the costs of and benefits (real and perceived) derived from engaging in 
collective action against a state.  Societies with many interconnecting identities are 
expected to experience lower odds of conflict than societies with few interconnections.  
Societies with a dominant identity and several minority identities are expected to 
experience higher odds of conflict.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the dominant form of identity 
or affiliation is ethnicity and this form of identity captures the manner in which group 
identity is most frequently transferred to the political arena; hence the variable of interest 
is drawn from the Minorities at Risk dataset and coded to denote the presence or absence 
of a minority community at risk of discrimination.  It has already been established that 
nations that exclude groups from participation in the polity based on ethnicity are more 
likely to experience low-level than intermediate level civil conflict and war thus 
confirming, for Sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence presented in earlier case studies. 
 The connection between groupness and conflict is further tested here by 
interacting availability of per capita precipitation with the minorities at risk variable to 
ascertain whether water scarcity exacerbates existing stresses as previous work has 
theorized.  Specifically, previous work has asserted that environmental scarcity will have 
the greatest impact on marginalized groups, who are also more likely to be minority 
groups, because they tend to be poor and inhabit the poorest quality land.  Neither 




theoretical model.  Therefore, this study cannot confirm the presence of an effect between 
marginalization and conflict in the face of scarce water resources when marginalization is 
defined as being a minority at risk of discrimination.  Likewise, this study cannot confirm 
the presence of a causal relationship between the inclusivity or exclusivity of society, 
scarce water resources, and the odds of civil conflict. 
 The findings of this section are counter to the evidence of institutional studies 
(Boone, 2003 and Kahl, 2006).  The lack of an interaction effect for either civil liberties 
or minorities at risk, despite the significance of each alone provides some insight into the 
means by which institutions mediate between water and conflict.  Both civil liberties and 
minorities at risk are indicators for social institutions; executive recruitment, which is 
useful at mediating between water resources and conflict, is an indicator political 
institutions.  This finding can only partially affirm Kahl’s assertion that suggests that 
environmental scarcity pressures both society and the state thereby increasing the 
opportunities and incentives to engage in violence against the state.  Kahl asserted that 
states with a high degree of groupness, sharp divisions along ethnic lines, and 
environmental scarcity would have a high likelihood of conflict.  Kahl further asserted 
that states with low levels of institutional inclusivity and environmental scarcity would 
have a high likelihood of conflict.  This research can only support a causal pathway from 
environmental change, in the case of this study, changes in water resources, through the 
political institutions of the state, to civil conflict.  Political openness and inclusivity 
create conditions under which groups can both express and seek redress for grievances in 




Table 16: Intersocietal Connections
Regime Type and Per 
Capita Precipitation




4.7383 *** 4.7349 ***
0.2832 0.2822
trade openness -0.0087 -0.0109 +
0.0061 0.0063
regime type -0.0152 -0.0208
0.0378 0.0378
regime type squared -0.0158 + -0.0147 *
0.0092 0.0070
population density 0.0005 0.0011
0.0032 0.0033
per capita gdp -0.0007 + -0.0007
0.0004 0.0004
minorities at risk 0.7229 + 0.4048
0.4158 0.5594
infant mortality 0.0087 + 0.0081
0.0052 0.0051
political stability 0.0096 0.0104
0.0111 0.0111
Cold War -0.8628 ** -0.8882 **
0.3298 0.3309
precipitation per capita -0.0005 -0.0006
0.0006 0.0006
precipitation per capita X 
gdp
0.0001 * 0.0001 *
0.0001 0.0001








constant -3.1678 *** -2.8863 **
0.9104 0.9810
N 1119 1119
Chi squared 685.2335 685.9595
log likelihood -204.9157 -204.5527
pseudo R squared 0.6257 0.6264
nagelkerke R squared 0.7337 0.7342
*** = significant at 0.001 level, ** = significant at a 0.01 level, * = significant at a 
0.05 level, + = significant at a 0.1 level
 
Summary: By What Means? 
 This study hypothesized that institutional capacity would mediate between water 
resources and conflict.  There is some evidence to confirm that nations with more capable 
institutions have a lower likelihood of conflict and that these institutions can act to reduce 
the effect that water resources have on conflict.  While there was not sufficient evidence 
to confirm that water resources, scarcity or abundance, would exacerbate existing 
weaknesses, there was evidence to suggest that the capability to manage water resources 
was being used in manners that increased the likelihood of conflict not reduced it, i.e. that 
the benefits to be derived from irrigated crop land are being disbursed via a patronage 
system to reward loyal followers. 
 When the concept of institutions is narrowed to focus on the effect of political 
institutions, and in particular the extent to which the selection of the chief executive is an 
open process, the data clearly indicate that open political institutions lower the likelihood 
of conflict but the data do not support a finding that open political institutions mediate 




Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
 In a focused examination of Sub-Saharan Africa this study sought to advance the 
discussion of the causal effects of environmental scarcity and degradation on domestic 
conflict in several ways: by grounding the domestic conflict-environmental degradation 
discussion in the civil and social conflict literature and including environmental variables 
in a model based in the civil conflict literature; by conducting a quantitative study in a 
field where few have been undertaken; by extending the scope of explanatory variables to 
include indicators for political institutions, and by introducing variation to the dependent 
variable through the use of a categorical variable.  These objectives were accomplished 
by exploring on three questions: Does the environment matter, with environment defined 
as water resource availability?  Under what circumstances?  And by what means?  
Does the Environment Matter? 
 Sub-Saharan Africa exhibited some remarkable differences from the findings of 
previous studies of conflict that included nations from across the world.  The linkages 
between population and civil conflict across the globe are undetermined; this work finds 
that population pressures are not a contributor to conflict in Sub-Saharan-Africa.  There 
are a few densely populated countries, for example, in 2000 Rwanda had 293 people per 
square kilometer and Burundi had 240 people per square kilometer.  There are also 
certainly sections within urban areas are very densely populated and Lagos, Nigeria is 
one of the world’s mega-cities.  In contrast, Botswana and Namibia each have fewer than 
two or three people per square kilometer.  As a whole, the continent is not populated 




 This study revealed a second remarkable difference from earlier work on civil 
conflict.  Infant mortality failed to pass the test of significance; a particularly curious 
finding in light of its role as an indicator of well-being in the State Failure project.  This 
work concludes that the differences in the findings are attributable to the different 
dependent variables.  Because the State Failure Task Force categories represent only the 
catastrophic end of the conflict continuum, the difference in findings between this study 
and the State Failure Task Force study indicate that the State Failure Task Force’s work 
can apply only on the extreme end of the conflict continuum. 
 This study examined several means of operationalizing the environment in an 
effort to ascertain whether one conceptualization of the environment was more effective 
at predicting conflict than another.  This study provides some evidence to support an 
assertion that water resources are a function of economic output and are a reliable 
predictor of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  While the expectation was for the 
precipitation per capita to vary inversely with conflict and thus provide confirmatory 
evidence for an assertion of scarcity contributing to conflict, instead the data support the 
opposite, that abundance water resources reduce opportunity costs for rebels to recruit.  
Water resource availability has a discernable causal effect on civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa but there is no evidence to support the assertion that the relationship is 
curvilinear, i.e. that that extremes of both drought and flood will increase the likelihood 
of civil conflict. 
While per capita precipitation more likely to be significant and significant at a 
higher level than difference in precipitation from a long-term average, other constructions 




increased water availability is associated with increased conflict, not less as expected.  
These findings are counterintuitive for two reasons.  First, the expectation was that 
precipitation would act to influence conflict through the economy, hence the use of an 
interaction term between gross domestic product and precipitation per capita.  However, 
this research concluded that absolute water availability has a larger effect on conflict than 
volume of water per unit of economic output.  The pathway between water and conflict 
still goes through the economy, just not in the fashion envisioned.  The agricultural sector 
is often the largest economic sector in a Sub-Saharan African nation; it is also the largest 
consumer of water and much of Sub-Saharan African agriculture is rain-fed rather than 
irrigation-dependent.  Thus, it is volume of water, which directly affects agricultural 
production, that has the largest effect on Sub-Saharan conflicts.  
Second, this study’s conclusions are counterintuitive because they reveal that 
abundant precipitation is associated with an increased likelihood of conflict.  Rather than 
supporting a grievance-based theory of conflict, these findings support a mobilization-
based conflict theory.  Increased water resource availability reduces opportunity costs of 
the would-be rebel to participating in violence against the state.  In an agriculturally 
based and labor-intensive economy that is dependent on precipitation rather than 
irrigation for agricultural production, sufficient quantities of precipitation reduce the need 
for additional hands to tend crops.  Typically, surplus product would require additional 
labor to transport and market it but, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is the additional barrier 
of an ineffective market and poor roads over which to transport the product to a market.  
These barriers are compounded by high transportation costs to get the product to a 




sufficient water availability acts to free labor resources from agriculture for other uses.  
However, if there are few alternative employment opportunities available, also a typical 
scenario in Sub-Saharan Africa, the promises of the spoils of war are appealing to the 
potential recruit.  Instead of dependence on the revenue generated from a resource or 
commodity, we have evidence here of abundant water resources creating conditions of a 
surplus labor force in search of a source of income. 
This study supports and extends Hauge and Ellingsen’s (1998) findings that water 
resources contribute to civil conflict.  Per capita precipitation created from a volumetric 
measure of annual precipitation multiplied by land area and weighted for total population, 
constructed to mimic the quantity of freshwater resources available in the nation, extends 
Hauge and Ellingsen’s findings by demonstrating that a variable measure of water 
resource availability based on annual precipitation can be used successfully in lieu of the 
water resource availability estimates.  This noteworthy finding makes a valuable 
contribution to the study of environment and conflict by adding a new indicator to the 
pantheon of potential correlates of civil conflict that is both variable and updated and that 
can be used in place of an estimator that is neither variable nor frequently updated.  This 
finding also means that future studies involving a larger selection of nations worldwide 
can incorporate a similar indicator for the static fresh water per capita resource variable.  
The use of precipitation data in this study also provides a valuable contribution to the 
environment-conflict discourse by more directly linking the data that describes the 





 Gletitsch et al. (2006), in their study of international conflict and shared river 
basins, found that water resources can lead to conflict between states but are more likely 
to lead to smaller conflicts than large-scale conflicts or wars.  There may be a similarity 
between such militarized international disputes an intermediate-level civil conflicts and 
civil wars as both use a 1000-death threshold and rebels involved in larger-scale civil 
conflict may be more likely to obtain support from neighboring countries.  This support 
may include actions such as allowing territory to be used as a base of operations or 
enabling the purchase and delivery of arms.  While not engaging in interstate conflict, 
such actions blur the lines between civil and international conflict. 
 There is insufficient evidence in Sub-Saharan Africa to support the assertion in 
assessments of climate change impacts that changes in water resource availability will 
contribute to conflict.  While global temperatures have exhibited a discernable pattern, 
precipitation has not yet varied significantly enough outside of the ranges established in 
the recent past to have a discernable effect. 
Under What Circumstances? 
 This research attempted to discern whether a categorical variable to represent the 
continuum of conflict could provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between the predictor variables and civil conflict.  This was tested using two distinct 
methods: ordered logistic regression and a series of dichotomous dependent variables.  
The statistical model ordered logistic regression provided strong evidence that the 
categories are distinct but could not support the assumption that they represent a 
continuum of conflict; the model failed to meet the assumption of proportional odds 




series models with dichotomous dependent variables, one model for each category of 
conflict, produced valuable results.  There are distinct differences among the levels of 
conflict and these differences are inconsistent with the results of Hague and Ellingsen.  
Hague and Ellingsen found that environmental degradation was more likely to affect the 
incidence of low or intermediate level conflict; this study only weakly supports a finding 
of water resources affecting the incidence of low-level conflicts.  The results of this study 
add an important nuance not seen before in studies of African conflict and environmental 
degradation.  By looking at a 35-year time span rather than the narrower 6-year time 
period of Hague and Ellingsen, we learn that it is sufficient or abundant water resource 
availability, rather than scarce resources that affects the likelihood of conflict and that 
environmental change, and specifically changes in water resources availability, has 
greater explanatory power on intermediate level conflict and war than on low-level 
conflict over the longer time frame.  Specifying the dependent variable into gradations 
finer than the presence or absence of conflict brings new understanding to the 
environment-conflict debate by indicating when resources are an effective explanatory 
variable. 
 The results of this study cannot confirm the hypothesis that scarcity must reach a 
threshold before increasing the probability of conflict.  None of the scarcity thresholds 
was significant in any statistical model nor was scarcity able to distinguish between any 
levels of conflict.  There are two possible conclusions that might be drawn from these 
findings.  First, it is possible to conclude that there is no single absolute threshold of 
scarcity that consistently distinguishes levels of conflict or that increases odds of conflict 




water resource variability.  The demands that communities located in normally arid areas, 
such as the Sahel, the Namib Desert or the Kalahari Desert, place on water resources 
differ dramatically from those of communities in the tropical rain forests of west or 
central Africa.  It is more likely that an effective measure of scarcity has to have inherent 
in it these variations in “normal” and the extent to which annual precipitation deviates 
outside of the range of normal to which communities have become accustomed.  Second, 
it is also possible to conclude that water resources have not yet reached a level of scarcity 
across enough of the continent sufficient to be detected above the existing long-term 
variation in a large-N statistical study.   
 While there is no evidence to support an assertion that scarce water resources 
have a measurable effect on the odds of conflict, the abundance model does support the 
assertion that of a relationship with conflict.  Yet, this does not confirm the hypothesis 
that abundance increases the likelihood of conflict.  The largest user of water resources in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is rain-fed agriculture and, when there is abundant water available 
for this sector, there is less likelihood that an aggrieved peasant population will feel 
compelled to take up arms against the state.  Rather than supporting a grievance-based 
theory of conflict and therefore those who assert that water scarcity will lead to conflict, 
these findings support a mobilization-based conflict theory.  Increased water resource 
availability reduces opportunity costs for the would-be rebel of participation.  Instead of 
dependence on the revenue generated from a resource or commodity, we have evidence 
here of abundant water resources creating conditions of a surplus labor force in search of 




 The research confirmed and extended earlier findings on the differences in 
conflicts across the historical divide of the Cold War.  This study not only found the 
temporal difference to be significant, but also found that there is no difference between 
the historical periods in the likelihood of the deadliest of civil wars and that low-level 
conflict is more likely in the post-Cold War.  We can therefore conclude that opposition 
movements experience lower opportunity costs and are thereby more likely to engage in 
low-level civil conflicts in the post-Cold War era.  Furthermore, this study concludes that 
changes in long-term water resources are more likely to contribute to conflict in the post-
Cold War than in the Cold War.  This confirms expectations that the loss of external 
support has affected the ability of Sub-Saharan governments to provide services, thereby 
affecting the potential for groups within societies to either experience new grievances or 
see existing grievances alleviated.  These results also indicate that in the future studies 
whose temporal boundaries cross these historical periods include a control for this 
temporal dimension.   
By What Means? 
 This study hypothesized that institutional capacity would mediate between water 
resources and conflict and explored several direct and indirect mechanisms by which 
political systems and environmental systems interact including political instability, 
institutional capacity to manage water resources, the openness of political institutions, 
and the interconnectedness of social groups.  Variables representing these constructs were 
included in the baseline, were added to the baseline model singly and added to the 
baseline in interactions with variables representing water resource availability.  The 




defined, that is capacity of the economic system to exert control over the market, was 
useful predictor of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and the greater the institutional 
capacity the lower the odds of conflict, but this indicator was not useful at distinguishing 
between level of conflict. 
In testing the various hypotheses, several variables were added singly to the 
baseline equation to explore the direct effects of institutional capacity in reducing the 
odds of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This study concludes that institutional 
capacity alone, be it the capacity to manage water resources or maintaining a political 
system that is open to the participation of all of society, has a strong influence on the 
likelihood of conflict.  The effect, however, is not always in a direction that was 
expected.  While a political system that allows for the chief executive to be selected 
openly and from a wide section of society reduces the likelihood of conflict, the capacity 
to manage irrigated cropland indicates an increased likelihood of conflict as the benefits 
of this more productive land are directed to a narrow segment of society. 
 This study offers some evidence to suggest that institutional capacity to manage 
water resources has an effect on the odds of conflict however; the data suggest an effect 
opposite to that hypothesized.  Rather than serving as a mechanism for the state to 
develop the institutional infrastructure necessary to manage water resources, the 
measures of institutional capacity variables indicate that World Bank funding and 
irrigated agricultural land created opportunities for political leaders to engage in rent-
seeking, misappropriate funds, and reward loyal supporters.  This finding is of particular 
interest to policy-makers who provide aid and advice to Sub-Saharan African 




particular.  These findings suggest that technical projects would benefit from components 
to strengthen governance practices. 
The indirect mechanisms explored as mediators between the environment and 
conflict also provided no evidence to suggest that institutions mediate between water 
resources and conflict.  There was no evidence that environmental stressors such as 
drought or floods exacerbate existing political weaknesses.  There was no evidence that 
the extent to which individuals in society are able to express options without fear of 
interference by the government has any effect on the relationship between water 
resources and conflict, nor was there evidence that open political institutions mediate the 
effect of precipitation by increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in violent action 
against the state. 
 Models on institutional capacity to manage water resources and on institutions as 
mediators between environmental change and conflict offered modest support for the 
hypotheses.  However, the theoretical grounding on which their inclusion is based 
suggests that institutional capacity ought to be of even greater import in explaining the 
risk of conflict.  The contradictory findings between the effect of irrigated agriculture on 
the one hand and civil liberties and executive recruitment on the other provide evidence 
that the relationship between water resources, and the environment more generally, 
institutional capacity and civil conflict are even more complex that was possible to model 
in this study.  Nonetheless, this study contributes to further refining our understanding of 
the intersections between institutions and conflict and of institutional study as a whole by 
suggesting that some seemingly plausible indicators for institutional capacity, while 




specified as they might be.  It is also likely that the interaction variables are affected by 
the same limitations of the environmental variables on which they are based.  It was 
noted above that environmental change may not have reached the point at which it will 
have a detectable effect on society.  Until the water resource variables are clearly 
distinguishable from the background noise in the data, it may not be possible to clearly 
discern or fully understand the manner in which institutions are mediating between 
environmental change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Studies of the environment conflict interrelationship have not succeeded in 
specifying well the manner in which the environment matters to civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The findings of this study provide additional insights into the 
mechanisms by which environmental change, and water resources in particular, affects 
the likelihood of conflict.  It has concluded that water resource availability has a 
discernable causal effect on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and that increasing 
amounts of precipitation are associated with an increased likelihood of conflict 
preferencing a mobilization-based theory of conflict over a grievance-based theory of 
conflict.  By expanding the dependent variable beyond the mere presence or absence of 
conflict to include categories representative of different levels of conflict we learn that 
changes in water resource availability has greater explanatory power on intermediate 
level conflict and war than on low-level conflict.  Finally, these results indicate that 
nations that are able to establish, implement, and enforce political and economic policies 
such as those to control or direct economic growth, reduce poverty, and adapt to changing 




Directions for Further Research 
This study has revealed several opportunities for further study.  In validating the 
applicability of a variable based in annual precipitation data weighted by the land over 
which it falls, these results open up new avenues to refine that variable.  The precipitation 
that falls goes to many different places, among them runoff, ground water recharge and 
evaporation.  The weighted precipitation variable used here can be made to more 
accurately reflect the proportion of precipitation that is usable to and used by society by 
further adjusting it to account for the other ecosystem uses to which that precipitation is 
put.  Incorporating additional precision, such as that described, into this key variable will 
then add additional precision and accuracy to the results of these models. 
A second opportunity for further research is to expand this analysis to cover other 
geographic regions as well as the globe as a whole.  Each continental land mass 
experiences differing precipitation patterns, different balances between precipitation, 
runoff, recharge, and evaporation, which interact to provide different climatic norms for 
water resource availability, to which societies have adapted.  One would expect that the 
interactions between these varying natural worlds and the varying political, economic and 
social worlds that have been constructed within those natural worlds will differ.  The 
question to ask is what those geographic differences are, whether they are significant or 
whether Sub-Saharan Africa is unique, and finally whether there are discernable patterns 
world-wide.  A first step in this expansion would be to extend to all countries the initial 
correlation of existing per capita water resource availability with the variable constructed 




A third opportunity for additional study, which this work has shed light on, is 
institutions and the role they play in the web of interconnections between resources and 
conflict.  This work has used a rudimentary method to quantify the institutional capacity 
to manage water resources, none of which was strongly significant and thereby 
successful.  The choice of a rudimentary method for quantifying institutions was 
deliberate in order to maintain the temporal range of 1965 to 2000.  There are a number 
of datasets with a more widely accepted method for transforming the abstract concepts of 
capacity and governance into numerical scales that reliably represent the relationship 
between the concept and the scale in which it is measured.  The body of theoretical work 
supporting the assumption that intuitional capacity is important warrants further research 
to better explore that relationship within the temporal bounds the available data imposes. 
 The relationship between groups and institutions examined in this study can go 
both ways; this study has posited the presence of a unidirectional causal relationship 
between the existence of a group with a particular characteristic and the odds of conflict 
in a state.  The causal relationship might also flow in the opposite direction: while the 
existence of a group makes it easier for contenders to organize and influence individuals 
to participate in collective action against the state, they also make it easier for the state 
(democratic or authoritarian) to target group members for retaliation or punishment.  
Thus, this relationship might be further explored with a dependent variable that 
distinguishes between violence perpetrated by citizens against the state and violence 
perpetrated by the state against its citizens. 
 A fourth area for additional research is in the linkages between indicators and 




community has asserted such a linkage but there has been little rigorous work to affirm or 
negate that assertion.  Average global temperatures are increasing as are concentrations 
of greenhouse gases.  Temperatures have risen 1.1°F in the past century, a rate that 
exceeds that of the past 1000 years, and current temperatures are rising three times as fast 
as those of the early 20th Century.  Concentrations of carbon dioxide, the most prevalent 
greenhouse gas, have increased from 280 ppm to 370 ppm since the preindustrial era and 
concentrations of this magnitude have not been seen in the last 420,000 years and perhaps 
as long as 20 million years.  This warming is having a discernable impact on the habits or 
range of many species and ecosystems.  Signs of this impact include thawing of the arctic 
permafrost, earlier songbird migration and nesting, and the melting of glaciers, including 
on Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya.  The glaciers on Mount Kilimanjaro have 
decreased in size by 80% in the Twentieth Century.  Some of these changes, including 
those in the arctic, are forcing human communities to adapt. 
 Climate change is expected to have an impact on Africa by exacerbate existing 
threats and vulnerabilities.  African nations are the most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change because they are least able to adapt (Hernes et al. 1995).  Many nations 
are currently vulnerable to drought, have high population growth rates, are highly 
dependent on agricultural production for export earnings, have low rates of foreign direct 
investment, and have large populations living in poverty (Benson and Clay 1998).  
Changes to precipitation and temperature will have a cascading effect first on agricultural 
production, transportation systems, and water available for personal, agricultural, and 
industrial consumption.  These initial impacts will subsequently affect food security, 




 Climate models suggest that temperatures will, on average, increase by 0.02°C 
per decade across the continent.  The current rainfall patterns exhibit much variability and 
modelers do not foresee any reductions in that variability.  Climate models project that 
dry areas will become drier and that wet areas will become wetter.  Specific changes 
modeled include a reduction of 30% or more from 1961-1990 baseline in water run-off in 
current drought-prone areas of southern Africa, including Angola, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, as well as Senegal and Mauritanian Sahel regions. 
 Based on these temperature and precipitation projections Africa will experience 
many impacts.  Reductions in volume and area of snow cover on glacial mountaintops 
can be expected to lead to less stream runoff and potentially fewer tourist visits.  Not all 
of the impacts are projected to be negative: models project that the Horn of Africa will 
experience an increase in water-run-off of 20% or more, but these modeled changes do 
not reflect the additional impact of changes in temperature and timing of water flows.  
Many African rivers are highly sensitive to climate change because they have a low 
runoff efficiency and a high dryness index; increases in precipitation are not expected to 
be greater than the increased evaporation that will occur because of higher temperatures.  
When these other effects are accounted for, some areas in Sub-Saharan Africa have been 
modeled to experience more run-off but less total water availability because of the 
additional effects of increased evaporation due to higher temperatures. 
 These countervailing forces are expected to occur in the Sahel and East Africa.  
Climate scientists strongly caution against drawing definitive causal arrows between 
runoff and a human security problematic, but several links between the natural causes and 




rainfed-agriculture.  This, in tandem with its high rates of poverty, means that its families, 
communities, and polities are highly vulnerable to changes in precipitation and that their 
vulnerability is expected to increase as water variability increases.  Increased variability 
is expected to reduce crop yields, as a result of either flood or drought, and to have the 
greatest impact on the poor because they have the least capacity to adapt.  Adaptation 
requires financial resources to move into irrigated agriculture or to purchase improved 
seeds (which not only cost more but also require fertilizer).  Hence, the impact on crop 
yields is an important indicator for Sub-Saharan Africa.  While projected crop production 
models are only speculation or best guesses, they could be taken as an early indicator of 
probable trouble spots: areas projected to see dramatic decreases in cereal productivity 
(declines of 25% or more) correspond to those areas currently known to experience 
frequent, recurring droughts, i.e. the Sahel, the Horn, portions of Kenya and Tanzania in 
East Africa, and Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa in southern Africa (United 
Nations Development Program 2006, 162). 
Social scientists have begun to look at the linkage between climate change and 
conflict.  In general, they begin from a premise similar to that outlined above: as existing 
resources essential to daily living, such as arable land and water, come under increasing 
pressure from changes in temperature and precipitation, conflict will arise over access 
and distribution to arable land or reliable sources of water for humans and livestock.  
Some initial work, using precipitation data similar to that in this study, has confirmed the 
connection between changing water resources and conflict (Hendrix and Glasser, 2007; 




exacerbate existing scarcities, I suggest that climate change is a potential causal factor in 
the outbreak of conflict that should continue to be explored further. 
Ultimately, one must ask whether these findings are significant or whether they 
constitute averted imagination.17  On the whole, the evidence is still not overwhelming.  
Just as the astronomer, secure in the knowledge that the object exists, will reconfirm an 
uncertain observation under better conditions, social scientists currently have adequate 
evidence to continue their pursuit of a more complete understanding of the means by 
which environmental change is a contributing factor to civil conflict, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the region on which this study focused, and across the world. 
                                                 
17 Averted imagination is a phenomenon commonly referred to among amateur 
astronomers when they are uncertain whether they have observed a faint object.  It 
derives from a technique, averted vision, whereby the observer looks just to the side of 
the object in question.  In so doing, a previously invisible object becomes visible.  
Averted imagination, then, occurs when the observer is certain that the sought after object 
is located in the field of view but is uncertain, because of the object’s faintness or the 
suboptimal observing conditions, whether the brain is indeed registering an image of the 
object or merely tricking the eye into thinking that it has glimpsed the sought-after object.  
The technique is analogous to the social scientist using quantitative data to represent an 
abstract and not directly measurable concept.  The quantification of the concept is the 
analog to averted vision; the running of statistical tests and declaring the findings to be of 





Appendix A: African Nations 
 
Sub Saharan African Nations Included in this Study Nations Excluded 
Angola Malawi North Africa
Benin Mali Algeria 
Botswana Mauritania Egypt 
Burkina Faso Mozambique Libya 
Burundi Namibia Morocco 
Cameroon Niger Tunisia  
Central African Republic Nigeria  
Chad Rwanda Islands
Congo Senegal Cape Verde 
Djibouti Sierra Leone Comoros Islands 
Equatorial Guinea Somalia Madagascar  
Ethiopia South Africa Mauritius 
Gabon Sudan Reunion 
The Gambia Swaziland Sao Tome and Principe 
Ghana Tanzania Seychelles 
Guinea Togo  
Guinea Bissau Uganda  
Ivory Coast Zaire  
Kenya Zambia  
Lesotho Zimbabwe  













0 no conflict 
1 conflict 
Major Episodes of Political 




0 no conflict 
1 low level conflict 
2 intermediate level conflict 
3 war 
Armed Conflict Database version 




0 SACDconfl equals 0 
1 SACDconfl greater than 0 
Armed Conflict Database version 




0 SACDconfl not equal to 1 
(low level conflict) 
1 SACDconfl equal to 1 
(low level conflict) 
Armed Conflict Database version 
2.1, 11 March 2004 (Eriksson et 
al. 2003) 
Intermediate-Level 
Conflict and War 
(midNwar) 
0 SACDconfl equals 0 or 1 
1 SACDconfl equals 2 or 3 
Armed Conflict Database version 















dummy dependent variable 





categorical dependent variable 
SACDconfl lagged by 1 year 
Eriksson et al. 2003 
Lagged Any Conflict 
(lagnoSACDconfl) 
 
dummy dependent variable for any  
SACD conflict lagged by 1 year 





dummy dependent variable for low-
level SACD conflict lagged by 1 year 
Eriksson et al. 2003 
Lagged Intermediate-




dummy dependent variable for 
intermediate-level SACD conflict and 
war lagged by 1 year 
Eriksson et al. 2003 
Openness To Trade 
 
(tradeopen) 
total trade as a percentage of GDP 
100*(imports + exports)/GDP 
World Bank 2001 
Regime Type 
(p4polity) 
institutionalized democracy index 
score minus institutionalized 
autocracy index score 
index from low (-10) to high (10) 
Marshall and Jaggers 
2000 
Regime Type Squared 
(politysq) 
regime type squared 
p4polity ^2 




population density in people per 
square kilometer 
100*( landarea/total_pop) 







per capita GDP 
(gdppercap) 
per capita gross domestic product in 
constant 1995 dollars 
World Bank 2001 
Presence Of A 
Minority At Risk 
(MAR) 
dummy variable coded as 1 if nation 
has any group classified as a minority 
at risk, otherwise coded as 0 
Gurr et al. 2002 
Infant Mortality Rate 
(infmort) 
number of infants dying before 
reaching age one, per 1,000 live births 
in a given year 
World Bank 2001 
Political Stability 
(p4durable) 
number of years since last regime 
transition or since 1900, whichever is 
more recent 
Marshall and Jaggers 
2000 
Cold War era 
(coldwar) 
dummy variable coded as 0 for years 
1989 through 2000 and 1 for years 
1965 through 1988 
 
Per Capita Precipitation 
(precipcap) 
cubic meters per person 
1000*(precip_volume / total_pop) 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
and World Bank 2001




percent difference from 100-year 
precipitation average (1900-2000) 
100 * (annprecip - ave100yr) / 
ave100yr 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
Squared Difference 
from Long Term 
Average Precipitation 
(ann100yrsq) 
squared percent difference from 100-
year precipitation average (1900-
2000) 
ann100yr ^2 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
Average Per Capita 
World Bank Lending 
(wb5yrh2ocap) 
average per capita World Bank 
lending in million 1995 dollars for 
water resource projects over the last 5 
years 
0.001 * ave5yrwblend / total_pop 
World Bank 2001 
5-year Average World 
Bank Lending as a 
Percent of GNP 
(wbh2oper5yrgnp) 
average World Bank water project 
lending as a percent of GNP over the 
last five years 
100 * ave5yrwblend / gnpave5yr 







Cumulative Number Of 
Treaties Per River 
Basin 
(treatyperbasin) 
cumulative number of signed 
international water resource treaties 
per river basin 




Database, and Gleick 
2000 
Percent Of Arable Land 
Purposely Irrigated 
(irrigland) 
percent of arable land purposely 
provided with water, including land 
irrigated by controlled flooding  
100 * irrigarea / arabland 





dummy variable for threshold of 
abundance coded as 1 if precipcap is 
greater than 213 cubic meters of 
precipitation per capita, otherwise 
coded as 0 
Mitchell et al. 2004 






dummy variable for threshold of 
scarcity coded as 1 if precipcap is less 
than 107 cubic meters of precipitation 
per capita, otherwise coded as 0 
Mitchell et al. 2004 





dummy variable for threshold of 
scarcity coded as 1 if precipcap is less 
than 89 cubic meters of precipitation 
per capita, otherwise coded as 0 
Mitchell et al. 2004 





dummy variable for threshold of 
scarcity coded as 1 if precipcap is less 
than 123 cubic meters of precipitation 
per capita, otherwise coded as 0 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
and Gleick 2000 
Civil Liberties 
(civil_liberty) 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Index  
1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Freedom House 2002 
Executive Recruitment 
(p4exrec) 
Polity IV composite index measuring 
the extent to which the process for 
selecting a nation’s political leader is 
institutionalized, open and 
competitive 
index from low (10) to high (8) 






Source Data for Independent Variables
 
Descriptive Name  
(variable name) 
Measurement Source 




percent difference from 100-year 
precipitation average (1900-2000) 
100*(annprecip - ave100yr) / 
ave100yr 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
Annual Precipitation 
(annprecip) 
total annual precipitation in 
millimeters 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
Arable Land 
(arabland) 
thousand hectares of arable crop 
land 
World Bank 2001 
Long Term Average 
Precipitation 
(ave100yr) 
millimeters of annual precipitation 
averaged over the years 1900-
2000, inclusive 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
Five-Year Average Gross 
National Product 
(ave5yrgnp) 
five-year rolling average gnp 
average of gnp over the five-year 
period ending in the current year, 
in million constant 1995 US 
dollars 
 
World Bank 2001 
Five-Year Rolling 
Average World Bank 
Water Project Lending 
(ave5yrwblend) 
average annual World Bank water 
project lending over the last five 
years 
average of wbh2olend over the 
five year period ending in the 
current year, in million constant 
1995 dollars 
World Bank 2001 




cumulative number of 






accessed October 2004 
Exports 
(exports) 
value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the 
rest of the world, in  constant 1995 
US dollars 




Descriptive Name  
(variable name) 
Measurement Source 
Per Capita Freshwater 
Resources 
(h2o_supply) 
thousand cubic meters of 
freshwater resources per person 




value of all goods and other 
market services received from the 
rest of the world, in  constant 1995 
US dollars 
World Bank 2001 
Number of International 
River Basins 
(intlrivr) 
the number of times each nation is 
listed as a riparian member of an 
international river basin 
Gleick 2000 
Arable Crop Land Under 
Irrigation 
(irrigarea) 
thousand hectares of arable crop 
land under irrigation  
World Bank 2001 
Land Area 
(landarea) 
total land area of country in 
thousand hectares 
World Bank 2001 
Number Of International 
Treaties Signed Annually 
(numtreaty) 
number of international treaties 
over water resources signed during 







institutionalized democracy index 
score minus institutionalized 
autocracy index score  
index from low (-10) to high (10) 
Marshall and Jaggers 
2000 
Volume of Precipitation 
(precip_volume) 
volume of annual precipitation 
equivalent to cubic meters per year 
landarea * annprecip / 10000 
Mitchell et al. 2004 
and World Bank 2001 
Total Population 
(total_pop) 
total mid-year population in 
thousands 
World Bank 2001 
Total Trade 
(total trade) 
value of all goods and other 
market services exchanged with 
the rest of the world, in  constant 
1995 US dollars 
imports plus exports 




Descriptive Name  
(variable name) 
Measurement Source 
Annual World Bank 
Water Project Lending 
(wbh2olend) 
amount of World Bank lending for 
water-related projects during the 
year in million constant 1995 
dollars 










deviation minimum maximum variance
MEPV conflict 1512 0.24 0.42 0 1 0.18 
lagged MEPV conflict 1512 0.24 0.42 0 1 0.18 
SACD conflict 1410 0.48 1.00 0 3 1.00 
lagged SACD conflict 1398 0.47 0.99 0 3 0.98 
trade openness 1283 66.29 35.53 0 237.96 1,262.30 
regime type 1405 -4.00 5.36 -10 9 28.77 
regime type squared 1403 44.72 24.47 0 100 598.74 
population density 1512 32.27 41.53 0.85 293.61 1,724.62 
per capita gdp 1285 704.36 1,020.85 84.72 8,508.24 1,042,124 
minorities at risk 1512 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.19 
infant mortality 1512 119.53 34.80 50 208.4 1,211.37 
political stability 1512 12.11 15.14 0 89 229.14 
Cold War 1512 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.22 
executive recruitment 1406 4.26 1.96 0 8 3.86 
per capita 
precipitation 1512 876.48 1,307.19 27.80 10,639.11 1,708,738.00 
difference from long-
term precipitation 
squared 1512 0.05 0.14 2.18E-08 2.50 0.02 
Hague and Ellingsen 
abundance threshold 1512 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.21 
Hague and Ellingsen 
scarcity threshold 1512 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.07 
Sharma scarcity 
threshold 1512 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.06 
United Nations 
scarcity threshold 1512 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.09 
5-year average World 
Bank lending per 
capita 1512 0.53 1.58 0 17.36 2.48 
World Bank lending 
per 5-year average 
gnp 1189 0.00 0.01 0 0.14 0.00 
cumulative number of 
treaties per river basin 1512 0.65 0.84 0 5 0.71 
percent of irrigated 
agricultural land 1231 3.84 6.78 0 44.11765 45.97 
civil liberties 1167 5.26 1.28 2 7 1.63 
total population 1512 9,665.22 14,157.45 108 111,506.10 200,000,000.00 
annual precipitation 1512 993.98 595.39 45.5 3,107.30 354,485.50 





variable N mean deviation minimum maximum variance
lag low conflict 1512 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.07 
lag intermediate 




Appendix D: Hypotheses 
 
Does the Environment Matter in Sub-Saharan African Civil Conflict? 
H1: Models of civil conflict that include environmental variables are better predictors of 
that conflict than models without environmental variables. 
H2: Water resources exhibit a U-shaped relationship with respect to conflict: extremes of 
both scarcity and abundance increase the probability of conflict. 
Under What Circumstances? 
H3: Water resource scarcity is more likely to contribute to low-level conflict than to 
intermediate-level conflict or war. 
 
H4: Changes in water resources must reach a threshold of abundance or a threshold of 
scarcity before they increase the probability of conflict. 
 
H5a: Civil conflict is more likely during post Cold War years than during Cold War 
years. 
H5b: Changes in water resource availability is more likely to contribute to conflict during 
post Cold War years than during Cold War years. 
 
By What Means? 
 
H6: Environmental degradation in combination with political instability increases the 
probability of conflict. 
 
H7: Nations that exhibit greater institutional capacity to manage water resources have 
lower probability of conflict. 
 
H8: Nations with more open political institutions will have a lower probability of 
conflict.  Furthermore, this will hold true even in the presence of environmental change 
or environmental scarcity. 
 




Appendix E: Per Capita Water Resources and Precipitation 
 
Correlation Water Resources and Precipitation 
 H2O_supply WeightPrecip 
H2O_supply 1.0000  
WeightPrecip 0.7812 1.0000 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Source SS df MS Number of 
obs 
51 
    F(  1,49) 76.73 
Model 1088890.38 1 1088890.38 Prob > F 0.0000 
Residual 695341.168 49 14190.6361 R-squared 0.6103 
    Adj R-
squared 
0.6023 
Total 1784231.55 50 35684.6309 Root MSE 119.12 
 
H2O_supply Coef Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
WeightPrecip 2.69e-06 3.07e-07 8.76 0.000 2.07e-06    3.31e-06 
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